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Abstract 
The positive accounting theory (PAT) approach hypothesises that, in imperfect 
markets, accounting choice may be determined by managers seeking to influence 
reported earnings and capital structure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In particular, 
PAT argues that accounting choices are likely to be motivated bý- factors such as 
managers' bonus schemes, the firm's debt/equity ratios and the wider political 
influence of third parties (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1986). Most prior literature 
focuses on Western countries, primarily the USA. However. this literature is limited bý' 
the manner in which ownership is measured as well as in the theorising of the link 
between ownership structure and PAT hypotheses. PAT predications have not yet been 
extensively examined in developing countries. The Egyptian empirical context of this 
thesis provides a valuable opportunity to examine accounting choices in a relatively 
recently established, and rapidly growing, capital market. Specifically, the thesis 
suggests that such choices are likely to be different in manager-controlled firms from 
those in owner-controlled firms because agency issues vary between the two categories 
of companies. In particular, the consequences of managers' relationships with their 
owners are considered for the two types of finns. These consequences are then 
examined within the extant literature of the PAT hypotheses. 
This study develops PAT's basic hypotheses in the Egyptian context and tests 
them using both (a) data from the Cairo stock exchange on publicly traded companies 
and (b) questionnaire-based data that includes many smaller privately owned 
companies. The sample for the questionnaire survey consists of the 320 largest firms 
operating in the Cairo area, Alexandria and Menoufia. The sample of the database 
xii 
consists of the 118 most frequently traded firms listed on the Cairo stock exchange: the 
data was collected from the annual reports published during the period 1999-2001. 
Two accounting alternatives were chosen as dependent variables in the current studN: 
the depreciation policy and the inventory valuation decisions of the firms responding to 
the questionnaire survey and included in the database. The economic factors considered 
in the current study that might influence a firm's choice of accounting methods are the 
firm's ownership/control status, the existence of bonus schemes, a firm's leverage 
characteristics and a firm's size. The data obtained using these methods are then 
statistically analysed in order to determine if significant conclusions can he achieved by 
using both univariate and multivariate analysis. 
The findings from the study as a whole (including both univariate and 
multivariate analyses) are broadly consistent with the main bonus plans contracting and 
debt-covenant hypotheses. These findings suggest that the existence of management 
incentive plans are significantly related to depreciation policies and inventory valuation 
methods that increase accounting income. Moreover, there is some evidence that the 
leverage characteristics of firms are related to the choices of depreciation policies and 
inventory valuation methods. However, the nature and influence of political visibility 
on managers' accounting choices is unclear. Even the largest companies tend to adopt 
income-increasing accounting methods. Such behaviour is consistent with managers 
believing that there are no significant political costs associated with increasing levels off 
income for large entities. It is possible that accounting choices in Egypt reflect the 
historical, cultural, fiscal and regulatory influences that exist in that country. Overall. 
the study provides evidence to support the relevance of the identified explicit 
contracting PAT hypotheses to accounting in Egypt, but it lends no empirical support 
for the relevance of the implicit political costs contracting theory hypothesis in Egypt. I 
x1ii 
The general conclusion that can be derived from the analysis undertaken xvithin 
the present study is that PAT hypotheses may offer some explanations about 
accounting choices in developing countries - particularly Egypt. Even though the PAT 
approach is in effect based on North American contract analysis and on a US stvIe 
institutional environment, it appears to offer useful insights into how Egyptian 
managers choose between discretionary accounting alternatives in dissimilar 
ownership/control status. It remains likely that PAT hypotheses that are well supported 
in the USA may not be appropriate in many other countries so that additional (and in 
some cases, different) variables may be needed to explain accounting policy choices in 
some economies. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Outline of the Study 
2 
1.1 Introduction 
The positive accounting theory' (PAT) approach developed by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978; 1986; 1990) argues that accounting choices are partly influenced by 
managerial opportunism. In particular, PAT researchers hypothesise that (a) to avold 
violating debt covenants and (b) to increase their own remuneration (when it is 
associate with company earnings) managers will often prefer income-increasing 
accounting methods. In contrast, it has been hypothesised that if there appears to be a 
likelihood of politically imposed costs, because of the appearance of high levels of 
income and wealth, managers will choose income-decreasing accounting methods. 
When considering the application of different standards that allow various policy 
choices, one can hypothesise about the reasons why managers select appropriate 
policies among the alternatives (Hunt, 1986). PAT suggests that the manager's choices 
may be influenced by particular firm attributes such as the existence of a bonus plan, 
leverage and size. 
PAT attempts to understand why accounting policies matter and to predict the 
particular accounting policies that firms will choose. The theory is based on a view of 
the firm as a "nexus of contracts"; it argues that a business entity can be described by 
the various contracts it enters into and that these contracts help to understand why 
managers prefer certain accounting policies and oppose others (Watts and Zimmerman 
1978; 1986). A number of studies rely on PAT to explain the relationship between firm 
specific variables and the choice of accounting method. (e. g. Hagerman and Zmijewski, 
1979; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Lee and Hsieh, 1985; Press and Weintrop, 
1990; Kuo, 1993; Gopalakrishnan, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; DeAngelo et al., 1994). 
Positive accounting theory is a theory that attempts to explain the nature of accounting, the role and 
activities of accountants as welt as relationships of accountancy to the economy. 
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These studies use multivariate regression techniques where the dependent variable 
represents an accounting choice and the independent variables represent the various 
firm-specific characteristics that are used as proxies for management compensation 
costs, debt contracting costs and political costs. The contributions of this research are 
numerous and include the discovery and the explanation of systematic patterns in 
accounting method choices, the recognition of the importance of contracting costs to 
accounting and the provision of a framework for understanding accounting choices 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The extensive use of contracts based on accoLinting 
numbers in firms and managers' perceptions about the impact of accounting figures on 
the valuation of their abilities by the external users of accounts can induce managers to 
assign a great deal of importance to the level of reported income. 
A separate strand of research argues that a firm's ownership appears to be related 
to accounting choices and suggests that studies which have ignored ownership structure 
are incomplete and possibly misleading (Hunt, 1986). Thus, examinations of the 
potential relations between corporate ownership and accounting choices are necessary 
to provide a more complete theory of accounting choices and to assist in further 
development of a theory of the firm (Ibid). Thus far, the literature presents evidence 
suggesting that there is a relationship between ownership structure 2 and at least some 
accounting choices (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Abdel Khalik, 1985; Hunt, 1986; Penno and 
2 Most empirical studies distinguish between two types of firms: owner-controlled and management- 
controlled classes. Most researchers have defined the owner-controlled group as firms that have at least 
one shareholder (or related group, such as a family) who owns a certain minimum percentage of the 
ordinary equity (e. g. 10%). management-controlled firms have been defined as any firm not in the 
owner-controlled group; thus, they do not have any shareholder owning enough equity to achieýe 
minority control (e. g. <10%). However, some researchers depart from their established criteria where 
evidence exists for categorizing a firm differently (e. g. Stano, 1976 cited in Hunt, 1986; Gadhoum and 
Zeghal, 2000). Mikhail (1999) provided a comprehensive discussion of how ownership concentration 
tests do not impose a uniform definition of "control" or take into account considerations peculiar to 
manager-controlled companies or have diffuse ownership. 
4 
Simon, 1986; Niehausq 1989; Carlson and Bathala, 1997). Hoxvever, this 11terature is 
limited by the manner in which ownership is measured as well as in the theorising of 
the link between ownership structure and PAT hypotheses. 
PAT hypotheses which were formulated in the USA have been tested frequently in 
Western industrialised countrieS3 . Ethnocentric studies seek to find out if theories that 
are applicable in one country apply to another in order to identify if the theories are 
universal or unique to one country (Gray, 1988). In addition, contingency theory and 
culture studies make use of countries to develop theories or test hypotheses about the 
functioning of accounting across the world or about the association between accounting 
and its envirom-nent (Hofstede, 1987; Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1995-. Nobes, 
1998). Thus, one can argue that testing PAT hypotheses in a dissimilar environment 
provides an interesting contribution to our knowledge. 
Within this chapter, the research issues being addressed by the present study are 
outlined. In addition, the basic elements of the research plan followed are presented. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1.2 introduces the motivations and 
the main research question of this project. Section 1.3 presents an overview of the study 
focusing on the basic aspects of the theoretical framework from which the hypotheses 
that are tested in this thesis have been derived. In addition, the research plan followed 
and the research methods employed are described. The potential contributions of the 
thesis to the existing accounting literature are explained in section 1.4. Section 1.5 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
For a summary of this evidence, see for example Field et al. (2001). 
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1.2 Motivation and research question 
PAT hypotheses were developed in the USA and have since been tested in rnaný- 
Western industrialised countries. According to contingency theory. however. managers' 
behaviour is influenced by the cultural and institutional environments in whicli theý- 
operate. Thus, it is possible that hypotheses that are well supported in studies of 
developed Western economies are not valid in emerging middle-eastern capitalist 
economies. 
Contingency theory is an important subset of positivist approach to research in 
accounting, which suggests that it is essential to identify environmental variables that 
influence reporting practice (see e. g. Hofstede, 1987; Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 
1995; Nobes, 1998). The United States has a highly developed equity market and a 
large investment analyst community that spends a great deal of effort and time in 
valuing securities. By contrast, Egypt's stock market is relatively small and the number 
of professional investors which monitor the movements in equity prices is relatively 
small. Thus, the conclusions from positive accounting theory studies in developed 
countries such as the USA may not apply within the Egyptian context. 
Egypt provides an interesting environment for studying PAT hypotheses. Until 
the early 1990s it had a largely managed economy with a sizeable number of state- 
owned companies. Many of these organisations have gradually been privatised and the 
Cairo stock exchange has become more active as a result. Nevertheless, a majority of 
firrns quoted on that exchange are primarily owned by small numbers of shareholders 
or families (World Bank Report, 2001). Within the economy as a whole, there are still 
significant numbers of relatively large businesses that are similarly closely owned and 
controlled. Furthermore, the government pursues taxation policies intended to 
6 
encourage the expansion of businesses that potentially provide employment to its 
citizens. These policies produce differing, and often extensive, periods of relief' from 
business taxation. Within this context, successful business growth xill probably be 
valued - indeed it seems to be rewarded by govermnent agencies. Consequently. the 
conventional political cost hypothesis advanced by PAT may be quite inappropriate, 
this scenario provides an interesting possibility to be considered. 
One can therefore argue that while it seems clear that economic self-interest 
and/or firm characteristics often motivate managers' accounting choice decisions in 
some Western countries, it is uncertain whether economic self-interest and/or firm 
characteristics dominate managers' accounting choice decisions in developing 
countries. Hence,, the objective of this study is to provide evidence concerning the 
relevance of the main established PAT approach to accounting choices within the 
Egyptian context, a developing economy with a recently re-established capital market. 
Based on this motivation, the current study seeks to answer one main research 
question: 
m Are major positive accounting theory hypotheses that are well supported in 
ý1. 
the USA and other developed economies valid in the Egyptian environment? 
This general question is further developed into three týestable hypotheses derived 
from the fundamental hypotheses' of PAT initiated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
and reviewed in Watts and Zimmerman (1986,1990) (see Chapter 4). Each of these 
three testable hypotheses are then split into two sub-hypotheses based on the ownership 
structure of the firms being tested. Specifically, tests are performed for companies 
4 Three fundamental hypotheses are presented in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) namely (i) the bonus 
plan hypothesis, (ii) the debt hypothesis and (iii) the size hypothesis. Theses hypotheses are outlined in 
detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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where the equity ownership is concentrated and those where shares are widely held. In I 
particular, the research investigates whether PAT hypotheses apply differentlY in 
owner-controlled" or "manager-controlled" firms because of the different agency 
relationships which may exist. 
1.3 Overview of the study 
Three hypotheses are derived from the PAT and will be tested on the accounting 
strategies of Egyptian corporations. Firstly, it is hypothesised that, ceteris paribus, 
managers of firms that employ executive bonus plans are more likely to adopt income- 
increasing accounting methods in order to affect wealth transfers from the firms' 
owners and shareholders; this hypothesis is derived from Watts and Zimmerman's 
bonus plans hypothesis. Prior research documents a strong empirical relationship 
between top executives' compensation and earnings (e. g. Sloan, 1993; Dechow. 1994). 
Top executives are responsible for the firm performance, including accounting 
earnings. To fairly reflect top executives' influence on firm performance, most firms 
relate earnings to top executives' compensations'. 
Secondly, the debt contracting costs hypothesis suggests that managers of firms 
that are closer to violation of debt covenants are more likely to make accounting 
choices which increase earnings in an effort to avoid the costs associated with 
renegotiations of debt contracts or bankruptcy. Because constraints on leverage 
5 However, Hall (2002) documents that although the amount of stock price-based pay (as a fraction of 
total top executive pay) in 1990 was less than 10%, it had grown to about 3 0% by 1992 and over 60% by 
the end of the decade in the USA. The vast majority of this percentage was accounted for by increases in 
the use of executive stock options. In Egypt, the stock exchange is still developing and the number of 
actively traded companies is small relative to the number of sizeable firms operating in the countr-y. 
Further, management bonus contracts are usually based on accounting earning (rather than share prices). 
This study does not therefore examine relationships between stock-based incentives and accounting 
choices. 
8 
(debt/equity) are often found in debt covenants, this variable is examined in this study. 
The level of financial leverage of a firm is used as a proxy for the firm's proximit. to ii N" 
violating debt covenants (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop. 1990: Sweeney, 
1994). Consequently, it is assumed that the more highly leveraged firms are more likely 
to select an accounting policy that increases income. 
A third hypothesis is derived from the conventional political cost hypothesis 
which suggests that managers of larger firms will seek to avoid the costs associated 
with the increased visibility which accompanies high earnings levels. Many researchers 
have implicitly assumed that very large companies may be viewed with suspicion, so 
that high rates of return could be perceived by outside observers as resulting from the 
unreasonable exploitation of external parties by the firm (Hagernian and Zmijewski, 
1979; Daley and Vigeland, 1983; Cushing and LeClere, 1992; Aitken and Loftus, 1994; 
Han and Wang, 1998; Mikhail, 1999; Eilifsen et al., 1999). Such perceptions could 
result in government and regulatory decisions which are costly to the firm. By making 
accounting choices that influence accounting numbers, managers may influence the 
decisions of such parties. Managers of very large finns might therefore be less likely to 
use an accounting choice to increase earnings than are managers of smaller firms, since 
the formýer tend to be closely followed by outsider stakeholders such as trade union 
officials and powerful lobby groups. The latter may complain about "excessive profits" 
and " abuse of a dominant position" if profits increase at fast rate. Decisions which 
increase earnings may therefore be associated with important political costs, since the 
resulting increase in reported income is likely to be followed by an increase in taxation 
or other external intervention in the affairs of the firm. 
These three hypotheses will then be examined separately for owner-controlled 
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and manager-controlled companies. Specifically, where owners monitor managers 
closely, no bonus plan may be employed to motivate executiý-es who in turn may haN-C .1 
fewer incentives to adopt increasing accounting choices. In contrast. for manager- 
controlled firms, bonus plans may be widely used to address the agenc\ý conflict 
between the goals of the shareholders and the aims of executives. In such 
circumstances, managers may have cogent self-interested reasons for choosino =7 
accounting alternatives which lead to higher reported earnings. In addition, the nature 
and/or level of debt and the importance attached to political costs may also vary from 
manager-controlled to owner-controlled firms. Thus, all three hypotheses will be 
examined for the two different owner-type companies. 
It will be argued that, given the structural characteristics of Egyptian industry 
(see Chapter 2) political costs are not likely to give rise to the adoption of income- 
decreasing methods for the majority of firms operating in Egypt. However, the 
existence of management bonus schemes based on accounting numbers and the 
prevalence of accounting-based terms in debt agreements may lead firms to adopt 
significant income-increase accounting methods. 
In brief, four basic characteristics of a firm have been hypothesised to influence 
the accounting choices of Egyptian companies'. These characteristics are: (1) the firm's 
ownership structure; (ii) whether a firm employs a management bonus plan; (iii) its 
leverage characteristics and its proximity to violating accounting numbers-based debt 
covenants and (iv) a firm's size variable which proxies for its political costs. Each 
hypothesis is divided to two subsidiary hypotheses concerned with the association 
between a finn's characteristics (independent variables) and the aspect of a firm's 
In addition, anther five control variables are studied in this thesis: systematic risk (BETA), capital 
intensity (CI), concentration ratios (CR), profit (PROFIT) and the tax rate (TAXRATE) (see Chapter 5). 
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accounting policy decisions under investigation - depreciation and inventory valuation 
methods (dependent variables). Particular surrogates have been used for capturing the 
independent variables in this thesis based upon the data available in document-based 
databases as well as the information gathered via a questionnaire survey (see Chapter 
5). 
1.3.1 Methodology and analytical process 
The empirical study follows most preceding work in the area by using an 
established database of financial information about firms quoted on the stock market 
concerned. Given the special features applying in Egypt, it also analyses data from an 
independent questionnaire survey. This methodological expansion enables mutual 
validation of, and challenge to, the findings from each independent source. It also 
allows the study to be extended to large firms that are not quoted on the stock exchange 
and to companies that are, on average, smaller than their quoted-company counterparts. 
The research process of the current study involved: (a) a review of the literature; 
(b) an exploration of the relevant characteristics of Egyptian businesses, i. e. the 
financial and broader economic environment which according to the international 
accounting academic literature can have a serious impact on a firm's accounting policy 
decisions; (c) the formulation of hypotheses; (d) the development of empirical models; 
(e) the collection of data (via a Questionnaire survey and a Database) and (f) statistical 
analyses (descriptive statistics, correlations and tests of hypotheses). 
The literature review was used to develop the main research question about how 
managers make decisions on accounting choices in the Egyptian businesses. In 
addition, the literature was employed to split the main research question into the three 
II 
testable hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses was then separated according to the 
ownership characteristics of the firms. Following previous studies in the area which 
have examined the economic consequences of accounting decisions, this study 
investigates the association between certain firms' characteristics based on published 
financial statements and their accounting policy decisions. However, not all financial 
statements of firms were obtainable. A database for only the most frequently traded 
equities on the Cairo stock exchange was available'. Consequently, this sample of 
database companies was biased towards businesses that were large and more widely 
held than most Egyptian firms. The researcher considered that information about 
smaller companies and about those with more concentrated ownership would enhance 
the analysis in this study. Such information was obtained from a questionnaire survey. 
Thirteen interviews were conducted as a part of the pilot study for the 
questionnaire survey. The questionnaire was distributed to the financial managers of 
the 320 largest firms operating in the Cairo area, Alexandria and Menoufia; practical 
and theoretical considerations dictated the choice of the particular sample (see Chapter 
5). The financial analysis was concerned with the annual reports published during the 
period 1999-2001. The financial statements of 118 of the most frequently traded firms 
listed on the Cairo stock exchange were collected. After excluding some companies 
because of data problems, the final sample includes 96 firms (see Chapter 5). No 
electronic databases on Egyptian firms' financial data exist; therefore, the details for all 
of the 96 firms were manually inserted into a database established for this study. 
In the final stage of the investigation, the operational hypotheses were tested 
using statistical analysis of the database and the survey information. Both univariate 
7 This study identifies the most frequently traded firms listed on two of the three sections of the Cairo 
stock exchange: (i) the "actively traded section" and (ii) the "rarely traded section". 
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and multivariate analysis were employed. In the univariate analysis. the relevant 
depreciation policy and inventory valuation policy choices were independemly 
examine for any association with those fin-ns' characteristics that had been 
hypothesised as being related to such a decision. The multivariate logistic regression 
analysis aimed to show the significance of the variables as a whole in the prediction of 
the dependent variable. 
1.4 Potential contributions of the study 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, this 
study tests and develops PAT's basic hypotheses in the Egyptian empirical context 
which - as far as this researcher is aware - has not been studied in the prior literature. 
Hence, the present study seeks to explain the accounting choice decisions of Egyptian 
firms on the basis of potential economic consequences of different accounting 
alternatives. This particular issue is interesting because important economic 
developments have taken place within the Egyptian business environment over the past 
ten years (see Chapter 2). It could be argued that these developments may have 
motivated Egyptian firms to become more concerned with accounting policy decisions. 
Thus the current study can contribute to our understanding of how Egyptian managers 
make decisions about accounting choice. 
Second, the findings of the present thesis can provide a basis for further 
investigations of factors that may influence accounting policy decisions of firms 
operating in Egypt. The present study has provided evidence that some firm 
characteristics such as the employment of a bonus plan and the level of leverage may 
influence Egyptian fin-ns' accounting policies. This study could be extended to include 
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additional variables by future researches in the area. 
Third, the analysis of this thesis introduces the notion that PAT hypotheses may 
be influenced by the ownership structure of the firms being examined. In particular. the 
thesis considers whether the different agency relationships ,, N-hich exist in owner- 
controlled and manager-controlled companies impact on managers' choices about 
accounting policies. To date, this possibility has not been extensively researched in the 
existing PAT literature; these tend to focus on US or UK companies ý, vhich all tend to 
differ from the classic agency problems associated with the separation of ownership 
from control. 
Fourth, the model used in this study could be used to study other accounting 
policy choices and the accounting decisions of companies in other developing 
countries. Thus, the present investigation may act as a catalyst for additional research 
both in Egypt and in other developing countries. There is a dearth of empirical research 
on accounting choices by managers in developing countries where data availability and 
access to companies can be problematic. This thesis may encourage other researchers to 
grapple with these difficult problems and address important questions in their own 
native countries 
Fifth, the findings of the current thesis may also be of interest to legislators. 
Understanding the potential motivations that influence a firm's accounting policy 
decisions could facilitate the design of legislation designed to achieve the Egyptian 
government's policy-related ob ectives. Moreover, for owners, shareholders and other j 
external users of published annual reports, knowledge of the possible reasons why a 
firm makes certain accounting policy decisions can be of some value. If financial 
statements are one of the major information inputs in users' decision making (Pike et 
al., 1993; Al-Abdulquader, 2003), then an understanding of what motivates the 
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preparers of annual reports to take decisions which increase reported income may be 
useful; this is especially true when capital markets maý- not be informational efficient 
(Fama, 1970). Finally, financial analysts and others with an interest in capital markets 
may be concerned about a firm's accounting policy decisions and the consequences for 
the level of reported income. 
1.5 Thesis organisation 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. The Egyptian context and the 
main structural characteristics of the economy as well as the financial reporting 
requirements of the country are discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the 
theoretical framework which underpins this study. Moreover, the findings of earlier 
pertinent research are reviewed and the main research question for this study is 
presented. Based on this analysis, the testable hypotheses that have been developed for 
the purposes of this study are presented in Chapter 4. 
The research design and methodology utilised to test the hypotheses as well as 
the data sources, variable definitions and measurements assumptions are described in 
Chapter 5. In addition, the assumptions underpinning the different statistical techniques 
employed are also presented in this chapter. The reasons for the selection of the 
particular research methods adopted in this study are explained so that the reader can 
follow the thinking of the researcher. 
The empirical results of the statistical analyses are presented in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. Chapter 6 presents the descriptive statistics and examines the association 
between certain variables obtained from the questionnaire survey and the variables 
extracted from the financial statement analysis. In Chapter 7, the empirical findings of 
the formal statistical analyses for testing the hypotheses are reported and interpreted. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 contains a brief summary of the study and outlines the conclusions 
drawn from the results. A discussion of the limitations of the study is provided in that 
chapter and the implications for future research are considered. 
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Chapter 2: The Egyptian Context 
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2.1 Introduction 
Egypt is a leading nation in the Middle East and North Africa, being the oldest 
and most populous country in the Arab world. The Public Enterprises Sector (PF-S) in 
Egypt was established as a result of a sustained period of nationalization and 
centralized state control introduced between 1952 and 1974. The foundations of 
liberalization were laid in 1974 when laws to open up the economy to foreign 
investment and protect investments against nationalization and confiscation were 
introduced. Little was done, however, to weaken state control over the economy. 
Throughout the 1970s, businesses were highly protected, inward-looking and 
dependent on imported inputs (Harik, 1998). During the 1990s, however, Egypt 
pursued successful macroeconomic stabilization policies and also initiated structural 
reform programmes to put the country onto a high growth path. 
Understanding the factors that shape the broader economic, business and political 
environment prevailing in a certain country can facilitate the comprehension of the 
business practices adopted by firms in that country (Nobes, 1991). Moreover, Tarca, 
(2002) indicates that factors which impact on the selection of accounting policies to be 
used in the preparation of the firm's financial statements include national law and stock 
exchange rules as well as competitive market pressures. Thus, the prevalent business 
envirom, nent, the level of economic activity, the development of national laws and the 
status of the stock exchange rules as well as culture may explain the accounting 
policies that are adopted by companies. 
This study aims to test PAT predictions in the Egyptian environment. The 
purpose of the present chapter, therefore, is to outline and discuss the distinctive 
characteristics of the broader business and economic environment which prevailed in 
0 
18 
Egypt throughout the period examined in this work. The discussion in this chapter 
therefore should provide a background against which the remaining analysis in other 
chapters could be evaluated. 
The remainder of this chapter is split into five sections. The next section 
summarizes the Egyptian business environment. Section 2.3 discusses the current state 
of the public enterprises sector in the Egyptian economy during the period between 
1952 and 1992. Section 2.4 includes a chronology of events associated with the 
economic reforms in Egypt. Section 2.5 discusses the potential of contingency theory to 
explain accounting practice in Egypt. The chapter concludes with section 2.6, where a 
synopsis of the main structural characteristics of the business, financial and economic 
environments within which Egyptian fin-ns operate is provided. 
2.2 The Egyptian business environment 
There are some features which distinguish the business environment in Egypt 
from those typically observed in Western countries. In Egypt, the size of the domestic 
market for manufactured products is relatively limited. Egypt's economic reforms and 
capital market developments therefore sought to encourage investment in export- 
orientated companies and to build up the skill base (and hence the disposable income) 
amongst the population. Rates of education for technicians and scientists are high in 
Egypt. Many have argued that flexibility in production and business processes as well 
as the ability to absorb new technologies is directly related to the stock of indigenous 
human capital (e. g. Wollganf, 1996). The government estimates unemployment at 7% 
in 2001. However, most outside observers believe that this figure is low, placing 
unemployment, in the identical period, closer to 12% (World Bank Indicators, 2001). 
Unemployment is also a problem because the private sector is still not sufficientlý- 
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developed to accommodate the rapidly expanding workforce and the government has 
long been overburdened by its self-imposed role as the employer of last resort. Skill 
levels compound these difficulties. The education system remains stretched and is 
thought to have room for improvement in terms of its ability to provide Nvorkers xvith 
the technical skills that a private sector economy demands (Harik, 1998). 
2.2.1 Stock markets 
The Egyptian stock exchange (ESE) is one of the oldest in the world and 
comprises two exchanges: the Alexandria stock exchange (ASE) which was officially 
established in 1888 and the Cairo stock exchange (CSF) which was established in 
1903'. The ESE was the fifth most active stock exchange worldwide prior to the 
nationalization of industry and the adoption of central planning policies in Egypt during 
the early 1950s. Thereafter, the ESE remained inactive for about 30 years. The policies 
of nationalisation and central planning led to a considerable reduction in stock 
exchange activity. The ESE was re-established again as a market for the raising and 
exchange of equity capital during the 1990s. 
The re-establishment of the Egyptian stock market in the 1990s was a part of the 
general process of deregulation and privatisation in the economy. These reforms played 
an important role in promoting the stock exchange as a channel for divesting public 
enterprises through public stock offerings and as a venue to enable the private sector to 
raise capital. A new capital market law' was key to this process, as it defined the 
8 The Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges have competed with each other since their foundation. In 
recent years, the two exchanges were integrated. They are now governed by the same board of directors 
and they share the same trading, clearing and settlement systems, so that market participants have access 
to equities listed on both exchanges. 
Capital Market Law No. 95/1992. 
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regulatory framework for financial intermediaries. established the Capital Mark-et 
Authority (CMA) as an independent regulatory agency for the securities industry and 
strengthened investor rights and financial disclosure requirements. 
The central role of a stock market is to enhance the mobilization of savings and 
the provision of equity capital to the corporate sector, as well as to promote efficient 
investment choices through continuous monitoring of share prices and the possibility of 
mergers and acquisitions (Fahmy, 1998). Egypt's stock market appears to have been 
successful in fulfilling this role since recent changes have been introduced. For 
example, in September 1996, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) added the 
Egyptian daily index to its database. The index comprises 32 of the most activelý, 
traded shares on the exchange. This move has increased confidence in the financial 
environment and hence encouraged more capital inflows". 
Each of the two stock exchanges (in Cairo and Alexandria) has listing rules, 
including requirements relating to the presentation of financial information that apply 
to companies trading on the ESE. Therefore, stock exchange requirements can 
influence a company's decision about the accounting policies to be followed. In this 
way, a stock exchange listing can impact on domestic policy choice. In Egypt, a 
sizeable number of companies are listed on the ESE; these are subject to the disclosure 
requirements of the exchange and the CNIA. 
The Capital Market Authority Index (CMAI) started on January 1992. The index 
includes all listed shares weighted in relation to the size of their issue. As such, the 
index covers the broadest base of equities although trading is concentrated in a 
considerably smaller number of shares. As of the end of March 2003, there were 1,151 
" Source: Capital Market Authority, (Cairo: CMA, issues 1997-1998). 
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companies listed on the ESE. In Egypt, a large tax advantage is given to companies 
listed on the exchange. Article 120 of the Tax Law 157/1981 stipulates that all Joint- 
stock companies, public or private, that are listed on the stock exchange, are tax exempt 
up to the equivalent of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) deposit rate (currently about 
9.25%) on their paid-up capital. In other words, taxes are only charged when the rate of 
return is above the market rate of interest. The magnitude of the subsidy has led to a 
many closely held companies being listed. Consequently, the ESE identifies listed 
companies as either (i) actively traded or (ii) rarely or not traded'' 
2.2.2 Business income taxation 
Egypt applies relatively high and non-uniform tax rates on profits. The maximum 
corporate income tax rate in gypt (40%) is high compared with other developing 
countries (Kheir-El-Din et al., 2000). Tax rates vary according to the nature of the 
firtn's activity. For corporate firms engaged in services, the maximum rate is 40%, 
whereas the rate for corporate firms undertaking manufacturing and exporting activities 
is only 32%. Like corporate taxation regimes elsewhere, the tax law in Egypt provides 
different forms of deductions and allowances". These include annual deductions to 
compensate for the deterioration of assets set by reference to rules established by 
government, as well as initial allowances granted to investment in new machinery". For 
11 Stock market developments are discussed in section 2.4.2. In addition, descriptive statistics about 
Egyptian capital market over the period 1990-2002 are presented in Table 2-2. 
12 For a fuller description of the various deductions and allowances given, see Kheir-EI-Din et al. 
(2000). 
13 In Egypt, the corporate tax base would be, in principle, the following: 
Y=R-C- Dep - INT 
where: R is revenues, C is current costs (salaries and material expenditures), Dep is economic 
depreciation (and depletion) of assets (evaluated at the cost of replacement) and INT is interest paid for 
borrowed capital (see EI-Samalouty, 1999). 
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comprehensive income tax, the corporate tax uses the ten-n of "economic depreciation" 
of assets evaluated at the cost of replacement (EI-Samalouty, 1999); these are instead 
of the depreciation charges shown in the accounting earnings. Thus there is a 
significant difference between the tax affects of depreciation, which has no taxation 
implication, and inventory accounting policies, which directly affect the amount of tax 
paid. In addition, the tax law allows for the deduction of interest on debt from taxable 
income. There are also special allowances granted to certain organizational forms, such 
as allowances related to the paid-up capital granted to joint stock companies listed on 
the stock exchange, which were identified in section 2.2.1. 
In Egypt, tax incentives can be conveniently grouped into two categories: first, 
tax holidays handed out under the recently issued Investment Law No. 8/1997 by the 
General Authority for Investment (GAFI)" and second, investment incentives available 
to all firms under the general income tax code. There are, in addition, other selective 
incentives directed at specific kinds of firms. The investment law authorizes GAFI to 
award tax holidays to any entity, regardless of their legal form, involved in: the 
reclamation and cultivation of barren or desert lands; animal, poultry and fish 
production; industry and mining; hotels, tourist villages; as well as tourist travel and 
transport. Also, current Egyptian tax law sharply discriminates among different types of 
investments, not only by sector and the type of financing, but also according to their 
organizational form. Corporations, especially joint-stock companies, are taxed 
relatively lightly in comparison to non-corporate forms of businesses, except when 
financed by retained earnings (Kheir-El-Din et al., 2000). 
14 Law No. 8 of 1997 on Investment Guarantees and Incentives was issued by GAR, which superseded, 
Law No. 230/1989, and also unified a number of articles concerning investment incentives in a number 
of laws: namely, Law No. 59/1979 on New Urban Communities, Law No. 
1/1973 on Hotels and Tourist 
Establishments, and Law No. 95/1995 on Financial Leasing. 
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The tax provisions in the Egyptian law that favour joint-stock companies over 
other forms of organization include": 
0 Joint-stock companies may deduct the imputed cost of paid-up capital 
financing from taxable earnings. 
0 Joint-stock companies have lower annual stamp duties on share capital 
compared to other businesses. 
0 Joint-stock companies only pay tax on 10% of dividends received from other 
companies, He other types of companies and businesses are taxed on 100% 
of dividends received. 
0 Only a joint-stock company can claim a five-year tax holiday if it has 50 
employees or more. 
Investment incentives are a prominent feature of the Egyptian tax policy and the 
preferred form is tax holidays. Egypt uses tax holidays to promote certain activities and 
to encourage new industries. Tax holidays vary from between 5 and 20 years and 
extend to lifetime exemptions from taxes in the case of free-zone investments". 
Several laws" govern the exemption pattern in addition to exemptions contained in the 
tax legislation itself 
15 See the Egyptian tax law 157/198 1. 
16 Law No. 8 of 1997 governs the tax-free investment zones. There are two types of tax-free zone: public 
ftee zones and private free zones. Private free zones are for a specific project or company; these 
accommodate storage, warehousing, handling and repackaging, assembly, and manufacturing for exports 
and services activities. Currently, there are seven public free zones established by the General Authority 
for Investment. Investment in tax-free zones have incentives as life-time tax exemption and exemptioji 
from import and capital goods duties, and can enjoy the absence of restrictions on exports. 
17 For example, see Law No. 8 of 1997 (The Investment Incentives and Guarantees Law), Law No. 159 
of 1981 as amended (The Companies law) and Law No. 59 of 1979 the (New urban Communities Law). 
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2.2.3 Disclosure in Egypt 
In spite of disclosure being critical to good corporate governance. disclosure runs 
against many traditions in Egypt. All corporate information has traditionally been 
thought of as "secret"". As in many countries, financial managers were assumed to 
keep many different sets of financial records: one for the "owner", one for tax 
inspectors and one for outside investors". However, the capital markets development in 
the past few years have resulted in several important reforms: 
9 The capital markets law requires quarterly financial disclosures in accordance 
with Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). Disclosure is also stipulated in the 
listing rules of the ESE. Rules require all listed companies to publish audited 
quarterly financial statements adhering to international accounting standards 
(IASs). Companies are also required to make timely disclosure of all material 
news that may affect their businesses and earnings. 
* Egypt has essentially adopted IASs as the national reporting framework for 
businesses. EASs are the same as IASs, with some minor exceptions. 
Recently, the exchange has issued new listing rules to address many of the 
deficiencies in the existing requirements. The new rules state that companies must 
disclose information about voting rights, the existence of large shareholders (with 3% 
or more of the equity), voting rights restrictions, shareholder coalitions and banking 
relationships. A new Egyptian stock market law issued in August 2002 requires all 
listed firms to disclose full financial statements on a quarterly and annual basis. Firms 
18 Source: Five interviews with the chairmen of investors associations in five industrial cities in Egypt 
confirmed this widely held view that most companies behave as if information about their performance 
belongs to the firm and should not be disclosed without a good reason. 
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that do not comply will be removed from the exchange. Indeed, from August 2003) the 
ESE will enhance its on-line electronic surveillance system for all listed firms to allo'w 
investors to get easy access to information and to highlight the identity of non- 
disclosers; this development is seen as an additional incentive to report regularly. The 
new stock exchange listing rules therefore require a new level of disclosure, including 
details about the "governance" (e. g. ownership structures) of finns. 
2.2.4 Corporate governance and board structure 
At a formal level, the corporate governance framework in Egypt appears similar to 
that which operates in many developed countries: e. g. shareholders vote at annual 
general meetings, boards of directors meet and companies restructure within the 
competitive capital market environment (World Bank Report, 2001). However, the 
need for corporate governance reform remains urgent and, although much has already 
been done, Egypt still has some distance to go (see Privatisation Coordination Support 
Unit (PCSU), 2000). Where and how far is indicated by a comparison of its present 
corporate governance policy framework with an emerging international consensus that 
shareholder value should be the goal of good corporate govemance. 
Currently, the principles of corporate governance are gaining widespread support 
in Egypt. Also, steps have been taken to ensure that Egyptian companies comply with 
principles of OECD governance. The current corporate governance system in Egypt 
provides respect for: (i) stakeholder rights that are protected by contract or specific 
laws, such as the labour act and the environmental law, (ii) employees that have the 
right to be represented at board meetings through the Employees Shareholders 
19This is related to the level of disclosure only but the accounting methods must to be the same. 
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Association (ESA) and (iii) increasing stakeholder access to information and greater 
redress for the violations of their rights (see PCSU, 2000). 
Regarding the ownership/control structures, companies are legally obliged to 
maintain an updated register of shareholders; they must make such a list available to 
the corporate governing bodies. Mergers and acquisitions are strongly controlled by 
Corporate Law 159, which stipulates that any person intending to launch an acquisition 
resulting in ownership of at least 10% of capital must give the company two weeks 
notice via registered mail. The ownership required to call shareholders meetings is 5% 
for ordinary meetings and 10% for extraordinary meetings (see World Bank Report. 
2001). 
On the other hand, the boards of Egyptian companies do not seem to meet 
international standards for overseeing the actions of management. Egyptian companies 
appear to share several characteristics which are not present among companies in 
developed countries". First, independence is rare or non-existent among directors on 
boards of companies. Many of the board members are major shareholders. Boards 
therefore tend to be driven by strong managers or owners and there is very little 
oversight or monitoring of their decisions. Second, there is often some confusion 
between board and management roles. More fundamentally, there appears to be a lack 
of separation between the role of management and the role of the board executive. The 
chairman tends to be the managing director and many of the board members are both 
major shareholders and managers. Finally, corporate governance problems for holding 
companies tend to be especially acute. The lack of oversight is particularly serious for 
subsidiaries of large holding companies. Many of these subsidiaries are publicly traded 
20 For a fuller description of these characteristics, see PCSU (2000). 
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companies with separate boards and governance structures. However. the board may 
have no real authority. Decisions about pricing, strategy and marketing are made at the 
holding company level. Expropriation due to low transfer prices or the movement of 
assets between subsidiaries is currently almost impossible to recognize or control. In t-- 
many cases the majority shareholder at the subsidiary level and the majority 
shareholder at the holding company level are the same. Thus majority shareholders are 
not affected by inter-company accounting (see PCSU, 2000). 
The World Bank Corporate Governance Report (2001) uses the standards of the 
Egyptian corporate governance system to evaluate Egypt's market and regulator), 
framework, emphasising the pre-eminence of shareholders' rights and the mechanisms 
for overseeing management. One can summarize the conclusions of this report as 
follows (see appendix I- 1): 
a. The Egyptian corporate governance system is framed by French civil law for 
corporations; Sharia law has no direct influence on corporate governance. 
b. There is one stock exchange with two trading floors: the CSE and the ASE. 
c. Capital markets law guarantees basic shareholder ownership rights, minority 
shareholder rights and the basic govemance processes and procedures. 
d. The report highlights a number of areas where the Egyptian corporate governance 
system needs strengthening. These can be grouped under six headings: disclosure 
of ownership and control structures; disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information; training and capacity building for regulators and the private sector; 
the role and effectiveness of shareholders' meetings; practices of boards of 
directors; the professional conduct of auditors. 
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2.3 The public enterprises sector in the Egyptian economy before 
the reform programme 1952-1992 
Generally, the term "public enterprises sector" (PES) is used for organizations 
that operate with publicly owned capital, whether nationally or locally. Accordingly. 
the PES includes units established by public capital whose activity contributes to the 
achievement of targeted economic and social development. After the revolution of July 
1952, the Egyptian government was keen to play a more active role in the economý- 
through projects that directly affected the development of the national economy. These 
included the establishment of an iron and steel company, a company for fertilizers and 
chemical production as well as a company for construction and public buildings. The 
Suez Canal Company and other French and British companies were also nationalized. 
2.3.1 Performance of the PES in Egypt 
Entities within the public enterprises sector were historically established as large 
entities. Each entity possessed substantial assets and employed large numbers of 
workers. Most of these public sector entities have factories located throughout the 
country and all operate under one parent company. Consequently, it was difficult to 
manage and control the financial performances of these entities because of the 
bureaucratic structures in place and the government influence on the decisions that 
were taken. They tended to perform poorly because of overstaffing and a chronic 
shortage of funds (PCSU, 2001). The decision to transfonn these public entities into 
private enterprises was taken in order to improve the economic development in the 
country. 
29 
Performance indicators from studies of the financial reports of public sector 
companies showed the need for a comprehensive reform of the PES in Egypt (see 
PCSU, 2001). First, the rate of profit on invested capital for such entities decreased 
from 8.0% in 1975 to 5.9% in 1988, while the average interest rate in 1988 was around 
14%. Second, debts and other financial burdens on the PES gradually increased. Debt 
increased relative to total invested capital, from 30.3% in 1975 to 74.3% in 1988. This 
led to aggregate losses over the period 1975 to 1988 reaching around fE 24-780 billion; 
by the end of 1988 total debt reached fE 80 billion". 
In 1991, with the begining of economic reform, the perfon-nances of the all public 
units were evaluated; some 399 large entities were scrutinised. This evaluation clarified 
that the average rate of profit on total invested capital was 6.39% at the end of the 1991 
financial year; this percentage was down from 6.35% a year earlier. Moreover, the 
number of these companies in financial difficulties reached 85 out of the total of 399 
(representing 21% of the population firms) including 62 loss-making companies 
(15.5% of the firms examined)". Since economic development was based mainly on 
enlarging the role of the PES, the deficits of these companies threatened the growth of 
the economy since profits were not available for reinvestment and expansion. In 
addition, deteriorating balance sheets meant that further borrowing was not an option 
for these companies as financial institutions were unwilling to extend credit" (PCSU, 
2001). 
" For a fuller description, see PCSU (200 1). 
22 Source: The Egyptian Ministry of Public Enterprises Sector, (Cairo: MPES, various issues). 
23 This is evidenced by the fact that (a) the general balance sheet deficit was almost 10% in 1952, but 
reached 18.9% during the period 1960-1973 due to the state's increasing role in the economic activity, 
and (b) during the period 1983 to 1991, the deficit ranged from 18.3% and 21% and lead to a peak in the 
fiscal year 1987. 
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In the early 1990s, the government of Egypt began implementing liberal policies 
to transfer some of the responsibility for economic growth to the private sector. One of 
the central goals of any privatisation transaction is the transfer of a state ov, -ned 
economic asset to new owners in the private sector. Transfer of ownership, or majority 
privatisation, usually refers to having 51% or more of the equity in a government 
enterprise sold to the private sector; in these transactions different types of ownership 
emerged". The state has, however, retained a substantial ownership in the equity of 
many privatised companies. Adopting this definition of "privatisation". the Egyptian 
government has implemented majority privatisations in 142 enterprises to date; 
ownership of these enterprises has been transferred to the private sector and the 
government is no longer involved in the internal business affairs of these companieS25. 
However, there is presently very little information available about the post privatisation 
development for companies which were sold off by the Egyptian government. It is still 
difficult to establish whether the privatised enterprises have indeed become separated 
from the state after their privatisation. 
The separation of management and ownership allows managers and the capital 
providers to specialize in what each is thought to do best (Omran, 2001). However, as 
corporations (especially publicly traded ones) grow, they need to achieve a balance 
between giving directors and management enough discretion to run the company and 
making them accountable to shareholders and other corporate stakeholders. 
24 Such types of ownership include (i) initial public offerings; (ii) sales to anchor investors; (iii) 
employee stock ownership programme and (iv) liquidation. The government launched a privatisation 
programme with Public Enterprise Law 203 of 1991 and executive regulations establishing the regulatory 
framework for the sale of some state owned enterprises. The Public Enterprise Office is responsible for 
advising on the sale of companies according to Law 203 companies. The law permits sales to foreign 
entities. 
25 Source: The Egyptian Ministry of Public Enterprises Sector, (Cairo: MPES, various issues). 
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Privatisation has resulted in a new economic environment which may affect the 
performance of all Egyptian firms, both private and public (Ibid, 200 1). 
2.4 A chronology of events 
The first step in the recent reform programme involved the increasing of interest 
rates above 20% and a reduction in government spending. At the same time, 
government revenues grew quickly partly due to a more efficient tax collection system 
and a higher local currency valuation of US dollar revenues from petroleum exports 
and Suez Canal income; this followed the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in 1991. 
In addition, revenue from the privatisation of public entities helped to improve 
government finances. The government implemented the first phase of a comprehensive 
Economic Reforms and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) from the Spring of 
1990 up until the Winter of 1993. A second phase of the ERSAP started in July 1993. 
As a result, the government was able to reduce its deficit from 15.5% of GDP in 1990 
to 0.9% of GDP in 1997. 
Table 2-1 Descriptive statistics about Egyptian economy 
Economic Indicators 1994 
/95 
1995 
/96 
1996 
/97 
1997 
/98 
1998 
/99 
1999 
/00 
2000 
/01 
2001 
/02 
Nominal GDP at market price (LE billions) 204 229 256 280 302 337 359 382 
Real GDP at market price (LE billions) 156 164 173 271 287 302 320 330 
Real GDP growth rate (Per Capita) 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.2 
Share of private sector in GDP 64.3 65.5 68.8 70.7 74.9 73.1 71.4 71.1 
Unemployment rate 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.1 7.0 
Average annual inflation 9.4 7.3 6.2 3.8 3.8 2.8 8.3 9.0 
Nominal interest rate 10.1 9.5 9.8 8.8 8.82 9.09 9.09 7.8 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Centre, (Cairo: tp 
CBE and IDSC, Various issues, 1994 -2002). 
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The combination of fiscal and monetary controls resulted in a reduction of 
inflation from 21.7% in 1990 to its current level of 9%21 (see Table 2-1). Privatisation 
continued to be a central aspect of the government's economic reforms and a further 
group of state-owned entities was sold in 1996. The government sold, either fully or 
partially, 159 companies during 1996-2002; only 30 companies were privatised 
between 1991 and 1995. 
2.4.1 Privatisation 
The privatisation process was intended to sell 30% of all non-financial public 
enterprises in 1996/1997 and to dispose of the remainder in 1997/1998. Shares of the 
newly-privatised companies were then traded on the ESE. Not all sectors were subject 
to privatisation. Some privatisation occurred in the tourism and the agriculture sectors. 
However, all the large public enterprises remained state-controlled in the petroleum 
sector, the National Airline and the Suez Canal Authority. The privatisation programme 
has been essential for the development of the capital market as the number of securities 
being traded as well as the appetite of investors for equities has increased. Further, the 
privatisation process has allowed domestic fund managers to include Egyptian equities 
from a number of sectors in their portfolios. Privatisation has increased the relative 
importance of the stock market to investors and shareholders and has also introduced a 
new dimension to the investment returns of Egyptian shares (see PCSU, 2002). The 
demand for securities by international investors should increase the standard of 
corporate reporting demanded by shareholders including the requirement that financial 
statements should be audited by high quality external auditors. While, the emphasis 
26 Source: Central Bank of Egypt, The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center, 
(Cairo: CBE and IDSC, Various issues, 1992-2002). 
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before economic reform was on information needed for economic planning at the 
macro level, the emphasis after economic reform has been on financial accounting and 
auditing. Another difference post-privatisation is the relative emphasis on income 
measurement. After the economic reforms were introduced and with the majority of 
businesses now being privately owned, income determination was of prime importance; 
before the economic reforms, this was not the case because government ownership 
dominated decisions (Jaruge, 1991). Using privatised companies quoted on the CSE, 
Omran (2001) found significant improvements in profitability, operating efficiency, 
capital expenditure and dividends. On the other hand, he finds significant decreases in 
employment and leverage. Output also decreased following privatisation but this 
change was not significantly different from zero. 
2.4.2 Monetary and stock market developments 
Stock market activity was low during the 1992-93 period recording a turnover 
ratio of about 5%. But this was followed by rise in activity to an average of 15% in 
1994-95. Capital inflows picked up again in 1996/97 as the privatisation programme 
gathered pace; thus the programme played a significant role in activating the Egyptian 
stock market. The market experienced a significant rise in its performance and most 
market indices recorded new highs achieving a return of about 52% in 1996-97. Total 
traded volume during the period 1996-97 increased threefold to reach 580 million 
shares; this compared to a total traded volume of 179 million shares during the period 
1992-95. Similarly, the total value of equities traded during 1996-97 increased to fE 
35 billion which was equivalent to about five times the total traded value during the 
period 1992-95. Thus, market activity reached its peak recording turnover ratios of 
23% and 34% for 1996 and 1997 respectively (see Table 2-2). 
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Despite some strong fundamentals, stock market performance declined in the 
second half of 1997, due to three exogenous shocks: (i) the South East Asia emerging 
market crisis (Lonie et al., 2001); (ii) a significant fall In oil prices (SourIal, 2002) and 
(iii) the Luxor attack (Ibid). These factors resulted in a deterioration in the extema! 
position of the country and capital account shifted into deficit. During the period from 
December 1999 to January 2000 interest expenses for borrowers increased resulting in 
a weakening in borrowers' financial positions. Also, customers' spending declined v, -Ith 
delays in debt repayments, which resulted in an erosion in corporations' net worth and a 
decline in creditworthiness. In response, banks started to reduce their lendincy activitv 
putting further pressures on the real activity of the corporate sector. This deterioration 
had a negative impact on the stock market such that, in the first half of year 2000, the 
stock market was volatile". The market started 2000 with an aggressive rise. Most 
indices achieved high growth levels similar to those in 1997, while the CMAI reached a 
new record high on February 14th, 2000 of 695.4 points. This surge was followed by 
continuous decline in all of Egypt's indices by almost 30%. Total market capitalization 
dropped to a low of LE 120 billion (36% of GDP) after reaching the highest level fE 
139 billion (42% of GDP) during January 2000. 
Looking at the overall picture over the two phases of the economic reforms as 
well as the structural adjustment programme in Egypt, the changes have resulted in 
significant domestic reforms and dramatic increases in foreign investment, foreign 
trade and j oint-venture enterprises with foreign companies. 
" Source: Capital Market Authority, Annual Report, (Cairo: CMA, various issues). 
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As such, it has been argued that they have been successful. Moreover, this success has 
led to the need to modify the current accounting system to meet the new economic 
situation which has emerged. 
The accounting profession in Egypt is still growing and new accounting standards 
are being introduced where none existed. They usually represent the adoption of 
standards found in the developed countries without proper consideration of the 
relevance of such standards to an Egyptian setting. For example, EASs are close to 
IASs, except with respect to financial leasing" and the treatment of pension costs. 
2.5 Contingency theory and accounting practice in Egypt 
Ethnocentric studies determine whether the accounting systems used in one 
country are applicable or used elsewhere; they seek to find out if theories that are 
applicable in one country can be used in another to identify if the theories are universal 
or unique to a single location (Gray, 1988). The most common approach of 
ethnocentric studies is replication (Adler, 1983). With replication, the main purpose is 
to confirm that the theories under investigation appear to explain some activity in 
another setting. In addition, contingency theory studies (Doupnik and Salter, 1995) and 
culture studies (e. g. Hofstedýe, 1987; Gray, 1988; Nobes, 1998) identify reasons at a 
macro level that are likely to cause differences in the accounting practices employed in 
various countries. Contingency theory hypothesizes that organizational structure is a 
function of context; the context is, in turn, determined by the external environment, the 
history and other organizationally determined factors. Contingency theory based 
2' The Government and the profession have taken significant steps to close the gap between EASs and 
IASs. Except for lease accounting, EASs were developed in conformity with IASs. The legal 
requirements concerning leases in Egypt do not recognize 
finance leases and the application of 
accounting treatments required under the relevant 
international standard. 
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studies make use of countries to develop theories or test hypotheses about the 
functioning of accounting across the world or about the association between accountinu, 
and its environment (Gray, 1988). A characteristic of the contingency tN, pe of studN- is 
the cross-sectional examination of data on a sample of countries at a point in time and 
cross-time analysis of data over a period of time. However, contingency theory also 
examines how and why bureaucratically rational systems of control become 
transformed when political factors predominate. This type of research requires one to 
discern which of the many differences between countries are the relevant analytic 
variables (Belkaoui and Maksy, 1985). 
There is an increasing recognition among researchers that accounting is not an 
autonomous phenomenon; other social, political and economic factors are seen as being 
ni. -I able to provide explanations for accounting changes, often playing a significant role in 
influencing the course of its transfon-nation (Hopwood, 1987). People in different 
cultures differ in their views and in their reactions to managerial practices. So particular 
cultural conditions often impact on the effectiveness of managers. Culture has been 
shown as a major factor affecting the structure of business, society and accounting 
(Hofstede, 1987; Gray, 1988). Hofstede (1987) defined "culture" as a collective 
programming process by a society, which is different from other societies because of 
the different belief systems of its members. He has investigated various cultural 
differences across countries. Building upon this pioneering work, O'Connor (1995) and 
Goddard (1997) found a contingent relationship between corporate and hierarchical 
culture and budget-related behaviour. Gray (1988) argues that accounting systems 
differ internationally because culture differs from nation to nation. However, Briston 
(1990) has argued that many developing countries with different cultures, religion, 
social, business and political environments have been "pressured" into adopting 
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Western conventional accounting principles; they use "Western" standards and their 
underlying philosophy without any or only negligible modification. 
As discussed earlier, Egypt has long-establish stock markets but they became 
inactive for 30 years. The re-activation of the Egyptian stock market started in the 
1990s but commentators believe that the stock market is still inefficient (Kantor et al.. 
1995). Despite such inefficiencies, Egypt is attempting to build a modem business 
infrastructure within the constraints of limitations in available social and physical 
resources. Egypt shares the common link with other countries in the region of an 
Islamic religious and cultural heritage that specifies certain rules about life and 
economic activity. owever, Sharia law may have no direct influence on financial and 
corporate legal frameworks. Abdel-Magid (1981) cited in Kantor et al. (1995) 
highlights the principles of Islamic economics and argues that: 
"The environment of corporate reporting in Islamic countries will be 
characterized by political, social and economic forces different from the 
forces found in the Western business environment.... The emergence of an 
Islamic model of accounting is a real possibility" (P. 97). 
Kantor et al. (1995) indicates that accounting information in developing countries 
is seen as both passive and active. It is passive in that financial reporting practices may 
be explained by a country's particular history or its stage of development (Mueller, 
1967). It is viewed as active in that the choice of financial reporting practices can 
actively encourage or discourage development (EI-Safty, 1989). Thus, accounting 
information in Egypt may differ from that supplied in developed countries such as the 
US and UK. France, more than any other of the developed countries, has financial 
reporting practices that are similar to those of Arab countries (including Egypt) because 
of the role played by civil law and the past colonial ties. In the last twenty years, the 
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relatively closer association of Egypt and other Arab countries with the United States 
may have driven a shift to the American style accounting practices; specific reporting 
practices that relate to either broad accounting principles such as the use of accruals 
and conservatism have grown in prominence. Kantor et al. (1995) point out that the 
financial reporting policies are not significantly different between Arab countries and 
Western countries. These practices which involve such items such as the disclosure of 
depreciation amounts and the use of depreciation methods, accounting treatment for 
inventory, the methods used to account for investments and the disclosure of 
information on accounting choices are broadly similar. 
2.6 Conclusion and closing remarks 
This chapter has attempted to present the main structural characteristics of the 
business, financial and economic environment within which Egyptian firms operate. 
This chapter reviews the Egyptian business enviromnent and outlines the chronology of 
events associated with the economic reforms that started in Egypt during the 1990s. 
Moreover, the insights offered by contingency theory and the nature of current 
accounting practice in Egypt were discussed. 
This investigation indicates that until the 1990s, Egypt had a largely managed 
economy with many publically-funded companies. In 1991, the total number of such 
companies was 399 entities controlled by twenty-seven holding firms (now reduced to 
ten); 190 of the companies have since been privatised". Egypt has long-establi shed 
stock market but this institution remained inactive for 30 years. Following the maný, 
privatisations, the ESE has been re-activated in the 1990s but the market is stifl thought 
29 This figure is correct as at 30-6-2002. 
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to be inefficient. In Egypt, investment incentiý, es are a prominent feature of the 
Egyptian tax policy. Tax incentives can be conveniently grouped into t-,,, -o categories: 
first, tax holidays are handed out under the recently issued Investment Law No. 8'1997 
by GAFI and second, general investment incentives are available to all firms under the 
general income tax code. There are, in addition, other selective incentives directed 
towards specific kinds of firms. For example, all joint-stock companies, public or 
private, listed on the stock exchange, are tax exempt on the equivalent of the CBE 
deposit rate (currently about 9.25%) on their paid-up capital. Egypt uses tax holidays 
of between 5 and 20 years to promote certain activities and to encourage new 
industries. For comprehensive income tax, the corporate tax uses the term of "economic 
depreciation" of assets evaluated at the cost of replacement (EI-SamaloLtty, 1999); 
these are instead of depreciation charges in the accounting earning. Thus there is a 
significant difference between the tax affects of depreciation and inventory accounting 
policies. 
Furthermore, an analysis of ownership and control structure within the corporate 
sector reveals that the majority of Egyptian firms are primarily owned by relatively 
small numbers of shareholders or families. That situation suggests that owners will 
frequently be clearly involved in monitoring company accounting policies. Also by 
virtue of the law, any person intending to launch an acquisition resulting in an 
ownership of at least 10% of capital must give the company two weeks notice via 
registered mail about the change. The ownership required to call shareholders' 
meetings is 5% for ordinary meetings and 10% for extraordinary meetings. For these 
reasonsý in this study, ownership control is assumed to be an important influence on 
accounting decisions. 1n Egypt, bonus contracts are usually based on accounting 
earnings; so the existence of such schemes is also assumed to exert influence on 
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managers' choices about accounting policies. 
There are strong links between the Egyptian state apparatus and large Egý, ptian 
firms. The state has encouraged large firms because of their potentially significant 
affect on unemployment and economic prosperity. For example, all joint-stock 
companies can claim a five-year tax holiday if they have 50 employees or more. Larger 
firms, due to their size, may be successful participants in the political process. This 
success can be seen by the lower effective tax rates that larger finns are supposed to 
face. Political benefits and investment allowances may contribute to a reduction in 
effective tax rates. Thus, this study considers whether firm size can explain accounting 
choices of Egyptian companies. 
Traditionally, large Egyptian firms relied heavily on debt rather than equity as their 
major source of capital. The financial structure of industrial firms operating in Egypt 
may influence the accounting choices adopted, as capital providers are relatively few 
and maintain a close relationship with a firm. Egyptian banks constitute the main 
source of funds for Egyptian industry. In certain cases they own some of the share 
capital. A significant portion of equity in many firms is owned by a relatively small 
number of shareholders or families, and the resulting ownership structure is more 
concentrated than that in the USA and other Western countries. Consequently, the 
financial accounting infon-nation in Egypt may be more oriented toward the needs of 
small numbers of big shareholders, financial institutions and the government than 
toward those of large numbers of small equity investors. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Literature 
Review 
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3.1 Introduction 
The current study analyses the possible accounting choices of managers when 
faced with different organisational structures and economic factors. Essentially, it is 
based upon an assumption that managers' behaviour varies in different contexts, i. e. 
that their actions are contingent on the situation in which they find themselves (see 
Chapter 2). One fundamental factor that influences policy decisions is the extent to 
which managers of businesses are major owners - i. e. whether the firm is "owner- 
controlled" or "manager- controlled". 
Of course, all available bases for categorising firms by reference to the level of 
owner control are necessarily arbitrary. Clearly, single owners who manage their 
businesses personally are at one end of the spectrum. At the other end are quoted firms 
where no shareholder owns a large enough block of shares to single-handedly influence 
company policy. In between these extremes, equity holders who are not managers may 
have greatly varying opportunities to influence management policy; (e. g., financial 
institutions that hold blocks of shares in a quoted firm may have numerous 
opportunities to informally influence managers whereas small individual shareholders 
may have little opportunity to effect policy). Nevertheless, one could reason that the 
usual approach that assumes that the level of a shareholder's influence is associated 
with the size of his/her shareholding is an acceptable basis for identifying the 
opportunity to influence a firm's policy. Even here, the criterion based on percentage of 
capital owned is necessarily arbitrary - many firms may be incorrectly categorised if 
one is seeking to identify whether owners control their finns in reality. The way in 
which this issue of definition is dealt with is discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. (It is, perhaps, important to recognise that incorrect categorisation of firms 
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will reduce the likelihood of observing differences that exist in the behaviour of oNvner 
and manager controlled businesses). 
The reasoning behind the structure of this chapter is shoým by Figure 31 -1 . This 
figure highlights the thinking which underpins the chapter - it is heavily dependent on 
the perception that agency relationships affect accounting choices. Specifically, the 
thesis suggests that such choices are likely to be different in manager-controlled firms 
from those in owner-controlled firms because agency issues vary between the t-,. N-o 
categories of companies. Subsequent sections of this chapter will follow the structure 
indicated in Figure 3-1. In particular, the consequences of managers' relationships with 
their owners are considered for the two types of firms. These consequences are then 
examined within the extant literature before the PAT hypotheses are developed. 
Within this chapter: (a) the proposed theoretical model and the relevant literature 
are reviewed; and (b) the determinants of accounting choices and the consequences of 
these choices are introduced. The chapter focuses on three areas of research about 
influences on managers' accounting choices. Section 3.2 discusses the possible effect 
of ownership structure on accounting choices and management performance measures 
using the "agency costs" paradigm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Section 3.3 
concentrates on the potential economic consequences of managers' relationships with 
their firms' owners. Section 3.4 reviews the findings of earlier studies about PAT and 
accounting choices in order to clarify how managers may respond to the economic 
consequences that might arise. More specifically, section 3.4.1 introduces the economic 
philosophy underlying PAT while sections 3.4-2,3.4.3 and 3.4.4 outline three 
motivations for accounting choices. Finally, a synopsis of the three areas of accounting 
research is provided and the main research question is established in section 3.5. 
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3.2 Ownership/control status 
In an Egyptian context, ownership structure is particularly significant. For 
example, an Egyptian firm might be owned by: (a) one or more family members, (b) an 
investor group; (C) holders of equity shares quoted on the ESE; (d) shareholding 
employees and/or (e) other companies. Managers of companies with widelý, dispersed 
share ownership frequently face very little external supervision of their decisions-, in 
this setting conflict may arise between the interests of managers and the goals of 
shareholders. For firms where one shareholder has a sizeable equity stake, a great deal 
of control may be exercised over managers. Ownership structure therefore needs to be 
considered as a potential influence on accounting choices in Egypt. 
In the literature, there are two competing arguments about the separation of 
corporate ownership from control. One suggests that managers when unencumbered by 
the threat of controlling shareholders will operate the firm in their own interest; such 
actions may lead to non-profit-maximizing behaviour. Williamson (1963) notes that 
certain managerial motives can result in "expense preferences" for certain types of 
items (e. g. staff expenses, payments for emoluments). Proponents of this view suggest 
that the separation of ownership and management limits the ability of owners to 
monitor executives; hence managers may be able to achieve a steady growth of 
earnings with a gradual rise in share prices rather than maximisation of profits. 
However, the other argument suggests that managers are effectively constrained from 
taking actions that are not in the best interest of the owners (see Hunt, 1986). A number 
of researches point out that any sizeable deviation from profit maximization may cause 
the firm's share price to drop and encourage another company to launch a takeover bid 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Marris and Mueller, 1980; Hunt, 1986). In order to 
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examine whether separation of ownership and control affects managerial behaviour, it 
is helpful to define what is meant by the terms owner-controlled and manager- 
controlled firms. 
The first category is usually intended to include those firms where a group of 
investors have the ability to control the selection of a majority of the board of directors 
through the voting rights from their shares in the firm. The second category includes 
companies with a diffused ownership. The most common method used by researchers 
to divide samples into the two categories is to separate owner-controlled and manager- 
controlled firms on the basis of some percentage of the shares which is held by an 
"owner". Most researchers have defined the owner-controlled group as firms that have 
at least one shareholder (or related group, such as a family) who owns a certain mini- 
mum percentage of the equity (e. g., 10%). Manager-controlled firms are usually 
defined as all companies that are not included in the owner-controlled category; i. e. 
that do not have any shareholder owning enough equity to meet the criteria adopted to 
identify owner-control". For this analysis, ownership control is measured by the 
average number of shares held per owner. The smaller the ownership control proxy, the 
more widely-held (manager-controlled) is the firm's equity. In subsequent sections, it 
is argued that managers' choices of discretionary accounting choices may be influenced 
by this ownership proxy. In those owner- controlled firms where direct monitoring takes 
place, the usage of incentive mechanisms such as bonus plans may be minimal. As a 
30 However, some researchers depart from this conventional criterion where evidence exists for 
categorizing a firm differently (Stano, 1976; Gadhourn and Zeghal, 2000; Jung and Kwon, 2002). For 
example, Bauwhede et al. (2003) distinguish between two types of firms: publicly or privately held 
firms. They used a dichotomous variable to define the type of ownership/control by setting the measure 
equal to one if a firm is listed on the Brussels stock exchange and zero otherwise. Furthermore, Jung and 
Kwon (2002) define blockholders as those shareholders who hold more than 5% of the holdings. Mikhail 
(1999) provided a comprehensive discussion of how ownership concentration tests do not impose a 
uniform definition of "control" or take into account considerations peculiar to manager-controlled 
companies or have difftise ownership. 
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result, managers may feel no need to select among accounting alternatives in order to 
increase reported income. In contrast, the owners of such firms may rely on debt 
financing (i) to share in the monitoring of managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
(ii) prevent the dilution of their equity stake (lbid). Thus, the managers in owner- 
controlled firms may make accounting choices to select income-increasing accounting 
methods in order to placate the owners of debt capital. Finally, managers of owner- 
controlled firms may be encouraged to choose income decreasing accounting 
alternatives in order to "minimise" the political visibility of the prominent oxvner; any 
evidence of "excessive" profits may reflect badly on the owner and render him/her 
liable for personal criticism and/or economic penalties. 
3.2.1 Agency relationships 
Agency theory focuses on the idea of contractual relations; the contracts involve 
a principal and agent in a setting where there is information asymmetry between the 
two (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)". The principal will attempt to maximize his/her own 
wealth and contract to avoid conflicts. Under this agency costs perception, one can 
assume that managers may have incentives make decisions that are in their, but not 
necessarily in their shareholders', best interests (Capozza and Seguin, 2002). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that shareholders will take actions to mitigate the 
potential for such costs since these may reduce the value of the firm. Thus, where 
possible they will seek to "control" the managers. 
One could assume that the decisions of managers in manager-controiled firms are 
31 Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the agency problem that often arose (a) between a firm's 
shareholders (the principals) and the management (agent) and (b) between shareholders and bondholders 
in an imperfect capital market. 
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unlikely to be as tightly constrained by the owners as those in owner-controlled 
companies, because the ability to monitor the managers may not be as great. Agency 
theory suggests that the goals of managers and owners may not be aligned and that this 
misalignment creates the need for costly monitoring through compensation contracts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To align the goals of the two parties. compensation 
contracts may be designed to motivate executives to make decisions that vvill not only 
increase their own wealth, but will also increase shareholder wealth". Steps taken to 
increase shareholder wealth should be reflected in improved firm performance (Watts 
and Zimmýerman, 1990). 
Agency theory predicts that contractual parties expect managers to utilize their 
discretion over accounting decisions to maximise their personal benefit. Further, 
opportunistic behaviour by managers that is acceptable under the contracts is assumed 
to be appropriate in reducing agency costs (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1983). It has been 
suggested that ownership structure affects the agency conflict between manager and 
shareholder. McConnell and Servaes (1990) indicate that interests of managers and 
owners become more closely aligned as the extent to whether owners manage business 
"managerial ownership" increases which leads to improved firm performance. One can 
assume that in owner-controlled firms, agency conflicts are less apparent, because 
owners have both powerful incentives to maximise their own wealth as well as the 
ability to monitor managers. In manager-controlled firms, the owners may not have the 
n I.. auility tOmonitor managers directly and may therefore have to rely on compensation 
schemes, debt holders potential on post actions or the threat of a takeover to encourage 
32 Using the Forbes executive compensation survey data, Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEO 
wealth derived from cash compensation changes only $3.25 for every $1,000 change 
in shareholder 
wealth. 
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senior managers to maximise shareholders wealth 
33 
. 
Management compensation contracts may be designed to reduce internal agencý- 
conflicts between the managers of a firm and its owners or shareholders. The literature 
suggests that managers exploit their accounting discretion to take advantage of the 
incentives provided by bonus plans. However, the literature does not provide evidence 
on whether this discretion comes at the expense of shareholders, or whether it is part of 
a deliberate attempt to align managers' incentives with those of shareholders, possibly 
at the expense of other claim holders (Field et al., 2001)". Accounting researchers have 
renewed efforts to discover the determinants of accounting choices in a response to 
calls for the development of a positive theory of accounting (e. g., Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978; 1986). The resulting literature is in large part based on the testable 
implications of agency theory as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976)". 
Consequently, one can argue that in manager-controlled firms there is a greater 
need for incentive schemes than in their owner-controlled counterparts. Moreover, 
management performance measures in manager-controlled firms may be different from 
those employed in owner-controlled companies. In the manager-controlled firms, 
accounting reports tend to be a major source of news about firms for shareholders; the 
latter may not seek out additional news as investors' information processing costs are 
large relative to the possible gains that they can achieve. Thus, investors and 
33 Of course, for a takeover to be a credible threat, a well-functioning and efficient capital market is 
necessary (Jensen, 1986). However, the evidence from Chapter 2 suggests that the ESE may not operate 
in such a manner. 
34 Thus, because individuals may act in a self-interested manner, considerable attention needs to be given 
to contract design ex ante in order to mitigate many of the problems associated with incentive alignment 
ex post (Emanuel et al., 2003). 
35 Mayers and Smith (1988; 1992) hypothesize that the coexistence of multiple forrns of ownership 
structure is partly attributable to the relative efficiency of ownership structures in controlling a,,,, enc,,, 
costs. 
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shareholders may respond to the reported accounting numbers per se since they do not 
have the capacity to seek out alternative sources of information. Consequently. one can I 
reason that in manager-controlled firms performance measures may be based on 
traditional ratios such as net income to net worth, sales to total assets, net income to 
total assets, net income to sales and long-term debt to total capital. In contrast, the 
owners of owner-controlled firms usually have direct access to infonnation over and 
au -bove that contained in financial reports and therefore may be able to monitor 
managers more easily without formal measurers. Thus, (i) financial performance 
measures may not be needed to monitor managers directly and (ii) if performance 
measures are necessary alternative non-financial data may be employed. 
A sizeable literature has developed about the relationship between type of control 
and accounting choices. It is hypothesized that companies with widely-held equity are 
more likely to ýexercise both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accounting choices in an attempt to smooth earnings". For example, Smith (1976) 
empirically tested the hypothesis that manager-controlled firms are more likely to 
smooth income" relative to their owner-controlled counterparts. Smith defined a firm 
as owner-controlled if one party owned 10% or more of the voting shares and 
manager-controlled if no single block of equity greater than 5% was controlled by any 
36 However, Fama (1980) argued that there must be no difference between the behaviour of owner- 
controlled and management-controlled firms, since competition in the labour market will perceive the 
latter. 
37 The income-smoothing hypothesis predicts that managers will use their discretion over accounting 
policy to reduce the magnitude of the deviation of reported earnings from an earnings trend number. The 
income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that managers are more likely to increase income when earnings 
are abnormally low in an effort to minimize fluctuations in the income stream. The objective of income 
smoothing is assumed to be to change financial statement users' perceptions regarding the risk of the 
firm. 
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one party". Using a sample Of 110 firms (57 manager controlled and 53 owner 
controlled) between 1954-1962, Smith examined five different target earnings per- 
share figures (as potential objects of smoothing)" and various accounting policý, 
decisions as smoothing "tools" in this analysis. The results suggested that both o, %N-ner- 
controlled and manager-controlled firms make accounting policy decisions that smooth 
income but that manager-controlled firms are more likely to smooth income and to do 
it more often than their owner-controlled counterparts. This result supported Smith's 
hypothesis that the accounting policy decisions made by manager controlled finns 
smoothed income significantly more often than the policy decisions made by owner- 
controlled companies (p. 721). 
In a follow-up study, Kamin and Ronen (1978) hypothesized that manager- 
controlled firms are more likely to be engaged in smoothing as a manifestation of 
managerial discretion. They found that manager-controlled firms which operated 
barriers to entry appeared to smooth income to a much greater extent than their 
counterparts in industries with low barriers to entry; thus, barriers to entry appeared to 
38 Range from 5% to 10% was considered as the "grey area" of ownership that neither created "sufficient 
incentive" for shareholders to engage in monitoring or to act as a valid indicator that owners were active 
in the management of their firms. 
'9 The smoothing objects are the numbers whose series are presumed to be the target of the smoothing 
attempts. Imhoff (1981) indicates that the target of management's smoothing efforts may vary across 
firms. He also points out that smoothing may take place over a long time span; thus, the length of the 
period studied may influence the results of the any investigation. Imhoff (198 1) points out that one of the 
more popular methods of investigating smoothing behaviour is selecting certain key variables (e. g. 
extraordinary items), which are influenced through management actions, and to observe their effect on 
earnings. However, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) argue that companies do not necessarily select 
accounting procedures independently, but consider the overall effect of all accounting procedures on 
income. The association between type of ownership/control and income smoothing behaviour has been 
examined in Ma (1988). He investigated the influence of the degree of control on smoothing behaviour 
and provided some indication that management-control led firms have relatively smoother income series 
than their owner-controlled counterparts. Similarly, Carlson and Bathala (1997) identified many 
variables which influence smoothing: manager versus owner control status, debt financing, institutional 
ownership, the dispersion of equity ownership, profitability and firm size. Using Albrecht and 
Richardson's (1990) methodology, their results suggest that ownership structure, executive's incentive 
structure and firm profitability are important in explaining income smoothing. 
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have an effect on the extent of any income smoothing. HoA-ever. Moses (1987) found 
no evidence to support the income-smoothing hypothesis. Using the PAT arguments 
developed by Watts and Zimmerman, Dhaliwal et al. (1982) tested for a relationship 
between depreciation method and ownership structure. Specifically, Dhaliwal et al. 
predicted that manager-controlled firms were more likely than owner-controlled 
companies to choose accounting methods that increased reported eamings. Dhaliwal et 
al. found that, as hypothesized, manager-controlled firms were more likely than 
owner-controlled firms to use the straight-line depreciation (SLD) method for financial 
reporting purposes. They argued that the managers of management-controlled firms 
preferred accounting methods which resulted in high and/or early reported income in 
order to keep shareholders satisfied and/or increase their remuneration. 
In a follow-up study, Abdel-Khalik (1985) analysed the effect of LIFO adoptions 
on executive compensation where "type of control" was included as an intervening 
variable to test for its potential effect on the choice of inventory method. Abdel-Khalik 
employed a single 10% ownership cut off for categorizing firms as either owner- 
controlled or manager-controlled. The results indicated that there was no significant 
negative association between executives' income-based bonus plans and adopting 
LIFO. However, the study suggested that manager-controlled firms which adopted the 
FIFO inventory method achieved a relatively higher level of compensation based on 
reported earnings than firms which adopted LIFO; thus, they uncovered a positive 
association between the existence of bonus plans and the adoption of income increasing 
inventory methods. 
Penno and Simon (1986) compared the accounting-policy decisions of private 
and public firms. They indicated that public firms are more likely to be manager- 
controlled than their private firm counterparts. Penno and Simon tested the hypothesis 
54 
that the publicly-traded firms are more likely to select accounting methods which will 
increase the level of reported earningS40. On the other hand, privately-owned 
companies are more concerned with reducing a firm's tax burden. Theý- argued that. 
managers of publicly-traded firms are more likely to adopt income-increasing 
accounting methods due to the likely impact of reported income on security prices (Ball I 
and Brown, 1968). Moreover, publicly-traded firms are more likely to be manager- 
controlled and thus employ bonus schemes based on reported profits. Privatelý-held 
firms may not have the same incentives to choose income-increasing accounting 
policies. Consequently, privately-held firms may not have the same incentive to 
employ accounting policies which have real economic costs such as the use of FIFO 
when accounting for inventory using LIFO would reduce tax liabilities. 
Niehaus (1989) found evidence to support the hypothesis that there is an 
association between a firm's ownership structure and its accounting-method choices. 
He argued that owners' wealth is mainly a function of equity concentration since firms 
with concentrated outside ownership can effectively monitor and control mangers' 
actions; he pointed out that the choice of LIFO initially decreased as managerial 
ownership increased. Thus, finns with concentrated-ownership are expected to adopt 
accounting methods which result in a reduction of tax payments. His empirical findings 
supported this view. On the other hand, no significant relationship was found betwýeen a 
firm's ownership structure and depreciation method or investment tax credit method. 
Niehaus's findings about the relationship between ownership structure and depreciation 
method contradict the findings reported by Dhaliwal et al. (1982). 
40 They used survey data to conclude that publicly-traded firms are more likely to use income-increasing 
accounting methods for inventory, investment tax credits, and depreciation than are private firms. 
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Dempsey et al. (1993) classified ownership structure into three groups: ov, -ner- 
managed, externally-controlled and manager-controlled. They uncovered significant 
levels of earnings management" through variations in the level of extraordinary items 
when management and ownership were separated; this result is consistent with the 
predictions of agency theory". More recently, Carlson and Bathala (1997) empiricallý, 
tested the association between differences in ownership structure and accounting 
choices. Several explanatory variables were identified: manager versus owner control, 
debt financing, institutional ownership, dispersion of share ownership, profitability and 
41 Schipper (1989) defined earnings management (EM) as purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with a view to obtaining private gain for shareholders or managers. Earnings 
management may take the form of either income increasing or income decreasing accounting choices. Opportunities for such earnings management arise because of flexibility permitted by GAAP (Evans and Sridhar, 1996). Many incentives and opportunities for earnings management have been put forward in 
the literature. First the literature suggests that managers may have personal incentives for management 
earnings because the consequences of their actions may be beneficial for them (see Healy, 1985; Gaver et 
at., 19,95; Guidry et al., 1999; Holthausen et al., 1995). Second, PAT roposes that earnings management P tn may help the firm to comply with debt covenant clauses (see Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). The accounting choices literature puts forward a third motivation for earnings management. 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) detected that accounting choices were used by companies experiencing persistent 
problems with their level of profit in order to cover-up poor performance. Moreover, minimization of 
political costs may encourage firms to manage earnings (see Eilifsen et al., 1999; Han and Wang, 1998). 
As mentioned earlier, Han and Wang (1998) provide evidence that oil companies during the Gulf War 
used income decreasing accounting policies to avoid the political consequences of reporting higher 
profits. Ownership structure and type of control would motivate for EM. For example, Dempsey et al. 
(1993) found significant levels of EM when managers were not the owners of the company. Fields et al. 
(2001) argued that earnings management might also be heneficial; it could convey inside information 
about future cash flows and possible uncertainty to investors enabling them to avoid undervaluation due 
to information asymmetry. However, previous studies in this area tend to pay more attention to the 
potentially negative consequences associated with earnings management (such as misleading investors) 
rather than to any positive aspects of this activity. Some motivation for EM is not explicitly linked to 
PAT. For example, Hall and Stammer ohan (1997) firid that firms with high debt levels, pending legal 
damage rewards and foreign competition are more likely to manage earnings. Further, firms that were not 
previously quoted on the market increased their income just before going public (see Friedlan, 1994). 
42 There is an argument that, if managerial theories are correct, different relationships will exist between 
investment decisions and the time series profile of reported earnings for owners-controlled and 
managers-controlled firms (Sunder, 1980). Sunder predicted that managers-controlled firms would 
select projects that yielded a smoother profile of earnings than owners-controlled firms. Sunder also 
examined the short-term negative effect of investment on earnings using the data and samples of firms 
contained in Palmer (1973) and Stano (1976). He suggested that since it was possible to identify directly 
firm-specific accounting methods, it might be desirable to separate the effect of accounting choices from 
the effect of type of control on the investment-earnings relationship. 
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firm size. They concluded that ownership structure, executives' incenti\, e structure and 
firm profitability were important factors in explaining income smoothing. 
To summarise, the evidence thus far suggests that there is a relationship between 
ownership/control and at least some accounting choices. For example, Hunt (1985)'-' 
Penno and Simon (1986) and Niehaus (1989) found that lower levels of management 
ownership are associated with the decision to adopt the LIFO inventory method. Also. 
Salamon and Smith (1979)' Dhaliwal et al. (1982) as well as Carlson and Bathala 
(1997) presented evidence that when compared with similar owner-controlled 
companies, manager-controlled firms often make accounting choices that increase 
reported earnings. However, there have been some inconsistent results. For example, 
Abdel-Khalik (1985) found no association between the choice of an inventory method 
and ownership structure". Further, Niehaus (1989) documented no correlation between 
43 Hunt (1985) identified ownership-structure and the firms' ability to avoid debt-covenants violation as 
explanatory variables influencing firms' inventory-method choice. More specifically, Hunt hypothesised 
that (a) owner-managers' wealth is more associated with share value and they are more likely to switch 
to the LIFO; (b) firms that have employed LIFO are less likely to use accounting-based bonus plans and 
(c) the closer a firm was to violating debt-covenants, the less likely it was to adopt the LIFO method. The 
results emerged from univariate and multivariate tests were consistent with the hypothesis that the closer 
a firm is to violating the lending-related constraints, the less likely it is to adopt the LIFO method. On the 
other hand, no relationship appeared between the inventory-method choice and the existence of income- 
based bonus plans, but there was evidence that firms that adopted the LIFO method had significantly 
lower levels of managerial ownership. 
44 Using a sample of 64 firms (32 manager-controlled and 32 owner-controlled) between 1954-1962. 
Salamon and Smith (1979) argued that executives of manager-controlled firms are more likely to 
influence the level of reported profits during years with below-average stock returns, than during years 
with above average stock returns. The findings indicated that there was a significant association between 
the security-return performance and the timing of the reporting policy choice for the manager-controlled 
firms, whereas, the association was not significant for the owner-controlled firms. 
45 Abdel-Khalik argued that ownership variable could influence inventory choice since the executives in 
owner-controlled firms derive more personal wealth from increases in the value of their stock holdings 
than would come about from the switch to LIFO. Abdel-Khalik documented that owner-controlled firms 
are likely to adopt the LIFO, due to the tax benefits that result from such a choice. However, the results 
did not indicate that for firms that switched from FIFO to LIFO, there was any difference between the 
management and owner-controlled firms, with regard to the structure of payment to executives. He also 
indicated that in the management-contro I led firms which kept the FIFO method had a higher accounting- 
based schemes, compared with the other firms. 
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the choice of the SLD method and ownership structure. Hunt (1986) argued that these 
inconsistencies might be the result of methodological differences, variations in sample 
size or differences in time period examined. Despite these inconsistencies. one can 
argue that the balance of the evidence supports the notion that accounting choices and 
ownership structure are correlated. Generally, these studies use a binary dependent 
variable representing the choice of accounting method and non-binary explanatory 
variables representing firm specific characteristics. The dependent variables previously 
examined include the choices between accelerated versus SLD methods as well as 
FIFO versus LIFO inventory valuation methods. Selected empirical studies of 
ownership/control hypothesis presented in chronological order are summarised in Table 
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3.3 The economic consequences of accounting choices 
Economic consequenceS46 and accounting policies are generally associated 
through causal links. For example, accounting policies can affect a compan)'" s cash 
flows and their distribution among a firm's stakeholders: e. g. shareholders, managers 
and bondholders (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Taylor and Turleý-, 1986; 
Tzovas, 1998)". Assuming that each individual aims to maximize his/her utility and 
prefers a higher to a lower cash flow surplus" (Grinyer, 1986), then. if a particular 
accounting method can increase, or decrease, different stakeholders wealth, these 
parties have an apparent motive for preferring certain accounting methods (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; 1986). Hindley (1970) suggests that managers have incentives to 
make accounting choices and report accounting income in the most positive way in 
order to obscure poor managerial performance and keep shareholders satisfied; these 
incentives depend on the ownership structure of the firm. Therefore, a firm's ownership 
46 The economic consequences of different accounting choices were initially analysed by Watts and 
Zimmerman, (1978,1986) and later extended by Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Press and Weintrop 
(1990) and Sweeney (1994). All these authors explain the link between a firm's cash flows and reported 
accounting income numbers via positive theories but Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) describe them 
using an economic consequences framework. Accounting choices have economic consequences if 
changes in the methods used to calculate accounting numbers affect the distribution of firms' cash flows 
or the wealth of parties who use those numbers for contracting and/or decision making purposes. 
Contracting and monitoring costs (such as management compensation contracts, lending agreements and 
firms' political visibility) are expected to extend the economic consequences that may arise (Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1983). 
47 For example, it has been suggested that enterprises facing high contracting costs are likely to focus on 
accounting choices because accounting numbers are used in those contracts (see Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). If current existing contracts are more efficient in reducing agency costs than other unused 
agreements, the procedures employed to calculate accounting numbers in those contracts might be more 
efficient than alternative approaches. Using alternative procedures may increase agency costs and reduce 
firm value or manager compensation. 
48 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the firm value depends on the fraction of shares owned by the 
management. They divide stockholders into two groups, inside shareholders - who manage the firm - and 
outside shareholders. The inside shareholders, however, are able to increase their cash flows bý! I 
additionally non-marketable perquisites. In this framework, there is an incentive for the manager to adopt 
investment and financing policies that benefit him, but cost the outside stockholders. 
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structure can influence the accounting method chosen. Such logic provides an 
explanation for managers' choice of accounting procedures. 
In the theoretical model (see figure 3-1), the accounting choices of owner- 
controlled firms may differ from those of manager-controlled counterparts because of 
differing agency relationships which may reflect: (a) different bases for the 
remuneration of the dominant managers; (b) more concern for cash flow implications 
(e. g. taxation) of accounting alternatives; (c) less emphasis placed on the perceptions of 
external parties regarding management's efficiency and ability and (d) possibly 
different more personal relationship with bankers". When managers' wealth is strongly 
dependent on the value of their equity holdings they might prefer logically income 
decreasing accounting methods which might be expected to reduce the tax paid by the 
firm. On the other hand, if managers' compensation is strongly dependent on 
accounting-based bonus payments, one might expect that income increasing accounting 
methods will be preferred. Owner-manager's wealth is more likely to depend on the 
value of their share-holdings, while the remuneration of a manager of management- 
controlled finns is more likely to depend on accounting-based bonus schemes". In 
owner-controlled firms, the extensive involvement of a firm's owners in the 
administration of the company permits a close monitoring of top managers' conduct 
49 Crutchley and Hansen (1989) investigated whether insider holdings lead to lower agency costs by 
examining the relationship between leverage, dividend policy and insider holdings. The authors found 
that higher earnings volatility is positively related to higher insider holdings, larger dividends and lower 
debt. On the other hand, if managers face lower costs of diversification, it leads to higher insider 
holdings, lower dividends, and lower debt. They argued that managers control agency costs through 
financial policy trade-offs. 
50 However, earlier empirical research reported findings indicated that the use of accounting-based bonus 
plans does not necessarily imply that managers will prefer income- increasing accounting methods 
(see 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
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and owners can directly motivates managers' performance" - Therefore, the need for 
bonus plans for top managers is possibly less important". It might be expected that, 
because of the more extensive use of accounting-based bonus plans in such firms. 
managers of management-controlled fin-ns may adopt accounting choice policies that 
increase reported income". On the other hand, managers of owner-controlled firms are 
not expected to face similar incentives. Thus, they can get more aggressively involved 
in tax-planning54. In closely-held firms, executives can directly communicate to 
shareholders; owners usually have more direct access to detailed economic information 
nil xbout the business and therefore may be able to monitor managers more easily without 
formal measurers for performance" (Klassen, 1997). On the other hand, in firms with 
51 Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that when a manager only owns a smaller stake, he is disciplined 
toward firm value maximization by the market forces such as the managerial labor market. 
52 Evidence from earlier studies (e. g., Amihud et al., 1983; Dempsey et al., 1993; Short, 1994) suggests 
that there is a link between managerial compensation schemes and ownership/control structure; i. e. that 
management-controlled firms are more likely than owner-controlled firms to have incentive 
compensation plans. 
53 However, bonus plans are not entirely based on reported earnings. Executives' remuneration may be 
linked with a firm's stock price or by offering stock-options to executives (Hall, 2002). 
54 Grinyer (1986) argues that high cash flows provide managers with opportunities to directly increase 
their wealth and well-being - e. g. increased salaries, perquisites etc. - and their job security by reducing 
the possibility that the firm will not meet various financial constraints, hence, managers prefer higher to 
lower cash-flows anyway. Thus one can be argued that managers will opt the tax planning since by doing 
so they increase the available cash-flows. 
55 Boudreaux (1973) hypothesised that owner-controlled firms are not only expected to earn higher rates 
of return than manager-controlled companies but that the two types of firms should also differ in terms 
of risk. Boudreaux tested a model that included return on equity as the dependent variable and control 
type, industry membership, risk (standard deviation of return on equity) and size as independent 
variables. The results indicated that rates of return were higher and more volatile for owner-controlled 
firms than for their manager-controlled counterparts. Stano (1976) incorporated the firm's share return 
(dividends and capital appreciation) as the measure of firm performance. The results indicated that, when 
compared to manager-controlled firms, owner-controlled companies had higher growth rates of earnings 
per share, were more risk averse, engaged in less merger activity and were smaller. Moreover, the annual 
equity return for the owner-controlled firms was higher than those for the manager-controlled firrns. 
However, in a later study, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) documented no significant relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate profitability. Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) reported the agency logic 
and its principal prediction as follows: "if diffuseness in control allows managers to serve their needs 
rather than tend to the profits of owners, then more concentrated ownership by establishing a stronger 
link between managerial behaviour and owner interests ought to yield higher profit rates" (p. 1174). 
Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) findings contradict the agency arguments in Jensen and Meckling (1976) 1 
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diffuse ownership, shareholders are likely to rely more heavily on formal controls 
which are written in terms of accounting numbers to constrain management's actIvities- 
thus, the reported accounting numbers per se are likely to be one of the main deý'ices 
available for signalling information to shareholders regarding firms' value and 
management's ability (Cloyd et al., 1996). Therefore, managers of finns with diffuse 
ownership may prefer higher to lower reported earnings. 
Bankers and other providers of funds may frequently use financial statements for 
their credit decisions. Under these circumstances, executives of owner- controlled firms 
may possibly be prepared to forego tax benefits, in order to achieve higher reported 
earnings (Cloyd et al., 1996) 56 . While the conditions of the debt covenants are often 
expressed in terms of accounting figures, the accounting methods employed can 
partially determine whether or not a firm is able to meet the debt covenants (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen and liftwich, 1983; Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and 
Weintrop, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Consequently, to 
avoid debt covenant violations, even executives of closely-held firms may have an 
incentive to choose a reporting method which yields higher rather than lower reported 
earnings. The effects on debt covenants may diminish the potential tax savings from 
LIFO (Cushing and LeClere, 1992). Therefore, managers may balance the benefits of 
avoiding debt violation against the costs of choosing a tax reducing method (Smith, 
Morck, et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). For example, Morck et al. (1988) indicated that: 
"Theoretical arguments alone cannot unambiguously predict the relationship between management 
ownership and market valuation of the firm's assets. While the convergence-of- interest hypothesis 
suggests a uniformly positive relationship, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that market valuation 
can be adversely affected for some range of high ownership stakes". 
56 As Cloyd et al. (1996) state, "Lower current-period reported income can increase the probability of 
debt covenant violations; it can reduce manager compensation tied to reported income; it may lead to 
lower performance evaluations... ; and it may even be perceived as lowering the market value of the firm. 
As these costs increase, confon-nity should decrease" (p. 28). 
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1993), assuming that, executives are unlikely to forgo tax savings without convIincine 
reasons 
57 
PAT is based on the premise that managers' accounting choices have economic 
consequences because contracts designed to alleviate various agency conflicts within 
firms are often written in terms of accounting numbers and because contracting and 
monitoring are costly (e. g., see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Thus, fin-ns' 
accounting choices are material because they affect incentives and lead to the 
resolution of agency conflicts". Managerial intent is concerned with accounting 
choices; specifically, whether the incentive of the decision is to affect the output of the 
accounting system or whether the incentive derives from other motives (Field, 2001). 
Thus, one can argue that accounting choices may be affected by whether the company 
is owner-controlled or manager-controlled. Consequently, agency differences between 
owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms must be of interest to the extent that 
they affect the validity of the PAT hypotheses (which could differ between the 
groups)". The next section of this chapter will discuss the PAT hypotheses; it will 
focus on the implications of PAT for accounting choices. In addition, the findings from 
earlier studies are reviewed and summarised. The perception that ownership/control 
status affects the validity of the PAT hypotheses will be discussed in the next chapter 
where the hypotheses that are tested in the current study will be established. 
57 McConnell and Servaes (1995) suggested that debt policy and equity ownership differ across high- 
growth and low-growth firms. The value of low-growth firms is positively correlated with leverage, and 
the distribution of equity across insider holdings, institutional holdings, and blockholdings across low- 
growth firms is more significant than for high-growth firms. 
58 The findings of earlier studies documented that bonus plans schemes may align the interest between 
owners and managers (Hunt, 1986). 
59 Mikhail (1999) cited literature that found financial reporting incentives vary with ownership 
concentration (e. g., Dhaliwal et al. 1982, Klassen 1997). Like Mikhail, this researcher believes that the 
manager-controlled versus owner-controlled comparison can provide a stronger test of the effect of 
ownership type and PAT hypotheses. 
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3.4 PAT and the accounting choice literature 
3.4.1 The economic philosophy reflected in PAT 
The interest shown by accounting research in examining the economic factors 
underlying the accounting decisions made by firms is not a new phenomenon. As early 
as 1964, Gordon considered this issue. More recently, Watts and Zimmen-nan (1978) 
used developments in the areas of finance and economics to explain some of the 
puzzles facing accounting researchers and practitioners. The influential work of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) in the corporate finance literature was the impetus for Watts and 
Zimmerman's analysis. Some of this research draws on theories of agency and 
economic regulation to develop a series of hypotheses that are capable of explaining the 
accounting decisions of executives; these hypotheses are in line with the PAT approach 
initiated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). The hypotheses suggest that in order to 
avoid violating debt covenants and to increase their own remuneration, when it is 
associated with company performance, managers will prefer income-increasing 
accounting methods. When the goal is to reduce the firm's visible wealth, and thus the 
threat of political costs, they will choose income-decreasing methods. 
PAT attempts to understand why accounting policies matter and to predict which 
particular accounting policies a firm will choose". It also seeks to explain the reaction 
of investors to accounting data by establishing a relationship between accounting 
phenomena and market processes. Efficient contracting versions of PAT imply that 
firms choose accounting policies to minimize contracting costs. The theory is based on 
60 Unlike normative theories of accounting, it does not set out to state what accounting procedures and 
policies should be employed, but rather to explain why they are used and what they are used for (see 
oxford business dictionary). 
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a view of the firm as a "nexus of contracts,,, where the business entit-,. - can be described 
by the various contracts that it enters into; the role of accounting in such contracts rnaý- 
potentially explain why managers prefer certain accounting policies and oppose others 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1986). PAT is a theory that attempts to explain the 
nature of accounting, the role and activities of accountants and the importance of 
accountancy to the economy. It seeks to explain observed practice; for example. it aims 
to explain why certain firms use the FIFO rather than the LIFO inventory method. It 
also seeks to predict accounting phenomena; for example, to forecast the attributes of 
firms which adopt FIFO rather than LIFO. PAT thus provides decision makers with 
explanations and predictions of the consequences of their decisions. 
Since Watts and Zimmerman's (1978) pioneering work, research in this subject 
has been characterized by incremental improvements in empirical research design. A 
large body of literature in accounting has tested the predictions of PAT. Many of the 
tests entailed the use of capital market data. For example, tests of the economic 
consequences of accounting information examine share price reactions to new 
accounting standards and study whether cross-sectional variations in these price 
reactions are related to financial variables (see Kothari, 2001). PAT hypothesizes that 
company specific characteristics such as firm size, leverage and the existence of a 
bonus plan motivate managers to use accounting choices to increase or decrease 
earnings. Managers may choose accounting methods in a self-interested attempt to 
increase the share price of the company for which they work prior to the sale of any 
stock oPtions that they hold. On the other hand, the same accounting choices may be 
motivated by managers' objective assessment that the current share price is 
undervalued according to their private information. Watts and Zimmennan's political 
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cost hypothesis extends the economics literature on accounting choices to encompass 
political as well as market processes. 
From the literature, one can identify at least three categories of moti,,, ýations for 
accounting choices: (a) contracting (b) asset pricing and capital market factors and (c) 
the influence of external parties. This classification is consistent with the typology of 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Field et al. (200 1). 
3.4.2 Contracting 
PAT usually hypothesizes that mangers use their accounting choices to 
maximize their bonuses (the bonus plan hypothesis) and to avoid undesirable 
constraints associated with borrowing (the debt covenant hypothesis). Thus, it 
concentrates on accounting choices that can affect the outcomes of one or more of the 
firm's contractual arrangements (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Such contractual 
arrangements include executive compensation agreements and debt covenants. the 
basic ftmctions of the contracts are to mitigate agency costs by better aligning the 
incentives of the two parties. However, depending on the structure of these contracts, 
accounting choices may be made to increase compensation or to avoid covenant 
violation thereby potentially circumventing the covenants. In most situations, multiple 
accounting choices can be chosen singularly or jointly to accomplish one or more 
goals. For example, FIFO for inventory and SLD accounting may often be expected to 
increase reported earnings and, hence, eamings-based contracts. Alternatively, LIFO 
often reduces the present value of taxes and the LIFO conformity rule frequently 
requires that if LIFO is used for tax calculations then it must be also used for financial 
reporting purposes (Fields et al., 2001). Thus, there are potential conflicts among 
different goals when choosing between accounting methods. 
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PAT (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1986; 1990) provided the motivation for 
many subsequent studies of whether typical contracts supply managers with incenti-ves 
to choose among accounting methods in order to achieve their desired financial 
reporting objectives. In general, researchers conclude that such incentives seem to 
motivate managers to select accounting methods to increase their compensation and to 
reduce the likelihood of bond covenant violations (Hagerman and ZmijexN-ski, 1979, 
Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Gopalakrishnan, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994; DeAngelo et al., 1994). So it can be argued that the first category of 
motivations for accounting choices is the agent contract (contractual motivation) which 
can be divided to management compensation contracts (internal agency conflicts) and 
debt contracts (external agency conflicts). Each of these elements are discussed in the 
next two sub-sections. 
3.4.2.1 Management compensation contracts 
The usual hypothesis is that managers with compensation schemes directly tied to 
accounting earnings are more likely to choose income-increasing accounting methods. 
This suggests that managers select accounting methods in order to affect wealth 
transfers from the firm's owners and shareholders. Because the existence of earnings- 
based bonus plans serve as the proxy for earning based management compensation 
schemes in earlier studies, this hypothesis is known as the "bonus plans hypothesis": 
"Managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting 
procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current 
period" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 208). 
Tests of the bonus plans hypothesis have provided mixed results. For example, 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) found a positive association between the existence of 
a bonus plan and the choice of depreciation method as well as the amortization period 
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for past pension costs. However, they found no association v, -ith either the choice of 
investment tax credit or the inventory valuation method employed. EI-Gazzar et al. 
(1986) found an association between the existence of a bonus plan and the accounting 
methods chosen to report for leasing contracts. However, Bowen et al - (198 1) found no 
association between the existence of a bonus plan and the choice of method adopted 
when accounting for interest. Ball and Foster (1982) attributed the mixed results of the 
bonus plans hypothesis to the way in which the bonus plan variable is modelled. They 
observed that because of its simplistic formulation, the dichotomous specification of 
the variable is subject to severe construct validity problems. They conclude that the 
inconsistent findings of prior studies may result from ignoring important bonus plan 
details (p. 184). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that where a manager's utility is 
affected by the firm's share price and managerial compensation, managers may adopt 
accounting choices for the purpose of maximizing their own utility; this possibility was 
formalised as the "opportunistic behaviour" of accounting policy choice" (see Healy, 
1985; Holthausen, 1990; Holthausen et al., 1995). The majority of empirical studies 
interpret their results as supplying evidence that managers take advantage of the 
discretion provided by compensation contracts to increase their compensation by 
managing reported earnings (Fields et al., 2001). Selected empirical studies of the 
bonus plan hypothesis are presented in chronological order in Table 3-2. 
61 However, Emanuel et al. (2003) indicate that efficient contracting theory can be used to explain details 
in institutional structures including compensation arrangements, covenants in loan agreements and 
accounting methods in contracting contexts. Efficient contracting and opportunism are 
distinguishable 
theoretically but difficult to distinguish empirically. 
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An analysis of this table reveals that most studies attempt to build on the 
contribution made by Healy (1985). Healy's (1985) empirical study is considered as a 
benchmark for many subsequent bonus maximizations investigations. He examined 
earnings-based bonus schemes which became a popular method of re"-arding corporate 
executives during the 1980s. It is logical to believe that managers whose remuneration 
is partially-based on the level of profit will manipulate this profit figure to maximise 
their remuneration over time. Healy tests the association between (a) managers' 
decisions about accruals" and accounting procedures and (b) the incentives coming 
from their compensation packages. Two classes of tests are presented: accrual tests and 
tests of changes in accounting procedures. The results of Healy's study indicate that 
managers are more likely to choose income-decreasing accruals when their bonus 
plans' upper or lower bounds are binding and income-increasing accruals when these 
bounds are not binding. His results suggest that bonus plans motivate management to 
select accrual and accounting procedures that maximise the present value of their own 
bonuses. Further, the adoption or modification of a bonus plan has a high probability of 
causing changes in accounting procedures. It is important to note that the detailed 
bonus infonnation analysed by Healy (1985) is difficult to collect. In a given sample, 
the number of firms describing the details of bonus plans can be too small for 
appropriate statistical analysis (Field et al., 2001). 
Despite shortcomings in Healy's methodology (e. g. using total accruals as the 
62 Accruals management refers to changing estimates such as useful lives, the probability of recovering 
debtors and other year end accruals to try to alter reported earnings in the direction of a desired target 
(Ayres, 1994). There are five well-known models of discretionary accruals in the literature. These are: 
the Healy (1985) model, the DeAngelo (1986) model, the industry model used in Dechow and Sloan 
(1991), the Jones (1991) model, and the modified-Jones model which is employed by Dechow et al. 
(1995). The Jones and modified-Jones models are most widely used because they appear to be powerful 
in detecting earnings management (see Dechow et al., 1995). Different authors have used different ways 
to define discretionary accruals. See Appendix 3-1 for a description of discretionary accruals 
measurement. 
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proxy for discretionary accruals), his results on upper and lower bounds has become a 
starting point for many subsequent compensation studies. For example, Guidry et al. 
(1999) found evidence which supports Healy's bonus plans hypothesis. The)- 
discovered that divisional managers for a large multinational firm are likely to defer 
income when the earnings target in their bonus plans will not be met and when theý, are 
entitled to the maximum bonuses permitted under the plan. However, contrary to Healy 
(1985), they found that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the 
lower bounds, managers select income-increasing discretionary accruals (and vice 
versa). They believe that these results are more consistent with the income-smoothing 
hypothesis than with Healy's bonus plan hypothesis. 
Gaver et al. (1995) and Holthausen et al. (1995) document results that are 
consistent with Healy's hypothesis only at the upper bound level. They find no 
evidence that managers manipulate earnings downward when earnings are below the 
minimum necessary to receive their bonus and thus reach different conclusions about 
managerial incentives around the lower bound. While Gaver et al. refer to the income- 
smoothing hypothesis when explaining their results, Holthausen et al. (1995), using 
more sophisticated data, suggest that variation in research design could explain the 
differences in the empirical results between Healy's investigation and their findings at 
the lower bound. They argued that Healy had to estimate the region of the bonus 
contract (upper bound, lower bound or in between) whereas they had actual data on the 
bounds. Healy used total accruals as a proxy for discretionary accruals whereas 
Holthausen et al. employed a modified Jones (1991)" method to estimate discretionary 
accruals. Further, Healy's data was for the period 1930-1980 and Holthausen et al. 
63 See Appendix 3-1 for a description of discretionary accruals measurement. 
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claim that incentive bonus plans changed significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Using data on cash compensation for CEOs of bank holding companies, Clinch 
and Magliolo (1993) investigated whether accounting changes which had no effects on 
cash flows had an impact on CEO compensation. They concluded that the discretionary 
treatment of specific accounting items did not affect the managers' compensation if it 
was not accompanied by a significant cash flow effect. In a more recent studv, Gaver 
and Gaver (1998) investigated the relationship between accounting earnings and cash 
compensation. They found a negative association between managerial ovnership and 
the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments as well as a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings. 
3.4.22 Debt contracts 
Debt contracts are concerned with external agency conflicts between a firm's 
managers and its providers of fixed income capital; they are widely researched in the 
literature. The contracting cost arguments suggest that accounting methods are selected 
to minimize agency costs among the various parties to the firm and, in so doing, 
maximize firm value. Managers of firms that are close to violating debt covenant' 
restrictions have incentives to choose income-increasing accounting methods in an 
effort to maximize the value of the firm by avoidance or reduction of the costs 
associated with violation of explicit or implicit restrictions. Research to test the impact 
of bond covenants on accounting method choices hypothesizes that managers select or 
64 The consequences of violating accounting-based debt covenants could be: "(a) termination of the 
lending agreement; (b) demand for immediate repayment of the loan; (c) increased collateral; (d) 
increased interest rate; (e) imposition of additional constraints; and (f) waiver of the violation" 
(GopalakTishnan and Parkash, 1995, p. 20). 
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change accounting methods to avoid covenant violations; this has become knwN-n as the 
"debt hypothesis": 
"The larger a firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to 
select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to 
the current period" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 216). 
Studies involving debt covenant restrictions have typically relied on one or more 
proxy measures in the literature such as the debt/assets and/or debt/equity ratios 
(Bowen et al., 1981; Daley and Vigeland, 1983; Ayres, 1986; Duke and Hunt, 1990; 
Press and Weintrop, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994, Sweeney, 1994; 
Gopalakrishnan, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). The assumption is therefore that at 
higher levels of leverage, debt covenant restrictions are more likely to bite. Most 
studies that have included leverage as an independent variable have found results 
consistent with the debt/equity hypothesis. That is, across a variety of accounting 
policy choices, managers of highly levered firms are more likely to use income- 
increasing accounting methods (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; 
Gopalakrishnan, 1994). 
For example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) test this hypothesis on firms that 
reported debt covenant violations. They find that in the year preceding (and in the year 
of) the violation, abnormal total accruals and abnormal working capital accruals are 
both consistent with the debt hypothesis. Using a sample of 130 firms that were first- 
time violators of their debt covenants between 1980 and 1989, Sweeney (1994) 
examines the probability of default for debt covenants with certain accounting methods 
(e. g. LIFO vs. FIFO). He finds that the defaulting firms made significantly more 
voluntary income increasing accounting policy changes than the control sample 
firms 
whose debt covenants remained intact. He also finds that despite 
financial reporting 
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benefits, firms will not switch to FIFO if the change generates significant tax costs. 
Gopalakrishnan (1994) builds upon this analysis by analysing the debt hý-pothesis for 
unlevered firms using a direct test of certain accounting methods (e. g. the SLD vs. 
accelerated method depreciation and LIFO vs. FIFO). The results indicate that the 
higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood of choosing SLD and /or FIFO. 
On the other hand, a numbers of studies find results inconsistent with debt 
hypothesis. For example, DeAngelo et al. (1994) test accounting choices in firnis that 
experience a persistent problem with their level of profit. They used data of 76 firms 
from the NYSE which reported at least three years of losses over the period 1980-85 
and that reduced dividends as a result; 29 firms in the sample cut their dividends due to 
binding debt covenants. They hypothesized that firms facing potentially binding debt 
covenants have greater incentives to make income-increasing accounting choices than 
firms without such binding debt covenants. They found very little difference between 
troubled and untroubled companies and no real significant income increasing 
procedures being adopted. As a result, they concluded that the accounting choices 
reflected the firms' financial difficulties rather than attempts to either avoid debt 
covenant violation or mask the financial difficulties. Selected empirical studies of debt 
hypothesis are summarized in Table 3-3. 
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3.4.3 Asset pricing and capital market 
The expectation underlying the asset pricing goal hypothesis is that managers NAil I 
attempt to influence asset prices by making specific accounting choices -when such 
influence may be possible because of information asymmetry. The basic focus in this 
category of research is to solve problems which arise when markets imperfectly reflect 
information held by the managers". 
The association between earnings and share price was first documented by Ball 
and Brown (1968)66 . They examined whether accounting choices that have no direct 
cash flow implications are associated with changes in share prices. Their results appear 
to be inconsistent with market efficiency and could be explained in several ways (see 
Kothari, 2001). These include investor irrationality (e. g. investors mechanically 
respond to levels or changes in earnings regardless of their source), managerial 
signalling (e. g. managers provide private information through their accounting choices 
that influence the beliefs of rational investors) and contractual motivations (e. g. 
managers avoid violating debt covenants thereby maximizing the value of the firm). 
Subsequent studies have examined the association between accounting numbers and 
share prices or returns through investigating whether choice of accounting methods 
affects either equity valuation or the cost of capital (e. g. see Watts, 1992). This research 
is extensively reviewed by Kothari (2001). The most significant conclusion of this 
research is that regulated financial reports provide relevant infonnation to investors. 
65 This research uses correlation with stock returns as a criterion for evaluating accounting methods. The 
maintained hypothesis is that capital markets are efficient. In recent years, market efficiency has been 
subjected to significant empirical assault. 
66 Specially, Ball and Brown (1968) documented that for their sample of US firms, positive unexpected 
annual earnings are associated with positive abnormal returns while negative unexpected annual earnings 
are associated with negative abnormal returns. Ball and Brown discovered that this relationship (which 
was stronger for earnings than for cash flows) was anticipated by the stock market several months before 
the disclosure date. 
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This area of research also examines whether accounting method choice affects 
equity valuation or the cost of capital. Typically studies focus on capital market 
reactions to discretionary accounting choices. Probably the most wi N, idell studied area in 
this literature is the valuation implications of discretionary accruals. Investigations bý- 
Warfield et al. (1995) and Wang and Williams (1994) find a negative association 
between the extent of accruals management and the information content of earnings 
(consistent with the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis). Other studies find 
that discretionary accruals have positive valuation implications (consistent with the 
signalling role of the accrual management hypothesis). For example, Hunt et al. (1996) 
and Subramanyam (1996) show that smoothing of earnings via discretionary accruals is 
associated with higher earnings multiples. In addition, Guay et al. (1996) and 
Subramanyam (1996) document a positive and significant relation between 
discretionary accruals and annual share returns. Kasznik (1999) reports that US firms 
with managers that overestimated earnings have significant levels of positive 
discretionary accruals. Management ostensibly make such choices to avoid the negative 
market reaction anticipated from the announcement of earnings that fall short of the 
target or expected earnings (Kasznik, 1999). However, the incentives among the 
sample firms to manage accruals upward are also consistent with the compensation and 
debt hypotheses outlined earlier" 
Many studies examine whether discretionary accruals influence share prices by 
focusing on specific situations such as takeovers. Erickson and Wang (1999) 
hypothesize that bidders will manage earnings upwards via discretionary accruals in an 
67 A number of UK studies have also considered this issue. For example, Ali and Pope (1995) document 
a strong stock market reaction for earnings over cash flows which they attribute to the information 
content of accruals. Clubb (1995) builds upon this analysis by discovering that abnormal returns for UK 
firms are related more to short-term rather than long-term accruals. 
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attempt to increase the share price and thereby decrease the number of shares that must 
be issued to complete a deal. They find evidence consistent with their expectations. 
However, using a variety of different research designs, Lev and Zarowin (1999) find 
that in the USA the relationship between share returns and eamings (and bem-een share 
prices, earnings and book values) have deteriorated over time. 
This category of research also deals with disclosure policies and examines the 
relationship between accounting information (voluntary disclosure) and the role of 
financial reporting for capital markets" 
68 Voluntary disclosure theory hypothesizes that, managers use corporate disclosures to reduce the likelihood of undervaluation and to justify poor earnings performance. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
reviewed recent empirical studies on voluntary disclosure and summarize five motives for such 
managerial disclosure decisions: capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock 
compensation, litigation and proprietary costs. These explain why managers increase the extent of 
disclosure in general, but there is no obvious reason to expect that these factors would systematically 
vary with managers' incentives. Firstly, the capital markets transactions hypothesis is motivated by a 
prediction that managers who anticipate making capital market transactions such as security issues have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosures to reduce the information asymmetry problem (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001), thereby reducing the firm's cost of external financing (Healy and Palepu, 1993; 1995). 
For example, a sizable literature documents that these equity issues by firms are associated with returns 
of -3% (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Burton et al., 1999; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1999). This effect exists independently of the size of the issue, the purpose of the issue 
and the potential usage of the proceeds. Studies of the market response to debt issues also document a 
negative market response which is typically much less than that for news of equity issue (Hansen and 
Crutchley, 1990; Burton et al., 1996). Thus, managers who seek to reduce their cost of capital appear to 
be more inclined to increase voluntary disclosure to reduce information risk through. Secondly, the 
corporate control contest hypothesis is motivated by evidence that boards of directors and investors hold 
managers accountable for current stock performance (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Brennan (1999) finds 
that target firms in takeover situations are more likely to issue management forecasts of earnings during 
contested bids. An exception to this general statements concerns situations where disclosing firms are 
larger (Imhoff, 1978), less risky (Ruland, 1978) and have good news to volunteer to the market 
(Waymire, 1985). Third, the stock compensation hypothesis is motivated by the expectation that firms 
which use stock compensation extensively are likely to provide additional disclosure to reduce the risk of 
misvaluation. According this hypothesis, stock-based compensation plans provide incentives for 
mangers to undertake voluntary disclosures. Stock compensation is more likely to be an efficient form of 
remuneration for managers and owners if share prices are an adequate reflection of firm values. Fourth 
the litigation cost hypothesis predicts that the risk of legal exposure influences CEOs' decisions about 
whether to publish forward-looking information to investors. Skinner (1994) suggests that firms not only 
voluntarily disclose good news, but also bad news to preempt large negative earnings surprises and 
thereby avoid the risk of litigation. Thus, this hypothesis presumes that in the absence of litigation 
managers have an incentive to time the disclosure of good and bad news symmetrically. Fifth, the 
proprietary cost hypothesis predicts that firms' decisions to provide additional disclosure is biased by an 
expectation that such disclosures can affect their competitive position in product markets (see e. g. 
Newman and Sansing, 1993). 
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3.4.4 Influence on third parties (political costs) 
The third potential motivation for accounting choices is concemed , vith 
interventions by third parties. This branch of research deals with the influence of 
external parties other than actual and potential owners of the firm: for example. 
government regulators, competitors and union negotiators. Many researchers have 
implicitly assumed that large companies may be viewed with suspicion, so that large 
companies earning igh levels of income may be perceived as exploiting external 
parties unreasonably. Such perceptions could result in decisions by such parties which 
are costly to the firm. By making accounting choices that influence accounting 
numbers, managers may influence the decisions of such parties. This possibility is 
reflected in the political costs hypothesis. The most common hypothesis considered 
here is that firms select accounting methods to reduce or defer taxes and to avoid 
potential regulation. In the PAT literature, the tax effect considers whether firms 
choose accounting methods to minimise the present value of taxes. In the case of firms 
that have probable increases in inventory costs, the choice of LIFO results in an 
associated rise in the incremental cash inflows associated with tax savings; on the basis 
of this reasoning, managers would be expected to choose LIFO. However, in the case 
of firms with conflicting goals, managers may not choose LIFO (see Fields et al., 
2001). 
A large body of research focusing on the tax consequences of accounting 
decisions has considered the choice between LIFO and FIFO for tax purposes. Maydew 
(1997), Scholes et al. (1992) and Guenther (1994) investigated intertemporal shifts in 
income by profitable firms that were induced by tax changes. Eilifsen et al. (1999) 
showed that if taxable income was linked to accounting income, there exists an 
automatic safeguard against the manipulation of accounting choices within the analysed 
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framework. In summary, the tax-related accounting choice research reports evidence 
that firms make accounting choices in order to reduce their tax burden and thus 
increase their cash flows. 
On the other hand, most of the research into the effect of regulation on 
accounting choices is based on industry specific regulations. It has been suggested that 
managers choose accounting methods and procedures to increase shareholder wealth. 
One cluster of research focuses on the re latory costs imposed by capital adequacy gu 
ratio guidelines (see Bowen et al., 2000). Companies in regulated industries are 
particularly useful settings for book-tax comparisons because their mandated 
disclosures are more extensive than other firms and their production functions are 
relatively simple. Mikhail (1999) examined life insurers, noting that public and private 
firms differ for at least two reasons: (i) public firrns compensation schemes are 
designed to mitigate agency costs and (ii) public firms are concerned about the stock 
market interpretations of reduced earnings associated with tax planning. To 
differentiate between these two explanations, Mikhail examined mutual life insurers, 
which have diffuse ownership and concurrent agency costs similar to public firms. 
Mikhail found that mutual insurers did not manage taxes. He concluded that public 
firms' incentive compensation contracts account for their difference from private 
companies, rather than stock market pressures. 
Han and Wang (1998) investigate whether finns that expect increases in earnings 
resulting from sudden product price rises use accounting accruals to reduce earnings 
and, thus, political costs. Specifically, they focus on oil fin-ns' accruals in a period of 
rapid petrol price increases during the 1990 Gulf crisis. Their results indicated that oil 
firms that expected to profit from the crisis used accruals to reduce their reported 
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quarterly earnings during the Gulf crisis. In contrast to previous research, the,,, found 
that the tendency to release good earnings news early was reversed for oil firms during 
this crisis. 
It has been argued that, since accounting techniques influence reported income, 
the political process may result in the choice of accounting techniques that adversely 
affect a firm's actual cash flows (Fields et al., 2001). This suggests that managers of 
firms facing political pressure are more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting 
methods to avoid the political costs associated with high visibility. Because firm size 
typically serves as a proxy for political pressure, this hypothesis is generally knoxvii as 
the "size hypothesis": 
"The larger the firm, the more likely the managers is to choose accounting 
procedures that defer reported earnings from current to future periods" (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 235). 
A number of studies have documented results that are consistent with the political 
costs hypothesis. That is, across a variety of accounting method choices, managers of 
larger firms are more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting methods. For 
example, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) reported evidence that firm size is 
correlated with the choice of depreciation method and investment tax credit method, 
but not with the choice of inventory method or pension cost amortization period. They 
argued that their results reflected the fact that, for the population that they studied, 
depreciation methods and investment tax credit accounting methods have no direct cash 
flow effects. In contrast, inventory valuation and pension cost amortization methods do 
have direct effects on cash flows. This result suggests that many managers may 
consider political costs only when making accounting policy decisions involving 
accounting choices which do not affect cash flows directly. 
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A number of points emerge from the above discussion in section 3.4. Overall, 
empirical studies of PAT provide evidence that managers change accounting methods 
or accrual estimates to reduce the costs of violating bond covenants when they are 
written in terms of accounting numbers. They also appear to make accounting choices 
in order to increase the value of earnings-based bonuses under compensation contracts 
and to reduce the level of taxes paid. 
3.5 Closing remarks 
In order to develop the hypotheses employed in this thesis, the current chapter has 
introduced the theoretical framework and reviewed the literature about the determinants 
of finus' accounting choices. After reviewing the pertinent literature, it is clear that 
many of the studies have focused on companies in Western countries, especially in the 
USA. There is a lack of research focusing on developing countries such as Egypt. The 
influence of contracting costs on firms' accounting choices emerges from the three 
fundamental hypotheses of PAT. One can argue that "contracting costs" are based on 
three distinctive contracting relationships: two explicit and one implicit. The two 
explicit contracts relate to compensation agreements between managers and owners as 
well as lending agreements between owners/managers and bondholders (agency 
conflict). The implicit contract refers to the creation of political pressures (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). The implicit contract is between companies that operate in a 
country and the government representing the citizens. It could be argued that implicitly 
citizens allow companies to operate within the border of their country as long as these 
companies do not harm or exploit them. The various governments (state and local) act 
as agents on behalf of the citizens. Furthermore, the ownership structure may 
be 
expected to influence the differing extents to which the PAT 
hypotheses are relevant 
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for owner and manager-controlled firms. 
The current study is concerned with the influence of various economic factors on 
managers' accounting choices by testing existing positive accounting theony in an 
Egyptian environment. The economic factors that are considered in the current study 
are the contracting costs within the context of ownership structure (see Figure 3- I). 
The general question arises: are major PAT hypotheses that are well supported in 
the USA and other developed countries valid in the Egyptian environment? This 
general question is further developed into three testable hypotheses applied to the t,, N-o 
sets of ownership structure in the next chapter. These hypotheses heavily depend on the 
perception that agency relationships affect accounting choices. 
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Chapter 4: Development of the Empirical Hypotheses 
85 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted why firms with different characteristics might 
be expected to adopt different disclosure and measurement practices ('Katts and 
Zimmerman, 1976,1986,1990; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981). PAT hypothesises 
that managers will exercise accounting choices to increase or decrease corporate 
income in order to meet their objectives. The theory suggests that the firm's choices 
may be influenced by particular firm attributes such as the existence of a bonus plan, 
leverage and size. 
Larger firms which may be subject to political costs, may adopt income reducing 
policy choices such as accelerated rather than SLD. The policy choices of firms 
financed with sizeable amount of debt may be influenced more by requirements of loan 
covenants than other firms. Firms with higher leverage may prefer income increasing 
policy choices if terms in loan covenants relating to the level of income are at risk of 
being broken. On the other hand, income-increasing policies, such as SLD and/or 
asset-increasing policies, involving the revaluation of assets or the capitalisation of 
expenditure, may be preferred where this has a favourable impact (from the lender's 
perspective) on financial ratios. In addition, it has been argued that a firm's ownership 
appears to be related to accounting choices and suggests that studies which have 
ignored ownership structure are incomplete and possibly misleading (Hunt, 1986). 
Thus, examinations of the potential relations between corporate ownership and 
accounting choices are necessary to provide a more complete theory of accounting 
choices and to assist in further development of a theory of the firm (Ibid). Thus far, the 
literature presents evidence suggesting that there is a relationship between ownership 
structure and at least some accounting choices (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Abdel Khalik, 
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1985; Hunt, 1986; Penno and Simon, 1986; Niehaus, 1989; Carlson and Bathala. 1997). 
However, this literature is limited by the manner in which ownership is measured. 
A large body of accounting literature tests predictions of PAT. The preceding 
chapter synthesized this body of literature since Watts and Zimmerman (1978) initiallý 
published their ground-breaking article. Management's economic motives for 
accounting choices tend to be grouped into three categories (see Chapter -33). Within 
each category, various uses of firms' accounting information may influence 
management's choice of accounting methods. For example, management may choose 
accounting methods in order to influence the outcomes of contracts that explicitly rely 
on accounting numbers (e. g. compensation contracts and debt contracts). In addition to 
representing e interests of accounting information users, managers are likely to 
operate in their own interest when there is conflict between the different categories. 
After reviewing the literature one can argue that, while the evidence to date supports 
perceptions that economic self-interest and/or firm characteristics motivate manager's 
accounting choice decisions in some Western countries (primarily in the USA), it is 
uncertain whether economic self-interest and/or firm characteristics dominate 
manager's accounting choice decisions in developing countries, such as Egypt; a 
developing state with a recently re-established capital market. Furthermore, this 
literature is limited by the manner in the theorising of the link between ownership 
structure and PAT hypotheses. 
4.2 The fundamental hypotheses and the Egyptian context 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, until the early 1990s, Egypt had a largely managed 
economy. From 1993 to 1996, however, the stock market grew by more than 17 times 
as the government implemented a large-scale privatisation plan. This change has 
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increased the relative importance of investors and shareholders and increased the 
importance attaching to the quality of accounting reports. Exterrial reporting 
requirements were imposed in 1997 by EASs. These standards are rnainlý, a translation 
of IASs". 
A" 
Applying IASs is mandatory for all companies reporting to the CMA under the 
provisions of Law 95 (Capital Markets Law) in Egypt. This includes all companies 
listed on the ESE as well as all specialised investment companies. Since 1998. most 
other companies in Egypt are required to comply with EASs, which are, in all material 
respects, the same as IASs. These standards have also been adopted as a part of the 
Uniform Accounting System that forms the basis of financial reports prepared by state- 
owned enterprises. 
Egypt provides an interesting enviromnent for the study of PAT hypotheses. As 
of the end of March 2003, there were 1,151 companies listed on the stock exchange. 
Nevertheless, a majority of firms quoted on that exchange are primarily owned by 
small numbers of shareholders or families (World Bank Report, 2001). Within the 
economy as a whole, there are still significant numbers of relatively large businesses 
that are similarly closely owned and controlled. Furthermore, the government pursues 
taxation policies intended to encourage the expansion of businesses that potentially 
provide employment to its citizens. These policies produce differing, and often 
extensive, periods of relief from business taxation. Within this context, successful 
business growth will probably be valued - indeed it might even be rewarded by 
government agencies. Cultural studies (e. g. Gray, 1988; Nobes, 1998) as well as 
69 in October 1998 the Group of Seven leading industrial nations adopted these IASs as the appropriate 
global financial reporting standards. At approximately the same time, the World Bank challenged 
auditors to refuse to give "clean opinions" on 
financial statements not prepared in accordance with 
internationally acceptable standards. Appropriately, all companies listed on the ESE must follow IASs. 
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contingency theory studies (Doupnik and Salter, 1995) identify reasons at a macro leiv-el 
that are likely to cause differences in accounting practices across various countries. 
Consequently, conventional PAT hypotheses may be quite inappropriate; the setting 
therefore provides an interesting research site. This thesis aims to test existing PAT 
theories in the Egyptian environment by constructing and testing hypotheses 
concerning Egyptian businesses. The following sections outline these hypotheses in 
more detail; these hypotheses heavily depend on the perception that agencý- 
relationships affect accounting choices. 
4.2.1 Ownership/control and bonus plans contracts hypotheses 
Bonus schemes provide a means of rewarding and punishing performance of 
managers (Smith and Watts, 1982; Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Sloan, 
1993). Bonus scheme contracts are one approach to reduce agency conflicts between a 
firm's managers and its owners (see Chapter 3). The usual hypothesis is that managers 
with bonus schemes directly tied to accounting earnings are more likely to choose 
income-increasing accounting methods". This suggests that managers select 
accounting methods in order to affect wealth transfers from the firm's owners and 
shareholders. 
The relationship between the ownership/control status of firms and the 
accounting methods they adopt is examined in the literature (e. g., Amihud et al., 1983; 
and Dempsey et al., 1993; Short, 1994). The findings from these studies are that 
manager-controlled firms which are characterized by a diffuse ownership structure 
'0 Ittner et al. (1997) found no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts was 
associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to their salary 
and bonuses. They also lent no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the 
board of directors were more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures. 
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where no one individual has a controlling interest are more likely to manage earnings 
than their owner-controlled counterparts, and to do so more frequently" 
Accounting earnings are expected to possess a variety of dýesirable characteristics 
that other performance measures do not have, including objectivity, rehabilitN'. 
verifiability and conservatism (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, pp. 205-207). Further, 
accounting earnings are a more appropriate basis measure on which to evaluate a 
manager's per ormance and calculate a manager's compensation than other measures 
such as share prices and realised cash flows (Healy, 1985; Sloan, 1993; Emanuel et al.. 
2003)72. Consequently, managers may be motivated to maximize such earnings 
(Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981). Sloan (1993) suggests that share prices are 
influenced by market factors that are outside the control of management and that may 
not therefore directly result from the manager's actions". Moreover, Dechow (1994) 
suggests that realised cash flows do not provide a timely measure of the effect of the 
manager's actions on firm performance, especially when performance is measured over 
short intervals. He argues that managers' compensation contracts almost invariably 
specify only one summary performance variable (e. g., earnings). However, Hall (2002) 
" Two theoretical arguments are used to support this correlation finding. The first argument is based on 
the managerial economics literature, which basically suggests that managers have incentives to make 
accounting choices and report accounting income in the most positive way in order to obscure poor 
managerial performance and to keep shareholders satisfied (Hindley, 1970). But these incentives depend 
on the ownership structure of the firm. The second argument is based on agency theory as articulated by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) where management bonus plans are more frequently link management 
remuneration and reported accounting earnings. The arguments of Watts and Zimmerman's positive 
theory are consistent with the view of managerial economists. Subsequent studies utilised agency theory 
to generate the prediction that manager-controlled firms are more likely than owner controlled firms to 
adopt accounting methods which increase reported earn ings (see Zmij ewski and Hagerman, 19 8 1). 
72 Other studies document a significant statistical association between variants of accounting earnings 
and incentive-pay programmes (e. g. Antle and Smith, 1985; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Dechow, 1994). 
73 Sloan found that the use of earnings-based as compared to share price-based performance measures is 
greater in firms where the share price is more subject to systematic influences; as measured by the firm's 
beta. 
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documents that although the amount of stock price-based pay (as a fraction of total top 
executive pay) in 1990 was less than 10%, it had grown to about 30% bý, 1992 and oN-er 
60% by the end of the decade in the USA. The vast majoritý, of this trend was 
accounted for by a growth in the use of executive stock options 
One could assume that the decisions of executives in manager-controlled firms 
are unlikely to be as tightly constrained by the owners as those in owner-controlled 
firms. This assumption leads to the hypothesis that manager-controlled firms are more 
likely than owner-controlled firms to choose income-increasing accounting methods in 
order to maximise their personal utility (see Chapter 3). This means that the executives 
in manager-controlled firms are more likely to benefit from the selection of accounting 
methods which increase reported income than their counterparts in owner-controlled 
firms. The executives of owner-controlled finns do not have the same incentives to 
increase reported earnings as their counterparts in manager-controlled firms. In such a 
case, the ownership structures of firms operating in Egypt are likely to influence 
accounting choices". Smith (1976) argues that the owner-managers of owner- 
controlled firms will be concerned with the acceleration of expense deductions for tax 
purposes and perhaps, for reporting purposes, in order to influence labour's bargaining 
position. This reasoning suggests that the executives in owner-controlled firms are 
more likely than the executives of manager-controlled firms to adopt accounting 
74 Further, Feltharn and Wu (2001) considered an explicit agency model and showed that such a result is 
sensitive to the ftinctional relationship between effort and risk. 
" In owner-controlled firms, the owners can motivate and monitor the behaviour of managers directly so 
the need for incentive compensation schemes based upon reported income is not great. On the other 
hand, the outside owners of management-control led firms must devise mechanisms to motivate the 
firm's managers to act in a manner which does not ignore the interests of the outside owners. One 
common mechanism used for this purpose is the adoption of incentive compensation schemes, which 
depend upon reported income. Consequently, it is likely that management-contro I led firms are more 
likely than owner-controlled firms to have incentive compensation schemes based upon reported income 
(see Chapter 3). 
91 
methods which lower or delay reported income. In other words, with defuse ownership 
the executives have an incentive to transfer wealth from shareholders to themselves 
because owners exert less control. The transfer of the wealth may be through the 
maximization of any bonus received. This suggests that bonus incentives may motivate 
manager-controlled firms' executives to select income-increasing accounting choices. 
In contrast, executives of owner-controlled firms may not have the same incentive to 
select income-increasing accounting choices. In Egypt, the stock exchange is still 
developing and the number of actively traded companies is small relative to the number 
of sizeable firms operating in the country. Further, management bonus contracts are 
usually based on accounting earnings (rather than share prices), which is implicitly 
recognized by the legal limit in Egypt of bonus remuneration: 10% of accounting 
earnings". This study does not therefore examine relationships between equity-based 
incentives and accounting choices, but hypothesises a positive relationship between the 
use of bonus schemes and the adoption of income-increasing reporting methods. This 
hypothesis is consistent with evidence by Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995), Holthausen 
et al. (1995) and Guidry et al. (1999) which suggests that managers select accounting 
methods in order to affect wealth transfers from the firm's owners and shareholders. 
Under this scenario, the following hypothesis is suggested with the expectation 
that it is relevant to Egyptian companies. 
Hl: 
NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and adopting income-increasing accounting choices. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely 
to adopt income-increasing accounting choices than those without bonus plans. 
76 The questionnaire survey included a question that 
directly referred to that area under discussion. 
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Egyptian company ownership structure is characterized by the prominent role 
afforded to the largest shareholder. This largest shareholder effectively controls the 
whole company by holding a significant proportion of equity. These owners usuallý' 
participate in firm management directly or indirectly through close contact with key 
managers; they can influence most of the management decisions (Jensen and Meckling. 
1976). In Egypt, the chairman of the board tends to be the managing director and many 
of the board members are major shareholders; the owner-managers dominate the 
management. Most boards are thus dominated by strong managers-owners. However. 
managers of Egyptian companies with widely dispersed share ownership frequently 
face little external supervision of their decisions and there may be conflicts between the 
interests of managers and shareholders". Ownership structures therefore need to be 
considered as potential influences on accounting choices in Egypt. The largest 
shareholder owner behaves in a way to maximize firm value when the owner's holding 
is large; in this case, convergence of interest between the owners and managers occurs. 
Under this scenario, one would expect that the larger the owner's holdings, the lower 
the likelihood that income-increasing reporting methods will be adopted: a negative 
relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that convergence of interest could 
occur as the owner's holdings increase, reducing agency costs. The reduction in agency 
costs would be greater, the higher the holdings of the largest shareholder owner. In this 
case, the largest shareholder owner acts to maximize firm value and impose fewer 
contractual constraints on the firm. The owner will be motivated to increase the long- 
77 See World Bank Corporate Govemance Report (2001). 
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term value of the firm instead of increasing income". However, in Egypt, o"mer- 
controlled firms may employ bonus plans if the large owners are not involved in the 
management and they employ professional individuals to represent them and manage 
the firms". In such case, the executives of owner-controlled firms may be motivated to 
increase the reported earnings not only to maximise their personal benefits, but also to 
influence their reputation and increase the satisfaction of their employers. 
Under this scenario, the hypothesis HI can be divided according to the type of 
control and the following two sub-hypotheses are adopted. 
Hlo: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and adopting income-increasing accounting choices 
in owner-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of owner-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting choices. 
Hlm: 
NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and adopting income-increasing accounting choices 
in manager-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of manager-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting choices. 
78 Warfield et al. (1995) show that the proportion of shares held by insider owners (managerial 
ownership) is a significant determinant of discretionary accruals. Then again, in Egypt, many of the 
board members are major shareholders, owner-managers dominate the management, and these owners 
usually participate in firm management directly or indirectly through close contact with key managers. 
Boards are thus completely driven by strong managers-owners. Thus all owner controlled Egyptian firms 
tend to be managerial ownership. 
79 Under the Companies Law No. 159 of 198 1, individuals or related group shareholders owning 10% or 
more of the total shares have a privilege to share in the management of the company or they can employ 
individuals to represent them and manage the firm. 
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The dependent variables most widely used in the literature are depreciation 
method, inventory method, the treatment of investment tax credits and the penod of 
pension amortization (e. g. Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich. 
1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Penno and Simon, 1986; Dhaliwal, 1988: Press 
and Weintrop, 1990; Bowen et al., 2000; Bowen et al., 2002). Investment tax credits 
operate in the USA and some Western countries but not in Egypt. Also, pension 
amortization does not appear in the Egyptian income statements, because under EAS 
No. 21 the pension system is subject to a special fund system and the investment of this 
special fund has a separate financial statement. This study is therefore limited to the 
remaining variables of depreciation method and inventory valuation choices. Further, 
depreciation and inventory costs are usually large expense figures for Egyptian firms" 
These variables should, however, be adequate because they can have large and 
systematic effects on the assets and expenses reported in firms' financial statements 
(Bowen et al., 2000; Bowen et al., 2002)". It is generally argued in the literature that 
the adoption of (a) SLD and (b) the FIFO stock valuation method will increase reported 
earnings in the short-term. Arguments and evidence on p. 125 indicate that they are 
likely to increase current earnings in Egypt also. The sums involved in Egypt can be 
material. For example, using a random sample of ten firms from the database, the ratios 
of depreciation costs to the profits for years 2001 were 4.5,0.2,2.8,0.5,1.1,1.1,0.7, 
0.35 0.6 and 1.8. The sums involved in inventory are also likely to be material. Table 6- 
I shows the industry classification of firms involved in the survey undertaken in this 
study. Similar industrial categories were found in the database. It will be observed that 
80 Source: - Five interviews with 
financial officers in five different firms and five interviews with the 
chairmen of investors associations in five industrial cities in the target population. 
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many of the industries involved, for example, textile steel, chemical etc. necessarý- hold 
relatively high levels of inventory. These arguments are accepted for this study, thus. to 
test HI and to follow the logic of the empirical tests reviewed in the literature that was 
discussed in the preceding chapter the following subsidiary hypotheses are adopted: 
ha: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the employment of 
management bonus plans and depreciation policy decisions. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likelý- 
to choose SLD. 
Hl 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the employment of 
management bonus plans and inventory policy decisions. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely 
to choose the FIFO inventory method. 
Once again, the hypotheses HI a and HI b can be broken up according to the 
type of control and the following sub-hypotheses are adopted. 
Hloa: 
NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and depreciation policy decisions in owner- 
controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of owner-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose SLD. 
H1Ma 
NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and depreciation policy decisions in manager- 
controlled firms. 
81 Further, in a given sample, the number of firms has R&D cost can be too small for appropriate 
statistical analysis to be undertaken. Thus, this variable was also not considered for analysis. 
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Alternative: In Egyptian fin-ns, managers of manager-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose SLD. 
H10b: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and inventory policy decisions in owner-controlled 
firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of owner-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose FIFO inventory method. 
HIMb: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between employment of 
management bonus plans and inventory policy decisions in manager- 
controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of manager-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose FIFO inventory method. 
To empirically test hypotheses Hla, H10a, HIMa, Hlb, H10b and H IMb. the 
classification of the firms into bonus plans and non-bonus plans categories, as well as 
the determination of whether Egyptian finns can be split into owner-controlled and 
manager-controlled groups is specified in Chapter 5. 
4.2.2 Debt contracts hypothesis 
The literature about the use of accounting infonnation by providers of capital 
deals with implicit claims, explicit contracts and general decision-making (Bowen et 
al., 2000). The extent to which firrns rely on financing resulting in implicit claims by 
their creditors is expected to be positively associated with the likelihood of managers 
choosing income increasing accounting methods. The literature linking implicit claims, 
explicit contracts and accounting method choice generally focuses on long-term debt; it 
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also considers the existence of and/or the proximity to debt covenants explicitly written 
on reported accounting numbers (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990; 
Sweeney, 1994)". Violation of such covenants can impose costs on firms. Since 
income increasing accounting methods can loosen some covenants commonly obsen, ed 
in long-term debt contracts, management has an incentive to make income increasing 
accounting choices to avoid these costs. Therefore, the existence of debt covenants is 
expected to be positively associated with management's choice of income increasing 
accounting methods. 
The debt hypothesis is one of the fundamental pillars of PAT (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978 and 1986) 83 . The strength of the debt hypothesis depends on the 
costs of violating the firm's debt covenants (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). 
However, despite the large number of studies which have investigated this area, the 
evidence remains largely mixed 84 . The likelihood of violation of accounting related 
covenants normally cannot be observed directly using readily available data. 
Researchers have therefore employed the level of leverage as a proxy for the likelihood 
of this event, assuming that the higher the leverage, the greater the chance of a violation 
occurring. Furthermore, they have generally assumed that the likelihood of violation is 
82 Empirical studies that examine the link between investor decision-making and management's 
accounting choices generally focus on short-term incentives and accounting choices (Bowen et al., 
2000). Dechow et al. (1996b) examine management's use of income increasing discretionary accrual 
choices prior to equity issues. They argue that management has incentives to choose income-increasing 
accruals in order to influence investors' decision making and, thus, the firms' cost of capital. Burton et 
al. (1996) confirm this view with UK data where profitability declined significantly following an equity 
issue. 
83 The idea of this hypothesis is that, managers have incentives to make financial reporting decisions that 
reduce the likelihood that accounting based covenants in their firms' debt agreements will be violated 
(see Chapter 3). 
" DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) found results which were supportive of the debt 
covenant hypothesis. However, Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) documented results 
that were inconsistent with debt covenant hypothesis (see Chapter 3). 
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reduced when the level of a firm's income increases (see, for example DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Given the absence of more appropriate proxies in 
Egypt, this investigation adopts gearing as the independent variable and income 
increasing accounting methods as the dependent variables in the current investigation. 
Most prior research examined Western corporations which borrow through the 
issuance of long-term bonds. In contrast, the banks constitute the main source of funds 
for Egyptian industry; indeed, in a number of cases they also own some of the share 
capital. Relationships and contracts with Egyptian lenders may therefore be 
significantly different to those in Western capitalist economies. Given this situation, the 
debt covenant hypothesis may not offer the same explanatory power for the accounting 
choices of Egyptian companies as in most previously published studies. Nevertheless, 
most Egyptian corporations rely on debt; financial statements are used to convey 
information about the borrowing firm's credit status to banks and other lenders. The 
conventional debt covenant hypothesis may therefore be expected to be relevant to 
Egypt because of the possibility that gearing affects the perceptions of potential and 
present lenders. Evidence on whether Egyptian managers' choices are consistent with 
an intention to reduce the likelihood that their firms will violate accounting-based debt 
covenants can be gained by testing hypothesis H2: 
H2: 
Null. - In Egyptian finns, there is no association between the use of income- 
increasing reporting methods and leverage. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the use of income-increasing reporting methods is 
positively associated with leverage. 
Closely-held firms are more likely to obtain a greater level of corporate debt as 
compared to firms with widely-held firms (Kim and Sorenson, 1986; Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). As mentioned in Chapter 3, while the conditions of the debt 
covenants are often expressed in terms of accounting figures, the accounting methods 
employed can partially determine whether or not a firm is able to meet the debt 
covenants. Consequently, to avoid debt covenant violations, even executives of 
closely-held firms may have an incentive to choose a reporting method which yields 
higher rather than lower reported earnings (Cloyd et al., 1996). The hypothesis H2 can 
be divided according to the type of control and the following two sub-hypotheses are 
adopted. 
H20: 
Null. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the use of income- 
increasing reporting methods and leverage in owner-controlled firms . 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the use of income-increasing reporting methods is 
positively associated with leverage in owner-controlled firms. 
H2m: 
Null. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the use of income- 
increasing reporting methods and leverage in manager-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the use of income-increasing reporting methods is 
positively associated with leverage in manager-controlled firms. 
As in the hypothesis HI, the hypothesis H2 can be divided into two subsidiary 
hypotheses: 
H2.: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the level of the leverage 
and the choice of SLD method. 
Alternative: In Egyptian finns, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that a firm will choose the SLD method. 
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NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the level of the leN, erage 
and the choice of the FIFO inventory valuation method. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that a firm will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
Once again, the hypotheses HI aand HI b can be divided according to the type of 
control and the following sub-hypotheses are adopted. 
H20.: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the level of the leverage 
and the choice of SLD method in owner-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that an owner-controlled firm will choose the SLD method. 
H2m,,: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the level of the leverage 
and the choice of SLD method in manager-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that a manager-controlled firm will choose the SLD method. 
H20b: 
NO. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the level of the leverage 
and the choice of FIFO inventory valuation method in owner-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that an owner-controlled firm will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
H2Mb: 
NO. - In Egyptian finns, there is no association between the level of the leverage 
and the choice of the FIFO inventory valuation method in manager-controlled 
firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood 
that a manager-controlled firm will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
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To empirically test H2a, H20a, H2Ma, H2b, H20b and H2NIb, leverage must be 
measured and the measurement of this variable is specified in Chapter 5. 
4.2.3 Political visibility hypothesis 
Tests about political visibility are also known as investigations of the "size 
hypothesis" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 235). The conventional hypothesis 
considered in the literature is that firms select accounting methods to reduce or defer 
taxes and to avoid potential regulation (political costs)". The tax-related accounting 
choice research documents evidence that firms make accounting choices in order to 
reduce their tax burden and thus increase their cash flows". This result is not surprising 
because managers are unlikely to forgo tax savings without convincing reasons"'. In the 
tax research literature, competing motivations often exist for accounting choices. 
85 However, contrary to size hypothesis, Daley and Vigeland (1983) found that the association between 
size (sales) and the choice of R&D is significant only for their subsample of smaller firms. Lee and Hsieh 
(1985) and El-Gazzar et al. (1986) reported that a firm's size does not reflect differences in the political 
costs of firms. In addition, Aitken and Loftus (1994) identify all relevant alternative accounting policy 
choices and the dollar effect of each accounting policy choice. Whereas the results lend no support to the 
political costs hypothesis, the bonus plan hypothesis is supported. They attribute the confusing results in 
previous studies to using sample firms from heterogeneous industries. They suggest that accounting 
policy choices are likely to be industry-specific. 
86 There is a suggestion that managers may consider political costs only when making accounting policy 
decisions involving accounting choices which do not affect cash flows directly. However using LIFO led 
to a positive affect on the firm's cash flow because the choice of LIFO results in incremental cash 
inflows due to tax savings; value-maximizing managers would thus be expected to choose LIFO. Thus it 
is desirable that firms with high political costs adopt the LIFO inventory method (Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1983). For example, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) documented evidences that firm size is 
correlated with the choice of depreciation methods and investment tax credit methods, but not with the 
choice of inventory methods or pension cost amortization periods. They reported suggestion that their 
results reflect the fact that depreciation methods and investment tax credit accounting methods have no 
direct cash flow effects. In contrast, inventory valuation and pension cost amortization methods do have 
direct effects on cash flows. This result suggests that many managers may consider political costs only 
when making accounting policy decisions involving accounting choices which do not affect cash flows 
directly. 
" However, using the characteristics of US public companies in the period 1975 to 1984, Cushing and 
LeClere (1992) found that while expected tax savings is the firms' primary reason for using LIFO, other 
firms do not use LIFO because of numerous factors; no single reason dominated. Such factors as LIFO 
bookkeeping costs, increasing production costs, the effects on debt covenants and the requirements of 
FIFO for government contracts diminished the potential tax savings from LIFO. 
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Income taxes represent an implicit contract between the go', v-ernment and the citizen: 
they explicitly rely on accounting numbers. Taxation of profits may be the most direct 
form of wealth transfer. One might have expected therefore that larger firms would face 
higher tax rates than their smaller-sized counterparts. Using effective tax rates as a 
proxy for political costs, Zimmennan (1983) found some evidence that large firms haNýe 
higher effective tax rates than smaller companies, thus in effect reducing their political 
costs. He discovered that this relationship varied over time and was largely driven by 
oil industry firms, suggesting that firm size is a noisy proxy for political costs. 
On the other hand, one could argue that although larger firms may face higher 
political costs, they may reap greater political benefits; for example, profitable 
government contracts, import restrictions, easier access to finance. Due to their size, 
therefore larger firms may be politically powerful and consequently enjoy higher 
political benefits. In Egypt there are strong links between the state apparatus and the 
large firm sector. The state has encouraged large firms because of their significant 
affect on the unemployment and economic prosperity. On the other hand, the tax rate in 
Egypt rises to 40%, so the largest firms find the incentive to reduce their reported 
income. However, investment incentives are a prominent feature of Egyptian tax 
policy, where the preferred form is a tax holiday. In Egypt tax holidays are used to 
promote certain activities and to encourage new industries. Tax holidays vary from 
between 5 and 20 years and extend to lifetime exemptions from certain taxes in the case 
of tax free zone investments. Thus, although it might be assumed that large Egyptian 
companies will face significant political costs, the reverse may in fact apply; instead, 
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they may enjoy significant political benefits". Nevertheless, for the purposes of the 
current analysis, this study adopts the conventional PAT political costs hypothesis that 
the larger Egyptian firms are more likely to adopt income-decreasing accounting 
methods to reduce political costs than smaller businesses. 
Due to monitoring costs, company size and higher company profits are proxies 
for possible extreme expectations of the probability of harmful or exploitative 
behaviour by companies. Past studies often used size (measured by total assets and/or 
total sales) as a proxy for political sensitivity. Nevertheless, size may be a proxy for 
factors other than political sensitivity". For example, the operating characteristics of 
smaller firms may be significantly different from those of larger firms (e. g., greater 
default risk). Thus, it seems possible that accounting method behaviour may differ 
based on the size of the firm because of factors other than political sensitivity. A more 
direct measure of political sensitivity may therefore be needed. A possible proxy for 
political sensitivity is the number of employees, since they are one of the political 
groups for each company and unions may be able to lobby effectively. This does not 
seem to be appropriate in Egypt, however, because employees in Egypt are not 
unionised or adept at imposing political pressure on their companies. Furthermore, 
Egyptian firms that employ 50 or more people can claim a five-year tax holiday, 
reflecting govenunental support for high levels of employment. One can argue that, the 
enterprise level and workers may not have incentives to reduce reported income by 
88 These political benefits may include the introduction of accounting standards that can contribute to a 
reduction in the level of firm's tax liability. 
89 Ball and Foster (1982) as well as Zimmerman (1983) indicate that firm size is a noisy proxy variable 
for political costs and has been used to proxy for other factors. Furthermore, Whittred and 
Zimmer 
1992) indicate that political costs are likely to be a function of numerous factors; for example, the nature 
of the industry, the number of employees or customers as potential voters, and geographical 
location. El- 
Gazar et al. (1986) argued that the level of effective tax rates may 
be a more appropriate proxy than the 
size about fIrm's political costs 
because taxes are supposed to be the most direct way for wealth transfer. 
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choosing income-decreasing methods to weaken the bargaining position of their unions 
in Egypt. This study has therefore rejected levels of employment as a proxy for political 
sensitivity. In the absence of an acceptable alternative, size has therefore been used to 
proxy for political sensitivity. The following hypothesis is therefore suggested here to 
test the relevance of the conventional PAT political costs hypothesis in Ecrypt. L- ý 
H3: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the firm and the 
use of income-increasing reporting methods; 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of larger firms are less likely than those 
of smaller firms to adopt income-increasing accounting choices. 
The hypothesis H3 can be divided according to the type of control and the following 
two sub-hypotheses are adopted. 
H30: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the firm and the 
use of income-increasing reporting methods in owner-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of larger owner-controlled firms are less 
likely than those of smaller firms to adopt income-increasing accounting 
choices. 
H3m: 
Null. - In Egyptian finns, there is no association between the size of the firm and the 
use of income-increasing reporting methods in manager-controlled firms. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, managers of larger manager-controlled firms are 
less likely than those of smaller firms to adopt income-increasing accounting 
choices. 
Large firms may use both depreciation and inventory valuation methods for 
decreasing accounting income. Consequently, H3 could be represented by Ma and H3 b 
as follows: 
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H3,,: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the firm and the 
use of SLD method 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the firm, the lesser the likelihood it "'III 
choose the SLD method. 
H3b: 
Null. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the finn and the 
use of FIFO inventory valuation method. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the firm, the lesser the likelihood it will 
choose the FIFO inventory method. 
Once again, as in the preceding hypotheses, the hypothesis H% and H3b can be 
divided according to the type of control and the following sub-hypotheses are adopted. 
H30,,: 
Null: In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the owner- 
controlled firm and the use of SLD method 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the owner-controlled firm, the lesser the 
likelihood it will choose the SLD method. 
H3m,,: 
Null. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the manager- 
controlled firm and the use of SLD method 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the manager-controlled firm, the lesser 
the likelihood it will choose the SLD method. 
H30b: 
Null. - In Egyptian finns, there is no association between the size of the owner- 
controlled firm and the use of FIFO inventory valuation method. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the owner-controlled firm, the lesser the 
likelihood it will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
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H3Mb: 
Null. - In Egyptian firms, there is no association between the size of the manager- 
controlled firm and the use of FIFO inventory valuation method. 
Alternative: In Egyptian firms, the larger the manager-controlled firm, the lesser 
the likelihood it will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
To empirically test Ma H30a, H3Ma, H3b5 H30b and H3Mb predictions. it is 
necessary to measure the size of Egyptian firms. Previous studies have measured the 
size of the firms using both (a) total sales (SALES) and (b) total assets (ASSETS), 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Kuo, 1993). The size 
of a firm is assumed to influence the political costs of a firm, since the larger the firm 
the more likely is that it will "attract" the attention of politicians as a potential target for 
a wealth transfer. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented the operational hypotheses developed for the purposes 
of this study. The general research question is further developed into three testable 
hypotheses. The hypotheses were derived from the conventional PAT predictions and 
split into the form of owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. Each hypothesis 
is divided to two subsidiary hypotheses concerned with the association between a 
firm's characteristics (independent variables) and the aspect of a firm's accounting 
policy decisions concerning depreciation and inventory valuation methods, (the 
dependent variables). It has been hypothesised that, ceteris paribus, managers of firm 
that employ management bonus plans are more likely to adopt income-increasing 
methods. This hypothesis is derived from the bonus plans 
hypothesis. A second 
hypothesis is derived from the debt contracting costs hypothesis, which suggests that 
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the use of income increasing reporting methods is positively associated with the 
leverage. The third hypothesis is derived from the conventional political costs 
hypothesis, which suggests that managers of large firms are less likely to use an 
accounting change to increase earnings than are managers of smaller firms. 
Details of variable definitions, variables measurement, data collection and 
sample, as well as how all the hypotheses are analysed are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Research Design and Methodology 
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5.1 Introduction: purpose of chapter and overview 
For the purposes of the current study, the operational hypotheses about the 
accounting choices of Egyptian corporations were developed in Chapter 4. It is 
necessary to empirically investigate the stated hypotheses. The development of the 
research plan is a prerequisite for this empirical testing. Research methodology is "the 
application of scientific procedures towards acquiring answers to a wide variety of 
research questions" (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1991, p. 16). It provides the tools to 
enable the researcher to underpin the work and obtain useful findings. Methodology 
incorporates the entire process of a study: that is, conceptualising the problem, 
developing the research questions to be investigated, data collection and data analysis 
as well as generalisation from the results. 
The present chapter introduces the research design and outline the methodology 
needed to investigate the hypotheses that were stated in Chapter 4. It describes the 
companies selected for the purposes of this investigation and the sources of data used in 
this study. Previous studies have provided the basis for selecting the research methods 
employed. These methods include a questionnaire survey and an analysis of the 
financial statements that were included in an Egyptian database. The data obtained 
using these methods are then statistically analysed in order to determine if significant 
conclusions can be arrived at using both univariate and multivariate analysis. In certain 
circumstances, the data derived from the questionnaire survey and the database have 
been compared and discussed. 
The remainder of this chapter is split into seven areas. The research design of the 
study is described in section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the population characteristics, 
the sampling procedure and the units of analysis. Methods for data collection adopted 
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are discussed in section 5.4. Variables and the measurement scales that are used in the 
analysis are described in section 5.5. Section 5.6 is concerned xvith the validity and 
reliability of the research. Within section 5.7 the statistical anal'Vses and le'%, el of 
significant are presented and discussed. The chapter concludes with section 5.8, where 
a synopsis of the research plan of this study is provided. 
5.2 Research design 
A sound literature review "gives a good basic framework to proceed further with 
the investigation" by clarifying the research problem and identifying likely variables 
(Sekaran, 1992, p. 38). Research design is concerned with how to conduct the research 
and what methods to use. Research design has been referred to as "a master plan 
specifying the methods and procedures" (Zikmund, 1994, p. 42). The objectives of a 
particular study play a crucial role in developing the research design that will be 
followed (Sekaran, 1992). Positivist studies generally aim to test a theory in an attempt 
to increase our understanding of how phenomena might be predicted. Research is 
classified as positivist if there is evidence of formal propositions, quantifiable measures 
of variables, hypothesis testing and the drawing of inferences about a phenomenon 
from the sample to a stated population (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
In line with the "positive accounting theory" approach initiated by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), the current study aims to test some existing theories in an Egyptian 
context. The primary mode of the research inquiry in positivism is based on deduction 
(Layder, 1993). Use of the hypothetical-deductive approach leads to generalization 
from the statistical tests which are undertaken (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Tsoukas. 
1989). Data collection techniques include experiments and sample surveys. Data 
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collection is usually carried out with the researcher being remote from the phenomena 
under investigation rather than participating in the project'. 
The analytical process of the current study involved: re,,, iiewing the literature. 
exploring the relevant characteristics of the selected Egyptian businesses, fonnulating 
hypotheses, developing models, collecting data, analysing data, making comparisons 
and testing the formulated hypotheses. Thus, certain hypotheses have been formulated 
and tested on the accounting choices of Egyptian corporations. The hypotheses link a 
firm's depreciation-policy and inventory valuation decisions to its ownership structure, 
the existence of a management bonus plan, leverage and company size. 
Earlier empirical studies of economic-consequences in accounting research 
primarily focus on established databases of financial information about quoted firms. 
They are concerned with examining and analysing actual data about various firms' 
characteristics and their accounting-policy decisions (see Tables 3-1,3-2 and 3-3 in 
Chapter 3). This research approach often involves the examination of statistical 
associations between variables which are either directly derived from publicly available 
information sources - in most cases, the financial statements - or estimated on the basis 
of data included in accounting reports - e. g. financial ratios. Under certain 
circumstances, other information gathering devices can be employed, in conjunction 
with, or independently from, the analysis of databases. The questionnaire survey is 
usually employed when the relevant information is not readily obtainable through 
established financial databases. For example, Penno and Simon (1986), Cloyd et al. 
(1996) as well as Schulze and Dino (1998) employed a questionnaire survey in order to 
90 Researcher Participation tends to be a feature of other methodologies - specifically these adopting the 
interpretative paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). For example, according to the interpretative 
paradigm, reality does not exist independently of the researcher and methods such as interviews, case 
studies and ethnographic investigations tend to be employed (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
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collect information regarding the accounting policy decisions of private firms". The 
dearth of available data about non-quoted firms' reporting strategies, compelled them 
to utilise a questionnaire survey to collect the necessary information. 
In this study, only the financial reports of the most frequently-traded Eg)'ptian 
companies are available in a database. The required information cannot be obtained 
from an examination of financial statements of non-traded firms on the ESE. Variables 
such as the usage of compensation plans and ownership structure which might be 
important in explaining a firm's depreciation and inventory valuation policy choices are 
not readily accessible. This information is unavailable for non-traded firms on the ESE 
from a readily available database. Also, the bases of accounting employed by non- 
traded firms are not obtainable from available databases. Moreover, an analysis of 
financial data may not be, by itself, sufficient for collecting all the necessary 
information regarding peoples' beliefs and opinions (Stelltiz et al., 1976). Thus one can 
argue that using a questionnaire survey to investigate respondents' opinions, beliefs and 
perceptions is considered necessary for investigating decisions about finns' reporting- 
methods". Consequently, a questionnaire survey has been conducted. 
Using SPSS software, the data collected from the questionnaire survey and from 
the database were independently analysed in two phases". Following the example of 
previous research, a univariate analysis was initially used to examine the association 
" One reason cited by Penno and Simon (1986), Cloyd et al. (1996) as well as Schulze and Dino (1998) 
for using an experimental survey to conduct their tests is that archival data are not readily available on 
private firms. 
92 Furthermore, Blaikie (1993) argued that using two methods allows the researcher to (i) obtain a variety 
of information on the same issue; (ii) use the strength of each method to overcome the deficiencies of the 
other; (Iii) achieve a higher degree of validity and reliability; and (iv) overcome the deficiencies of 
single-methods studies. 
93 In the first phase (Chapter 6), the descriptive statistics regarding the responses to the questionnaire 
survey and the variables used for the financial statements analysis are presented. 
In addition, the 
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between the dependent variable and each of the independent and control variables taken 
one at a time. A multivariate analysis was then undertaken. The multivariate analysis 
was used to examine the significance of the variables as a whole in explaining 
depreciation and inventory method choices. The results from the two data sets were 
then compared and discussed. 
5.3 Population and sample selection 
"Population refers to the entire group of people, event or things of interest that 
the researcher wishes to investigate" (Sekaran, 1992, p. 225). Most researchers are not 
a 'k ble to survey the whole population and, accordingly, have to settle for a sample. 
Access to the whole population may not be possible or even feasible for a lot of 
researchers. 
Two "samples" of companies were selected for scrutiny in the current work. First, 
the financial officers of firms in the Cairo area as well as in the Alexandria and 
Menoufia Governorates in Egypt were identified as the population for a questionnaire 
survey. These areas were chosen because they are the most industrialised areas in 
Egypt; most large Egyptian firms are concentrated there. The sample for the 
questionnaire survey consists of the 320 largest firms (classified by their working 
capital in the financial year, 2001)" drawn from the research population. The Egyptian 
Business & Finance Portal web as well as interviews with the chairmen of the investors 
association between certain variables is investigated. In the second phase (Chapter 7), the results of the 
statistical analysis, which aims to formally test the formulated hypotheses, are reported. 
94 Five interviews with the chairmen of investors associations in five industrial cities in Egypt confirmed 
this widely held view that most common way for classifying the largest firms is based on their working 
capital. Given the absence of more appropriate method in Egypt, the researcher used that approach to 
establish the largest firms because that basis was the only accessible source. 
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associations in five industrial cities9' were used to determine the 320 largest firnis in the 
population to be surveyed. Practical considerations contributed to the sample selection 
decision. During the pilot study for the questionnaire', a number of intervie,,, vees 
suggested that the researcher confine the sample of the questionnaire survey to the 
larger firms. They argued that larger firms, with organized public-relation offices. 
would be more likely to participate in the study and respond to the questionnaire survey 
than smaller companies. However, the main reason for concentrating the sample on the 
largest firms was that small businesses tended not to have an organized accounting 
function and consequently would not be able to contribute information relevant to the 
central objectives of this study. More than half of the respondent finns in the 
questionnaire survey are listed on the stock exchange, but they are classed as -rarely 
traded" firms. 
Second, Egyptian firms quoted on the ESE were identified as the population for 
the database sample. A database of listed companies is available from three resources: 
(i) the CMA in Cairo which controls the stock market, (ii) the Disclosure Department at 
the CSE, which has a link with EGID for data display and (iii) Kompass Egypt which 
maintains a commercial database on businesses. Only the annual reports for the most 
frequently traded companies were complete in the databases". These 118 most 
frequently traded companies were therefore selected as the sample for the current 
research study. Due to a lack of complete financial data that were required to construct 
9' Precise details of the interviewees in the different cities cannot be revealed in order to preserve the 
anonymity of these chairmen. However two of the cities are in the Cairo area, one is in the Alexandria 
Governorate, and two are in the Menoufla Governorate. 
96 See the pilot study that is discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
97 A large tax advantage is given to firms quoted on the exchange (there is a tax exemption for all 
companies listed on the Egyptian exchange). The magnitude of the subsidy led to many closely held 
companies being listed. Consequently, the ESE identifies listed companies as either (i) actively traded or 
(ii) rarely or not traded. The rarely traded companies are in most cases closely held. 
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the variables to be tested, other firms were omitted. The annual reports v, -ere collected 
for the 118 companies after paying a nominal fee to the three sources. Some of these 
firms were excluded because it was not possible to obtain their accounts for a 
consecutive three-year period which was necessary for the statistical analysis which 
was performed. The final sample includes 96 firms (see section 5.4.2). Thus, the 
sample of firms from the database included only companies for which complete 
financial statements were obtained. Since the relevant data were obtained from the 
records of the ESE, they refer only to listed and traded firms. The data were collected 
for the financial periods ending in 1999,2000 and 200 1. The empirical research took 
place during 2002. 
Firms' ownership/control status in both samples of companies (questionnaire 
survey and database) was split into owner-controlled and manager-controlled (as a sub- 
population). A firm's ownership/control status is normally defined in the PAT literature 
on the basis of the percentage of the ownership of a firm's equity capital. Many studies 
have classified a fin-n as closely held, when one party controls more than 10% of its 
capital (see, Chapter 3); they have used dichotomous variables to classify firms into 
owner-controlled and manager-controlled categories based on this percentage. Such an 
approach has been adopted in the current study which classifies firms as either owner- 
controlled or manager-controlled using a zero--one dummy variable. Since the 
ownership required to call a shareholders meeting in firms listed on the ESE is 5% for 
ordinary meetings and 10% for extraordinary meetings" the current study utilises the 
98 Since the Companies Law No. 159 of 1981 articulated that individuals or related group shareholders 
own 10% or more of the total shares of a company have a privilege to share 
in the management of the 
company or they can employ individuals to represent them and manage the company. 
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following ownership criterion (as that employed by many previous researchers)". 
Specifically, if the percentage of equity owned by one owner (or related group) is equal 
or greater than 10%, then the firm is classified as owner-controlled. If the percentage is 
equal or less than 5%, the firm is classified as manager-controlled. Between 5% and 
10%, the researcher was unsure about the type of control and companies in this region 
were omitted from the analysis. Consequently, respondents to the questionnaire sun-eý- 
were requested to indicate if one shareholder or one related group (for example, a 
family) owned 10% or more of the total share capital (question 5). 
For firms included in the database, a finn was identified as an "owner-controlled" 
entity when one shareholder or related group (five shareholders) held equity capital 
equal or more than 10%. No electronic databases on the ownership of Egyptian firms 
exists therefore data on the identity and size of the largest five shareholders' holdings 
was collected by examining annual reports. This information on ownership structure 
was confinned for about 70 firms using the Kompass Egypt Financial yearbook. 
Ownership structures for the remaining 26 firms were confirmed by examining details 
ftom the disclosure database of the CMA. 
The researcher had to exercise judgement in choosing the cut-off level of 
ownership that is assumed to create a "sufficient incentive" for shareholders to engage 
in monitoring. In previous mostly American empirical research, concentration of 
ownership has been measured using cut-offs ranging from 5% to 10%; these 
percentages are employed to indicate that owners are likely to play an active role in the 
management of their firms (Tosi and Mejia, 1994). Egyptian firms are required to 
" More recent studies use of ýcontinuous classification. However, in Egypt the ownership required to call 
shareholders meeting is 5% for ordinary meeting and 10% 
for extraordinary meeting. Which suggest that 
the dichotomous classification is more appropriate. 
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report all individuals or institutions holding 3% or more of their shares (in American 
companies is 5%). The objective of this research is to test the existing PAT theories in 
an Egyptian enviromnent; therefore, the researcher recognised that the current studv, 
has to be compatible with the literature and the cut-off levels of 5/o> to <10% ý, N-ere 
utilised to indicate that owners are likely to be active in the management of their firms. 
The percentage used as cut-offs are consistent with those employed in past research" 
(e. g. Dhaliwal, 1982; 1988) where ownership structure was unchanged during the test 
period. This procedure defines fewer firms as being manager-controlled and therefore 
was deemed to be more appropriate to the Egyptian environment"' 
5.4 Research methods 
As indicated above, the empirical study follows most preceding work in using an 
established database of financial data for firms quoted on the stock market. The 
investigation also analyses data from a questionnaire survey. This methodological 
expansion enables mutual validation of, and challenge to, the findings from each 
independent source. It also allows the study to be extended to large firms that are not 
quoted on the stock exchange and to companies that are, on average, smaller than the 
quoted firms. In addition, the ability to ask questions that cannot be measured by 
reference to a database provides a relatively rich source of information on the factors 
that managers say influence decisions. Given the objectives of this study, data were 
collected on the following items: firms' depreciation and inventory policies; firms' 
ownership structure; firms' leverage and size characteristics and existence of 
100 The gap between the 5% and 10% ranges was considered a "grey-area" of ownership where the 
firm 
was neither manager-controlled nor owner-controlled. 
101 Overall no firms in the database were included in the cut-offs level. 
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management bonus plans. A summary of the research methods emploNred is presented 
in Table 5-1. 
5.4.1 Questionnaire survey 
5.4. LI Pilot studies 
Before starting the research survey, pilot studies were held to assess the 
feasibility of the research project and to assess the validity of the research instrument. 
The first pilot study for testing the questionnaire was conducted at the Department ýof 
Accountancy and Business Finance at the University of Dundee. Members of the 
academic staff in the Department who have research experience with questionnaire 
surveys were asked to express their opinion regarding the validity of the research 
instrument; in particular, views were sought on the selection and wording of questions, 
the general aims of the instrument and the measures being ascertained. The staff 
recommended some rephrasing and restructuring of the questionnaire so that the 
questions more precisely conveyed their intended meaning. 
Subsequently, a second pilot study was undertaken in Egypt. It was considered 
desirable to test the research instrument with professionals who have research 
experience within the Egyptian business environment. Three members of the academic 
staff who have undertaken research in Egypt were interviewed. One was a Professor of 
Accounting in the Zagazeg University (Zagazeg, Egypt) and was working as a 
consultant in the CMA in Cairo; the other two were lecturers in the Business 
Administration Department at Menoufia University (Shebin El-Kom, Egypt). These 
individuals also checked the translation of the questionnaire from English into Arabic. 
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A third pilot study including ten interviews was also undertaken in Ep-pt. Five 
interviews were with financial officers in five different firms" and five inteniews 
were with the chairmen of investors associations in the five industrial cities that would 
be targeted with the questionnaire. The interviewees were asked about the applicabilitý- 
of the questionnaire (in terms of the terminology used and the range of size emploN, ed 
for certain quantitative variables concerning the size of the firm)"'. Also. on the basis 
of their experience, the interviewees were asked (a) to indicate potential difficulties that 
the researcher might face during the questionnaire survey; (b) to express their opinion 
regarding the extent to which the issues under investigation were relevant within the 
Egyptian business environment; and (c) about the length of the questionnaire and the 
clarity of the questions. 
First of all, the interviewees suggested that the study should focus on the larger 
firms in order to improve the response rate. They also mentioned that the academic 
terminology used in the questionnaire was at an appropriate level of sophistication for it 
to be well understood by the potential respondents. However, it was suggested that the 
ranges envisaged for the size variables had to be widened to include smaller companies 
in order to be suitable for Egyptian firms in the target population. They indicated that, 
in their opinion, the questions included in the questionnaire adequately identified the 
variables which they were indicated to measure. Regarding the length of the 
questionnaire, all the participants suggested that the questionnaire was short enough" 
and that all the questions were clear and understandable. However, they pointed out 
102 These firms spanned three sectors: Textile, Building materials, Electrical appliances. 
103 Specifically, the size ranges for total sales, market value and total assets were all involved based on 
the recommendation of these interviewees. 
... Since, a satisfactory response rate is more likely to be achieved in shorter questionnaire (Stelltiz et al., 
1976). This issue was raised by the researcher in the interviews that were held. 
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that the major problem that the researcher would most likely face v, -ould be a verý, - lo, %&- 
response rate to a postal questionnaire survey. Consequently. they recommended 
personal administration of the questionnaire"'. In addition they indicated that if the 
documents were distributed by Fax a higher response rate might be achieved than if the 
mail service was used; fax is the most frequently used method of sending documents 
from one business to another in the Egyptian environment"'. 
They also pointed out that managers of Egyptian firms are very reluctant to 
participate in surveys either because they do not wish to do so or because their firms 
have a policy of not responding to such requests. Also, managers of Egyptian firms can 
be extremely suspicious and therefore reluctant to participate in research where 
findings may be published - particularly in the case of "sensitive questions". The 
interviewees recommended that the best way to achieve an adequate response rate was 
to establish personal contact with firms' financial officers and to personally administer 
the questionnaire. By establishing personal contact, the researcher would be in a 
position to explain the purpose of the survey and to outline the issues under 
investigation. Thus, financial officers might be prepared to participate. 
On the basis of the above comments, modifications were made to the initial draft 
of the questionnaire. Although it was initially considered that only a postal 
questionnaire survey should be undertaken, it was decided that 50% of the 
questionnaires might be distributed by fax and in person. The personal distribution of 
the questionnaires was used when the geographical proximity of the target-sample 
105 Personally-administration questionnaires allow the researcher to establish a report with the 
respondents during an introduction to a survey. On the other hand, personally administrated 
questionnaires are more expensive, especially, if the sample is geographically dispersed (Sekaran, 1992). 
106 Potential respondents who had already been surveyed in the pilot study were eliminated from the 
sample of firms target with the final version of the research instrument. 
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Permitted it. In the case of the questionnaires that were sent via fax or through the mail. 
potential respondents were personally contacted by the researcher using a telephone to 
notify them that the survey instrument had been sent. 
5.4-1.2 Questionnaire distribution 
Closed-ended questions involving multi-choice questions were used in the 
questionnaire"'. Respondents had to choose an answer from a list of predetermined 
replies. The focus of the questions was on finns' characteristics and their accounting- 
policy decisions. It was supposed that the respondents had relatively clear opinions 
regarding the issues being raised and so only a limited number of alternative answers 
was supplied. Rating scales - such as likert scales"' - were used to allow the researcher 
to give a numerical value to a respondent's opinion. This type of question seems to be 
more suitable when respondents are expected to have a relatively clear opinion 
regarding the issues raised in the question and when questions aim to gather factual 
information (Stelltiz ýet al., 1976). 
The questionnaire was distributed to the financial managers of the 320 largest 
firms operating in the Cairo area, the Alexandria Governorate and the Menoufla 
Governorate in Egypt. An appeal for co-operation was expressed via a letter signed by 
one of the supervisors of this thesis as well as a covering letter signed by the 
researcher; both were enclosed along with the questionnaire. In addition, the objectives 
of the study were outlined and an assurance of anonymity was given. Three weeks later 
107 The final version of the questionnaire document is presented in Appendix 5-1. 
108 The likert technique presents a set of attitude statements. Respondents are asked to express an opinion 
based on a five-point scale. Each degree of agreement is given a numerical value from one to five. Thus a 
total numerical value can be calculated from all the responses. 
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a reminder was given to the non-respondents through telephone contact. One more call 
was made for those who had not completed the questionnaire three or four days after 
the first prompting. After the second reminder, no further attempt was made to contact 
the individuals. Questionnaires were faxed or hand delivered for at least 50% of the 
sample in order to address with the issue of a possibly low response rate. Thus, from 
the total sample of 320 questionnaires sent, 42 were personally delivered" while the 
remaining 278 were distributed through fax and mail. An analysis of the responses for 
the three different distribution methods is shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 A summary of the responses to the questionnaire survey 
Distributed 
(1) 
Collected 
(2) 
(3) = (2)/(1) 
N 
(4) = (2)/93 
N 
(5) = (2)/320 
N 
Personal distribution 42 30 71.4 32.3 9.4 
Fax distribution 118 44 37.3 47.3 13.8 
Mail distribution 160 19 11.9 20.4 5.9 
Total 320 93 - 100.0 29.1 
The overall response rate for this response project is 29%, since 93 out of the 320 
questionnaires distributed were returned"'. However, this overall rate masks 
differential responses for the different categories of delivery methods used. The 
response rate from the personal distribution was relatively high, since 30 out of 42 were 
collected (about 71%)"'. In contrast, only 19 out of 160 questionnaires that were 
delivered by post were returned (about 12%). Thus, the predictions of those who took 
109 The researcher made five visits to five different sub-areas in the target cities to deliver the 
questionnaire to the potential respondents. Each visit took two days; respectively 20-21 July 2002,22-23 
July 2002,27-28 July 2002,29-30 July 2002 and 3-4 August 2002. 
"' Moser and Kalton (1993) reveal that if the response rate is below the range of 20-30%, it is possible 
that serious bias has been introduced in the sample. Thus, it can be argued that the probability that the 
findings would be seriously biased may not be substantially high. 
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part in the pilot surveY interviews turned out to be correct. Distribution of the 
questionnaires via personal contact or by fax proved to be relativel), successful 
(Wallace and Mellor, 1988) while those sent in the post were relatively poor. 
5.4.2 Database 
As has already been pointed out, the empirical study follows most preceding 
work in the economic-consequences literature by using an established database of 
financial data for firms quoted on the stock market. The database contains various 
firms' characteristics and their accounting-policy decisions which directly, or after due 
ustment, can be used for testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. 
To obtain a sufficient set of data for a consecutive three-year period in order to 
estimate a logistic regression model three steps were taken. First, regulated and non- 
service firms (financial and insurance) were excluded from the sample because these 
firms were unlikely to have inventory or incur significant depreciation cost. Second, 
annual reports of firms were examined to determine the depreciation and inventory 
methods used by each firm for financial reporting purposes during 1999,2000 and 
2001 - firms that did not report depreciation method or did not supply details about the 
inventory valuation method were excluded from the sample. Third, firms which made a 
change in their depreciation method and/or inventory valuation method within the 
1999-2001 period were excluded from the sample. The final sample included 96 firms. 
No electronic data on these Egyptian fin-ns exist as the database involves paper-based 
files stored with the CMA, the EGID and Kompass Egypt, therefore, information for all 
of the 96 firms was collected and pre-processed manually from these paper files. 
111 All of the 30 documents were collected personally at the same day of distribution; the remaining 12 
documents did not arrive. 
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Overall, there was a small overlap between the respondents in the sunýey and the 
firms identified in the database"'. More than half of the respondent firms in the 
questionnaire survey were listed on the stock exchange. Nevertheless, most were rarelý- 
or non-traded firms and hence not included in the database. For the purposes of 
statistical analysis, the two samples were kept separate and the same tests were applied 
independently to both samples"'. 
5.5 The measurement of variables and model design. 
The hypotheses have been formulated in the form of a relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. For testing the formulated hypothesis, it is crucial 
to determine what variables to use and how to measure them. The variables in this 
study were derived from the literature and categorized into dependent, independent and 
control variables. The measurement of the variables facilitates the use of statistical 
techniques and contributes in assessing the relationship between variables (Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1976). Following previous research in the area, the choice of scale for 
the measurement of the variables was determined according to the nature of the 
variable being measured and the desired level of sophistication for the data analysis. 
5.5.1 Accounting choices (dependent variables in the model) 
To test whether or not firms base their choice of accounting methods on 
economic factors, it is necessary to identify which accounting procedures are most 
likely to be used. Evidence presented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
112 For example, only three companies were in both the questionnaire survey and the database sample. 
These companies cannot be named because anonymity was guaranteed but their identity is known to the 
researcher. Any test of companies between the two samples took this slight overlap into account. 
113 It would not be entirely satisfactory to amalgamate the two data sets directly, because of differences in 
the variables from one source to another, and because a few firms may be represented in both data sets. 
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Matsumoto (2002) suggests that managers use accounting discretion to avoid reporting 
negative earnings surprises. Most earlier studies that predict the choice of accounting 
techniques summarise the choice with dichotomous variables; tests of firms' choices 
among accounting techniques usually examine a particular choice(s) (e. g., depreciation 
method and/or inventory valuation method) in isolation from the set of other 
accounting methods employed by the firm (e. g. Hagerman and Zmijewski. 1979: 
Gopalakrishnan, 1994; Bowen et al., 2000; Bowen et al., 2002). 
Two accounting alternatives were chosen as dependent variables in the current 
study: the depreciation policy and the inventory valuation decisions of the finns 
responding to the questionnaire survey anýd included in the database. These were 
selected because they can have large systematic effects on the assets and expenses 
reported in Egyptian firms' financial statements (see p. 94). They have also been 
observed as being material in the USA (Bowen et al., 2000). Further, they are usually 
disclosed in the corporation's annual reports. 
FIFO will increase current earnings when there is inflation of inventory prices. 
The method would have consistently increased earnings in Egypt over the period 1994 
to 2001 because inflation has always been positive in the range of 2.8% to 9.4% (see 
Table 2-1). SLD depreciation will always increase current profits but at the expense of 
profits some time in the future; all methods ultimately write off the same capital sum 
over the life of an asset. Managers may prefer present income to future income (of the 
same amount) because, if they receive earnings related bonuses, the amount of current 
earnings provides managers with opportunities to directly increase their immediate 
wealth and well-being - e. g. through increased remuneration, perquisites etc. and job 
security (by showing satisfactory amount of earnings). Furthen-nore, current wealth can 
be invested, so given high positive rates of interest in Egypt (see Table 2-1) potential 
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managers would prefer present income to future income of the same amount"'. 
Consequently, subject to the details of the bonus plans, managers are likelý' to prefer 
higher to lower earnings. More specifically, the focus of interest is: (i) whether a firm 
adopts SLD or others and (ii) whether a firm adopts the FIFO for inventory valuation or 
some other altemative. A dummy variable was used to capture the dependent variables. 
In another words, the depreciation variable was coded one (1) if a particular firin was 
adopting SLD and zero (0) if it adopted other methods of depreciation"'. Furthermore. 
the inventory variable was coded one (1) if a particular firm was adopting the FIFO 
method of inventory valuation and zero (0) if it adopted other methods of inventory 
valuation"'. 
ID - Respondents to the questionnaire survey were requested to indicate by answering 
two questions (Questions 14 and 20) whether or not the firm in which they were 
employed was making use of these two options. The responses to the two questions 
have been measured on a binary scale. For firms included in the database, an inspection 
of the bases of accounting that are highlighted in the notes to annual reports enabled the 
depreciation and inventory method choices to be identified"'. 
5.5.2 Independent variables in the model 
The economic factors considered in the current study that might influence a 
firm's choice of accounting methods are the management bonus schemes, a firm's 
114 There is a lack of data on CEO turnover in Egypt. 
115 The only other method was reducing balance. 
116 The only other methods were weighted-average and LIFO. 
117 In the case of differences in the depreciation method used for different types of assets, the 
depreciation method that used for the fixed tangible depreciable assets (e. g., plant, machinery) has been 
used to identify the firm's depreciation method for the purpose of further analyses; since fixed tangible 
depreciable assets are more likely to spend the largest cost relative to other fixed assets. 
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leverage characteristics and a firm's size (see HI, H2 and H3). 
5-5. ZI Bonus variable 
This study hypothesises that managers have incentives to use accounting choices 
that increase earnings if bonus schemes are based on these accounting eamings. Some 
prior studies have used a zero-one dummy variable to test the bonus hypothesis. This 
simplistic approach ignores the details of the bonus plans as well as the effect of total 
compensation on the accounting choice. Healy (1985), for example, has shown that the 
details of bonus plans are significant. Alternatives were not available to the researcher, 
however, because the details of compensation plans used by individual companies in 
Egypt were kept private. Consequently, the simplistic approach was the only one 
available and has been adopted in the current study; the details of bonus plans were not 
modelled in the analysis. Thus, the bonus variable (MP) in the current thesis was 
measured as one (1) if the managers have bonus plans based on accounting numbers 
and zero (0) if not. 
Respondents to the questionnaire survey were asked whether their firms 
employed bonus plans or not (question 8). For firms included in the database, the 
distribution account was used to detennine whether a firm employed bonus schemes"'. 
5.5.2.2 Leverage variable 
Previous studies have argued that firms with large amounts of debt relative to 
their equity (leverage) in their capital structure are more likely to choose accounting 
methods that result in higher or earlier reported earnings. The current study 
hypothesizes that the use of income increasing reporting methods is positively 
118 The distribution account is a part of the financial statement published by Egyptian companies which 
details how the profit has been distributed to shareholders, managers and employees. 
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associated with leverage. The firm's total debt to total assets and long-term debt to 
equity ratios have been widely used as a proxy for a firm's dependency on debt 
financing (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Healy and Palepu. 1990, 
DeAngelo et al., 1994; Jung and Kwon, 2002; Bauwhede et al., 2003). The same 
approach has been adopted in this study. 
Questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate the proportion of their firm^s 
total assets that was financed by debt capital (Question 12). The same approach was 
adopted for the database companies. On the basis of data being disclosed in the 
financial statements, the firm's debt to total assets and long-term debt to equity ratios 
were used. Both ratios were available for about 70 companies from the Kompass Egypt 
Yearbook (200 1) and the ratios for the remaining 26 firms were computed by the 
researcher. 
5.5.2.3 Firm size variable 
Size has been used in the past as a proxy variable for political visibility (Pacecca, 
1995); it is hypothesised to be positively associated with the usage of income- 
decreasing accounting methods. The political cost hypothesis states that managers of 
larger firms are more likely than those of smaller firms to adopt income-decreasing 
accounting choices in order to minimise their "political visibility". Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) and Gopalakrishnan (1994) used both total sales and book value of 
assets as a proxy for the political cost. 
In the questionnaire survey, size was measured using three measures: namely, 
current market value (SIZEI) (question 4), the total value of sales (SALES) (question 
6) and the balance sheet value of the total assets reported in the most recent financial 
statements (ASSETS) (question 7). When determining the size measure to be employed 
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in the current analysis for the responses to the questionnaire survey, market value 
(SIZE1) was eliminated because many respondents did not provide this information. 
Thus, in both the questionnaire survey and the database, size is measured using (a) the 
total value of sales (SALES) and (b) the most recently reported balance sheet figure for 
the total assets (ASSETS). For all companies in the database firms, the -most recently 
reported balance sheet figure" related to the financial year ending in 200 1. For the 
survey firms, the questionnaire specifically asked for the most recently reported figure. 
5.5.3 Control variables 
The hypothesized relationship between dependent and explanatory variables is 
influenced by other factors that should be controlled in the analysis. Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) argued that firms with (i) high systematic risk, (ii) high capital 
intensity technology or (iii) belonging to industries which have high concentration 
ratios have incentives to reduce the mean of their reported earnings through choosing 
income decreasing accounting choices. Their argument is based on the belief that high 
accounting profits by firms with these characteristics are more likely to compensate 
investors for the additional risk being bome and to avoid attracting new competitor 
entrants into the sector. A similar approach has been adopted in the current study. The 
three variables suggested by Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) are employed as controls 
in the current study; in addition, another two variables (PROFIT and TAXRATE) were 
also included as control measures. 
The definition of risk in the current study is the beta coefficient from the market 
model"' which is calculated as the volatility of the company's share relative to the 
119 This model relates the return on a share (Rj to a constant term plus a coefficient times the return on 
the market (Rmd. - Rj, = a+ fiR., 
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volatility of the market as a whole. BETA coefficients were available for the 96 fimis 
included in the database from the CMA in Cairo. They were computed using the daIlY 
returns around December 31,2000 and a value weighted market index. Relative capital 
intensity (Cl) was estimated by dividing fixed assets by total sales. As Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) suggest, the concentration ratio (CR) is assumed to be a proxy 
variable for the ability of a firm to earn monopoly rents. It is measured by the eight 
largest firms' concentration ratios for their industries (their percentage of the sector's 
sales)"'. Lilien et al. (1988) provide evidence that unsuccessftil firms are more likely to 
choose income increasing accounting procedures than their successful counterparts 
(cited in Gopalakrishnan, 1994). Thus, PROFIT is also included as a control variable 
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PROFIT is measured as the earnings before interest and taxes for the financial year 
divided by the book value of assets (Moh'd et al., 1998). In addition, since inventory 
method choices could be affected by tax incentives, TAXRATE is included as a control 
variable"'. The TAXRATE is the firm's tax rate calculated by dividing the tax expense 
by net income before taxes. 
5.5.4 The analysis 
To identify the determinants of the cross-sectional variation in accounting 
choices, the current study adopts two approaches. First, univariate analysis is 
Where the model is normally estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Accordingly, the 
coefficient on the return on the market variable is an unbiased estimate of the true beta of the share. 
t" Concentration ratios are used in this study as measures of monopoly rents because they are widely 
used and no better proxy is readily available, (see e. g. Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Holthausen, and 
Leftwich, 1983; Press and Weintrop, 1990). 
12 1 Hence a return on assets measure is used to proxy for profitability in this thesis. The measure 
employed in the analysis relates to the same year in which the accounting choice is made. 
"' Zimmerman (1983) used the effective tax rates as a proxy for political costs. In addition EI-Gazar et 
al. (1986) argued that the level of effective tax rates may be a more appropriate proxy than the size for 
firm's political costs because taxes can be argued to be the most direct way for wealth transfer. 
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undertaken where tests of association between the depreciation and inventorY 
(dependent variables) and each of the independent variables are conducted. This 
association is measured for dummy variables (bonus plans versus no bonus plans) using 
a chi-square test; a2x2 contingency table is examined. For the other categorical 
variables (LEV and SIZE) a Kendall's tau-b test is employed. The bivariate correlation 
has been utilized for testing the association between the control variables and 
dependent variables. 
Second, multivariate analysis is performed using two specified models. These 
logit models are based on the cumulative logistic regression function. In the case of a 
single explanatory variable xi the model is as follows: 
pi= 
I 
[5i] 
where: 
I e-'-Pxj 
Yj is the dummy variable describing one of income increasing accounting method 
(e. g. Yj =I if SLD is employed and =0 if otherwise), Pi is the probability that Y, = 1, a 
is the constant, 8 is the regression coefficient and xj is the value of the independent 
variable for company i (e. g. LEV). Equivalently, applying the logit transformation: 
In p =a+A, [5.2] 
[1-pil 
i 
The corresponding formula for R explanatory variables is: 
log 
[1-pi Iý 
180 +flIXV +182X2i 
+**, *-')6kXki 
[5.3] 
where: 
Xhi is the value of the h 
th 
variable for company i, Ph is the regression coefficient 
for variableXhand Pi /0 - Pd is the "odds ratio" 
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. 
123 The factor e is the factor by which the odds change when the kth independent variable increases by 
one unit. When fi is positive the factor eý will be greater than 1, and thus the odds will increase. On the 
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The form of the two regression models are as follows; predicted signs for the 
coefficients are shown in parentheses while the definitions and measurements of the 
variables included in these two regression models are presented in Table 5-3. 
Model 1: 
log[-Z'-', '] MPi+, 82LEVi+ #3SIZE, + P4 BETA, + fl5 Cl, + P6 CRt+ fl- PROFIT [5.41 (I - P11j) 
Predicted signs (+) 
Here, in model (1), MP, LEV and SIZE are the variables of interest. However, 
10YE-4 TA, CI, CR and PROFIT are included as control variables. Consistent with the extant 
literature, 81 and 82 are predicted to be positive whereas P3, #4, #5, #6 andP7 are 
predicted to be negative. Model (1) is used to test hypotheses Hla, Htc),, HIMa, Fl2a, 
H20a, H2ma, Ma, H30a and H3ma that relate to depreciation policy choice. 
Model 2: 
log[ 
(I - Pfifý, i) 
=flo + fl, MPj+ fl2LEVi+fl3 SIZEi+ fl4BETA, + 
fl5CI, + & CR, + fl7PROFIT, + fi8TAXRA TE, 
[5.5] 
Predicted signs NN 
In model (2), MP, LEV and SIZE are also the variables of interest. However 
BETA, C1, CR, PROFIT and TAXRATE are included as control variables. Once again, 
, 81 and, 82are predicted to 
be positive whereas, 83, P4, P5,4, #7andP8are predicted to be 
negative. Model (2) is used to test hypotheses Hlb, H10b, HlW H2b, H20bý H2Mb, H3b, 
H30b and H3Mb that relate to inventory valuation policy choice. 
other hand, if fi is negative the factor e6will be less than 1, and as a consequence, the odds will decrease. 
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Table 5-3 Variables definition and measurement 
Variable 
_ 
Type of variable __ - 
Measurement method Depreciation method Depende nt variable _6o__d ed one (1) if the firm i adopts SLD and zero (P, i, d (0) if the firm i adopts other methods of 
depreciation. 
Inventory valuation Dependent variable Coded one (1) if the firm i adopts FIFO method of 
method (Pfijb, d inventory valuation and zero (0) if the firm 11 
chooses other methods of inventory valuation. 
Existence of Independent variable Coded one (1) if the managers have bonus plans Management based on accounting figures and zero (0) if not. incentive plans (mPd 
Leverage (LEVd Independent variable The ratio computed by the company's: 
-Debt / total assets (LEV) and 
-Long-term debt / equity (LEVI) 
Firm Size (SIZEd Independent variable Measured by using: 
-Total sales (SALES) and 
-Total assets (ASSETS). 
Risk (BETAd Control variable The firm-specific systematic risk measured by the 
company's beta estimated from the market model. 
Beta computed using the daily returns around 
December 31,2000 and a value weighted market 
index. Beta was obtained from the CMA in Cairo. 
Capital intensity Control variable The fixed assets divided by total sales 
(CId 
Competition (CRd Control variable Concentration ratios were measured by eight- 
firms concentration ratios for industries 
(percentage of sales). 
PROFflý Control variable Measured as earnings before interest and taxes for 
the financial year divided by the book value of 
assets. 
TAXRA TE, Control variable Tax expense divided by net income. 
If fi is 0 the factor eý equals 1, the odds are unchanged. t) 
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5.6 Testing goodness of fit for the measures-validity and reliability 
Positivists stress that reliability, validity and general i sability form the comer 
stones for judging research (Sarantakos, 1993; Abernethy et al., 1999). In a I 
questionnaire survey, a number of factors can influence both the characteristics beln(, 
measured and the measurement procedure itself (Stelltiz et al., 1976). The measuring 
instrument possibly reflects a number of errors. These errors can be identified as either 
constant and/or random errors. Constant errors are introduced by factors that 
systematically affect the variable being measured. Random errors refer to "... errors that 
differ from individual (or some other object) to individual during any one measuring 
instance and that vary from time to time for a given individual measured twice by the 
same instrument" (Stelltiz et al., 1976, p. 64-65). Validity is defined as the absence of 
constant and random errors. The validity of a test refers to the appropriateness, 
meaningfulness and usefulness of the specific inferences made from the test results 
(Dunn, 1989). Validity also refers to the results of a test and how they are interpreted; it 
is inferred from research findings and applied experience, using personal as well as 
generally accepted standards (Dunn, 1989). According to Stelltiz et al. (1976) it is 
extremely difficult to guarantee the complete validity of a measurement; nevertheless, 
it is crucial to Provide some evidence that the measuring instrument actually measures 
what it presumed to measure. 
There are three primary ways to assess validity (see Figure 5-1). First, "content 
validity" is primarily concerned with the selection and wording of items (questions), 
the aims of the instrument and what it is intended to measure. Face validity is the most 
common type of content validity. 
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It is inferred from expert judgements and certain logical procedures (Dunn. 
1989). Thus, face validity is generally assessed by asking potential respondents or 
expert panels who examine the relationship between test objectives and test items or bý- 
knowledge of the normal practices used to judge the appropriateness and rele-vance of 
items. There are no replicable rules for evaluating the face validity of a measuring 
instrument; therefore, the extent to which a measurement has face validity is a matter 
for the researcher's subjective judgement (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976; Dunn. 
1989). 
In the current study, the following approach has been adopted. Each surve), 
question was examined to check whether it adequately measured what it was presumed 
to measure in the pilot study. In addition, "experts" in the Department of Accountancy 
and Business Finance at University of Dundee as well as practitioners evaluated the 
questions that were being asked. Thus, one can say that the face validity of the 
questionnaire was supported. 
Second, "criterion validity" refers to the ability of a measure to correlate with 
other measures of the same concept (Zikmund, 1994). There are two ways to assess 
criterion validity. The first is concurrent validity that refers to the ability of a scale to 
correlate with criterion measures of the same constructs when measured at the same 
time. The second is predictive validity that refers to the ability of a measure to predict 
future values or to correlate with criterion measures of the same construct measures 
later. In sum, the difference between concurrent and predictive validity is a different 
time horizon. 
In this study an attempt has been made to assess the criterion validity of the 
research instrument. Database information and factual characteristics of firms have 
been adopted as external criteria. 
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Third, , construct validity" refers to the ability of a scale to confirm a network of 
related hypotheses that are based on a theory developed from constructs (Zilcmund. 
1994). Construct validity arises when the researcher is conducting statistical tests. 
Construct validity attempts to make sure that there is a consistent relationship between 
empirical evidence and the theoretical logic developed from the constructs. There are 
two types of construct validity. Convergent validity refers to the ability of a measure to 
have a high correlation with other measures of the same construct. Finally, discriminant 
validity refers to the ability of a measure to have a low correlation with measures of the 
different constructs. 
Sekaran (1992) argues that methods of assessing validity for quantitative research 
include the ability to test hypotheses adequately (internal validity) and the ability to 
extend the results obtained to wider settings (external validity). Internal validity refers 
to whether or not the research is measuring what it is supposed to measure. External 
validity refers to the relationship between the results of the measured object and reality; 
it concentrates on how the results from one study can be applicable to other situations 
(i. e. how generalizable they are). 
Internal validity in this study has been achieved by using two research methods. 
The questionnaires were sent to a person who has a great deal of knowledge in the 
subject area. Furthennore, the results are clearly presented (tests and tables), fully 
explained and interpreted in the thesis. The external validity of this study comes from 
the full description of how the study has been carried out, in order to help the reader 
understand how the results are achieved. The research design and the theoretical 
framework have been presented in order to avoid biased conclusions. External validitý, 
was achieved via the sampling method adopted and by deliberately sampling from a 
population. 
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Estimation of the reliability of the measurements refers only to the random errors. 
A reliable instrument is one that gives repeatable results. Reliability refers to a measure 
free from error and therefore yielding consistent results (Zikmund, 1994). Reliability 
occurs when a measure shows the same results over time and across different 
situations. Reliability in this research is assessed in terms of the stability of results 
generated through the application of some measurement instrument, such as a sun-ey 
questionnaire and the collection of data from a database. 
Overall, the researcher believes that the research procedures were both valid and 
reliable. Every attempt was made to ensure that validity and reliability were achieved. 
Of course no research is perfect and the existence of more complete information might 
have enabled the researcher to use different measures for a larger group of companies. 
Nevertheless, within the constrains that existed, the researcher believed that the choices 
made have been satisfied. 
5.7 Statistical techniques and the level of significance 
The financial data and the responses to the questionnaires were analysed to 
answer the research questions addressed in this study. The variables involved in the 
questionnaire survey and database were measured either on a nominal or an ordinal 
scale. For the hypotheses testing, both univariate and multivariate analyses were 
conducted (see Chapter 7). The aim of the univariate analysis was to examine the 
empirical validity of predictions relating to a particular economic motive rather than to 
examine the relative impact of all of the economic motives identified in the current 
study on management's accounting method choices. For the univariate analysis the chi- 
square test, using a2x2 contingency table, was utilized to establish the association 
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between the dependent variables and the dichotomous independent variables. the 
relationship between the dependent variables and each of the categorical explanatorý- 
variables were investigated using non-parametric Kendall's tau-b test 
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of association 
for ordinal variables. Multivariate analysis is able to supply different perceptions and 
show which relationships are significant aniong the different predictions considered. 
The multivariate analysis aimed to indicate the significance of the variables as a whole 
in explaining the association of individual variables with the depreciation and inventory 
valuation policy decisions of firms. The empirical analysis of the proposed models has 
been conducted in a cross-sectional framework using logistic regression analysis 
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- 
Since the dependent variables are binary"', the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) may 
result in predicted values which lie outside of the limits (0, I), and may lead to 
inefficient parameter estimates (Menard, 1995). The logit model is a technique which 
seeks efficient parameter estimates while recognizing the limitations placed on the 
dependent variable. 
The logistic regression analysis proceeded in two stages. Throughout the first 
stage, the incremental tests were conducted to examine the contribution of each 
independent variable in explaining the dependent variable using the models developed 
for the purpose of the study. Throughout the second stage, the logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to indicate the accumulating explanatory power of the 
identified variables. A "backward elimination" search was conducted to obtain a clearer 
124 Kendall's tau-b test is a non-parametric measure of association for ordinal or ranked variables that 
take ties into account. The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship, and its 
absolute value indicates the strength, with larger absolute values indicating stronger relationships. 
125 Logistic regression analysis is employed when the dependent variable can take only two values. 
126 A firm either makes use of the relevant option or not; according to the depreciation method variable, a 
firm either makes use of the SLD or not; according to the inventory valuation method variable, a 
firm 
either makes use of FIFO or not. 
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picture by removing some explanatory variables that are either insignificant or hiiahlý- 
correlated with others and to identify a model in which most of the variables haN e 
significant coefficients. 
The model's performance has been evaluated using the likelihood ratio index as a 
measure of "goodness of fit" (Judge et al., 1988)"'. The log-likelihood is the log of the 
likelihood of the probabilities of adopting SLD and/or FIFO by each of the companies 
in the sample. Since the likelihood is a small number that is less than 1, it is customary 
to use the minus twice log likelihood (-2 LL) as a measure of how well the estimated 
model fits the data. A good model is one that results in a high likelihood of the 
observed results. This translates to a small value for -2LL 12'. Given that log-likelihood 
is negative, the -2LL is positive, and thus larger values indicate a worse prediction of 
the dependent variable. The chi-square values for each model test the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients for all of the terms in the model, except the constant, are zero 
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. 
Within the incremental tests, the change in the -2LL which corresponds to each step in 
the selection procedure is referred as the improvement chi-square. 
A combined test of the model coefficients was performed using the improvement 
127 The likehood ratio index (LRI) provides a measure of goodness of fit and is calculated as follows: 
L RI =I- [L (. Q) /L (co)] 
where: 
L(Q) = the value of the log likelihood function evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates. 
L(o)) = the maximum value of the log likelihood function under the hypothesis that fil = ------ = fik =0 
128 For example, if a model fits perfectly, the likelihood is I and -2LL is 0.0. 
129 ., Model chi-square " Gm is a likelihood ratio test which reflects the difference between error not 
knowing the independents (initial chi-square) and error when the independents are included in the model 
(deviance). Thus, Gm = initial chi-square (DO) - deviance (Dm). Model chi-square follows a chi-square 
distribution (unlike deviance) with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of 
parameters in the examined model compared to the model with only the intercept. However, "Block chi- 
square" is a likelihood ratio test also printed by SPSS, representing the change in model chi-square due 
to entering a block of variables. 
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in the log-likelihood 130 
. The ability of the fitted model to predict the choice of method 
from the independent variables was measured by the percentage correctIly identified by 
131 the fitted model The significance of the individual parameter estimates for the 
independent variables was assessed by treating the ratio of parameter estimate to its 
standard error as a standard normal deviate"'. For the regression coefficients, the p- 
value shown is the probability of a standard normal deviate taking a value ftirther than 
the observed ratio in the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis. This process 
takes account of the predicted sign of the coefficient. 
Regarding to the level of significance, it is customary in the social sciences 
research to set the level of significance at 0.05. In this study, the hypotheses Were 
evaluated at the 0.05 level of significant. 
5.8 Summary and closing remarks 
This chapter presented the research plan employed in this study. The first part 
referred to the research design being employed. The data-collection methods used 
consist of a questionnaire survey and the analysis of a database. The sample of the 
questionnaire survey consists of the 320 largest firms (classified by the working capital 
in financial year 2001) operating in the Cairo area, the Alexandria Governorate and the 
Menoufia Governorate in Egypt. The sample of the database includes the 96 most 
"0 The omnibus test of model coefficients compares the fit of the model in question with that of the first 
model, with a single parameter. Large values of this statistic indicate a significant improvement in fit, 
13 1 The overall percentage correct compares the observed frequencies with the fitted group frequencies, 
using a cut-off point to assign an observation to a group [0 or 1] depending on its estimated probability 
of group membership. 
132 SPSS provides the Wald statistic for this purpose, which is the square of the ratio of parameter 
estimate to its standard error. The Wald statistic is not appropriate when the alternative hypothesis is 
one-sided, as it destroys the information on the sign of the parameter estimate. 
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traded companies listed in CSE for which information were available. The types of 
variables employed include independent, dependent and control variables. 
Measurement of the variables employed in the questionnaire surveý- has involved 
nominal, ordinal and ratio scales. Parametric and non-parametric tests have been used 
for analysing the data collected by the questionnaire survey and the database analysis. 
The questionnaire was the subject of a pilot-study and a pilot testing. On the basis of 
the findings of the pilot study, modifications were made to the structure of the 
questionnaire. The utilized statistical tests and level of significance have been 
discussed. 
To conclude this chapter, a positivistic hypothetico-deductive approach has been 
adopted by deriving the hypotheses from the literature (PAT). Primary and secondary 
sources of data are then used to test these hypotheses: a questionnaire surveý, and a 
database. As recommended during the pilot study, the questionnaire was distributed via 
fax and personal contact for at least a proportion of the sample to deal with the issue of 
the low response rate. 
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Empirical Findings 
- Descriptive Statistics - 
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6.1 Introduction 
Descriptive statistics surnmarising (i) the responses to the questionnaire sun-ey. 
(ii) the characteristics of the main variables in the database and (iii) the association 
between certain of the variables are presented in the current chapter. The results of 
statistical tests of the hypotheses that were formulated in Chapter 4 will be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
The present chapter is organised into four sections. Section 6.2 contains 
descriptive statistics for the responses to the questionnaire survey and for the 
association between certain responses. Section 6.3 presents descriptive statistics for the 
variables that are included in database and for the association between certain pairs of 
these variables. In section 6.4, the summaries in section 6.2 (questionnaire survey) and 
section 6.3 (database) are compared. 
6.2 Questionnaire survey 
A full description of the target population, the sample selection, the pilot testing 
and the amending of the questionnaire and its distribution was provided in Chapter 5. In 
brief, the target population for the survey consisted of the 320 largest firms (classified 
by working capital in financial year 2001) in the three most industrialised areas in 
Egypt: the Cairo area, the Alexandria Governorate and the Menoufia Governorate. 
These areas were chosen because most of the large firms in Egypt are concentrated in 
this location. Data from the Egyptian Business & Finance Portal web and interviews 
with the chairmen of the investors associations in five industrial cities were used to 
determine the 320 largest firms which comprise the sample for the study. Practical 
considerations contributed to the sample selection procedure. The questionnaires were 
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distributed and collected through fax, by mail and in person. The personal distribution 
of the questionnaires was used when permitted by the geographical proximity of the I 
target-sample. Almost half of the questionnaires were collected by fax. In the case of 
the questionnaires collected through fax and by mail, potential respondents were 
contacted initially by telephone calls to prepare them for forthcoming document. 
Out of the 320 questionnaires, 93 were returned completed and usable. the 
response rate therefore is 29%. Some of the returned questionnaires were only partially 
completed but were usable with regard to most questions. Thus the sample size for 
responses to individual questions varies with a maximum of 93. The sectoral 
distribution of the responding firms classified according to distribution method 
employed is presented in Table 6-1. This table also includes the distribution of the 320 
firms in the target population for each industry and the response rate on an individual 
sector basis. An analysis of the table reveals that response rates vary from a low of 
16.0% for the "Building materials" sector to a high of 100% for the "IT and 
communications" industry. It is worth pointing and, however, that there were only 3 
companies in this latter sector - all off them returned their completed questionnaire. 
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6.2.1 A test of non-response bias 
Bias is the difference between a survey estimate and the actual population value. 
The presence of non-resPonse bias, if it exists, suggests that the viewpoints of non- 
respondents are significantly different from those of respondents (Wallace and Mellor, 
1988). Non-response bias is associated with (i) an estimate of the amount of non- 
response and (ii) the difference in the estimate between the respondents and non- 
respondents. Bias is associated with both low response rates and strong differences in 
the estimates between respondents and non-respondents. Non-response bias analyses 
serve as an indicator of the quality of the data collected and help identify potentially 
biased estimates. 
The non-response analysis for the questionnaire survey in the current study was 
conducted on the basis of (i) the sectoral characteristics of the respondent firnis and (il) 
the comparison of "early" with "late" respondents. Firstly, the sectoral distribution of 
the respondent firms was compared with the corresponding distribution for the target 
population. In order to confirm that the sample is representative of the population, a 
chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of responses in each sector is 
constant was carried out. This test resulted in a chi-squared goodness of fit statistic of 
12.17 on 10 degrees of freedom, with a p-value... of 0.0.274 and hence the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level. This means that concerns regarding non- 
response bias on any inferences from the sample to the population may not be serious. 
Secondly, the probability of non-resPonse bias was investigated using the idea 
that later respondents to a survey are more similar to non-respondents than are earlier 
133 When all 12 sectors were employed the test resulted in a chi-squared goodness of fit statistic of 
19.521 on II degrees of freedom, with a p-value of 0.052. However one cell 
had an expected frequency 
of less than 1, rendering this chi-squared approximation 
invalid. Consequently, the offending sector "IT 
and communications" was combined with "Other" 
for the purposes of this test. 
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respondents (Wallace and Mellor, 1988). Thus, the responses to the questionnaire Nvere 
divided into two groups: those questionnaires which were collected in the first three 
weeks after distributing the questionnaire documents were placed in the first group 
while the remaining questionnaires were included in the second group"'. 
The first group consisted of 48 respondents while the second group was consisted 
of 45 respondents. Based on the two groups, Mann-Whitney U-tests" were applied to 
those variables that were measured on the ordinal scale; for those questions based on a 
categorical scale, a chi-squared test was perfonned (see Table 6-2). This finding led to 
the conclusion that the viewpoints of non-respondents were probably not significantly 
different from those of respondents; only two variables"' are significance with the two 
sets of responses. It is therefore, not unreasonable to assume that the results of the first 
group in the sample are similar to those in the second group. 
134 In this case, the questionnaire documents which were received before or on 
15/08/2002 were placed in 
the first group; since the questionnaire documents were faxed or posted 
in 24-25 July 2002, these 
respondents took less than three weeks to answer the questionnaire. 
In Egypt the post takes 3 days to be 
delivered. 
135 The Mann-Whitney U-test is used when one variable of interest at least is measured 
in ordinal scale, 
and the two random samples are independent. 
136The test results indicated that there was no difference at the 
5% level of significance between the tNN, o 
sets of responses based on 40 out of 
42 variables. The two variables are "depreciation method" and 
"depreciation rate of buildings". 
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Table 6-2 Test of non-response bias 
Variables Type of test p-value 
I- Industry group Ch-square 0.106 
2. Quoting on the CSE Ch-square 0.642 
3. Current market prices U-test 0.544 
4. Ownership status Ch-square 0.189 
5. Total value of sales U-test 0.283 
6. Total value of the total assets U-test 0.272 
7. Existence of bonus schemes Ch-square 0.073 
8. The basis of bonus U-test 0.234 
9. Percentage of bonus U-test 0.989 
10. Trend of percentage of bonus U-test 0.634 
11. Total assets to debt U-test 0.337 
12. Rate of tax U-test 0.844 
13. Depreciation method Ch-square 0.016 
14. Inventory valuation method Ch-square 0.491 
15. Industry norm and the depreciation method U-test 0.555 
16. Class of asset and the depreciation method U-test 0.438 
17. Simplicity of calculation and the depreciation method U-test 0.057 
18. Net income and the depreciation method U-test 0.801 
19. Cash flows and the depreciation method U-test 0.210 
20. 
-Depreciation 
rate of buildings U-test 0.001 
21. Depreciation rate of plant and machinery U-test 0.057 
22. Depreciation rate of vehicles U-test 0.643 
23. Depreciation rate of computers and office equipment U-test 0.472 
24. Depreciation rate of furniture U-test 0.286 
25. Basis of depreciation rate of buildings U-test 0.140 
26. Basis of depreciation rate of plant and machinery U-test 0.180 
27. Basis of depreciation rate of vehicles U-test 0.536 
28. Basis of depreciation rate of computers and office equipment U-test 0.686 
29. Basis of depreciation rate of furniture U-test 0.312 
30. Change in depreciation method for buildings U-test 0.652 
31. Change in depreciation method for plant and machinery U-test 0.404 
32. Change in depreciation method for vehicles U-test 0.720 
33. Change in depreciation method for computers and office equipment U-test 0.432 
34. Change in depreciation method for furniture U-test 0.701 
35. Industry norm and the inventory method U-test 0.715 
36. Current price and the inventory method U-test 0.390 
37. Simplicity of calculation and the inventory method U-test 
0.131 
38. Tax charges and the inventory method U-test 
0.438 
39. Net income and the inventory method U-test 0.925 
40. Change in inventory method for raw material U-test 0.052 
41. Change in inventory method for work in progress U-test 0.155 
42.. Change in inventory method for final product U-test 
0.169 
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6.2.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables identified in Chapters 4 and 5 were: the existence of a 
management bonus plan (MP), leverage characteristics (LEV) and size (SIZE). The 
hypotheses developed for the current study were put in the fonn of all finns, owner- 
controlled firms and manager-controlled firms. Thus, one can assume that it is 
important to present the descriptive statistical of ownership/control structure for the 
respondent firms and then present the descriptive statistics for each independent 
variable. The descriptive statistics are presented in the following sub-sections; in some 
cases these statistics are broken down by different categories of other variables. 
6.2.2.1 Ownership structure and Bonus scheme 
Following the pattern established in many previous empirical studies, "' this 
investigation used dichotomous variables to classify finns by ownership/control type as 
either owner-controlled or manager-controlled"'. Table 6-3 presents details of 
descriptive statistics for the ownership structure of the firms responding to the 
questionnaire (Question 5). For example, the current study uses two different categories 
of control in the analysis. Specifically, measures of concentration are employed to 
identify the "Owner controlled" group: i. e. respondents in category (A) of Table 6-3 
which refers to firms where one shareholder or one related group (for example a 
family) owns 10% or more of the total share capital were categorised as owner- 
controlled; all other firms were combined into a "Manager controlled" group. However, 
respondents from 15 of the 93 firms indicated that the ownership status of their firms 
137 See for example Kamin and Ronen, 1978; Dhaliwal et al, 1982; Amihud, et al., 1983; Dempsey et al. 
1993; Short, 1994. 
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spanned two or more of the options offered in question 5 of the questionnaire survey, 
resulting in a total of 108 answers. 
Table 6-3 Descriptive statistics for the ownership structure of firms in the survey 
(Question 5) 
Type of ownership Number of firms % 
A One shareholder or one related group (for example a family) 
owns 10% or more of the total share capital. 60 55.5 
B A bank or an insurance company owns 20% or more of the 
total share capital. 7 6.5 
C One group of up to five shareholders (either physical persons 
or legal entities), who are not members of the same family 
own 10% or more of the total share capital. 28 25.9 
D Privatised company and the government still own 50% or 
more of the total share capital. 1 0.9 
E Privatised company and the government still owns less than 12 11.1 
150% of the total share capital 
Total 108 100.0 
Category (C) of Table 6-3 includes 14 firms which are also in category (A); these 
firms were therefore removed from the manager-controlled group. Similarly one firm 
was removed from category (E). This adjustment leads to the classification shown in 
panel A of Table 6-4 in which each firm appears exactly once. The descriptive statistics 
regarding the type of ownershiP/control of the respondent finns shows that the 
ownership of the majority (65%) of respondent firms in the survey is concentrated in 
the hands of few owners. One could therefore anticipate that in these 60 companies the 
major owners of the firm would tend to exercise active control over their companies5 
affairs. 
138 More recent studies use of continuous classification. However, in Egypt the ownership required to call 
shareholders meeting is 5% for ordinary meetings and 
10% for extraordinary meetings. Which suggest 
that the dichotomous classification is more appropriate. 
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The 60 owner-controlled firms can be further divided into Family and Non- 
Family controlled firms. Category (A) of table 6-3 includes 14 firms, which are also in 
category (C); these firms fall in the non-family controlled category. The classification 
shown in panel B of Table 6-4 indicates that the majority of the respondents in owner- 
controlled companies (77%) were working for firms with highly concentrated family 
ownership. 
Table 6-4 Type of control for the firms in the survey 
Panel A: Control of firms Panel B: Distribution of the owner-controlled firms 
Type of control Number of firms % Owner-controlled Number of firms % 
Owner 60 65 Family controlled 46 77 
Management 33 35 Non- Family controlled 14 23 
Total 93 100 Total 60 100 
Evidence from earlier studies (e. g., Amihud et al., 1983; Dempsey et al.. 1993; 
Short, 1994) suggests that there is a link between managerial compensation schemes 
and ownership/control structure; i. e. that manager-controlled firms are more likely than 
owner-controlled firms to have incentive compensation plans. Such plans are thought 
to reflect the outside owners' need to motivate managers to act in a manner consistent 
with owners' interests; in Egypt, these plans usually rely on linking compensation with 
reported earnings. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, in Egypt, owner-controlled 
firms may employ bonus plans if the large owners are not involved in the management 
and if they employ professional individuals to represent them and manage the firms. In 
such case, it is hypothesised that the executives of owner-controlled 
firms may be 
motivated to increase the reported earnings not only to maximise their personal 
benefits, but also to influence their reputation and increase the satisfaction of their 
employers. 
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Table 6-5 indicates that a considerable proportion (about 54%) of the respondent 
firms employ bonus schemes. Furthermore, cross-tabulation of control type against use 
of a bonus scheme in Table 6-5 suggests that bonus schemes are more likely to be used 
in the case of manager-controlled firms. The proportion of manager-controlled firms 
that employ bonus schemes (91%) is much higher than in the case of owner-controlled 
firms (33%). The observed results reported in Table 6-5 clearly suggest that there is a 
strong positive association between the firm's type of ownership/control and the 
employment of a bonus scheme, (Kendall's tau-b = 0.553). Because of the influence of 
bonus schemes on manager's motivation, this result is consistent with the prediction 
that manager-controlled firms are more likely to adopt income increasing accounting 
methods and with the evidence reported in the literature"'. 
Table 6-5 Control and usage of bonus schemes of firms in the survey 
Management bonus Owner-controlled Manager-controlled All firms 
schemes Number of firms % Number of firms % Number of firms % 
No bonus scheme 40 66.7 3 9.1 43 46.2 
Bonus scheme 20 33.3 30 90.9 50 53.8 
Total 60 100.0 33 100.0 93 100.0 
Table 6-6 shows that 86% of the 50 firms that employ bonus schemes base their 
bonus on net income after tax, while 8% of these firms use net income before tax. In 
the remaining 3 firms, the bonus payment is not related to income; one of the firms 
reported that the level of bonus payment for their company was determined by the total 
sales, while the other two finns stated that a fixed bonus was paid upon the attaimnent 
of a specific target. 
139 See for example, Dhaliwal et al. (1982), Lewellen et al. (1987) and Dempsey et al. (1993). 
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Table 6-6 Type of bonus schemes employed by firms in the survey 
Bonus-payment basis Net income before tax Net income after tax Other Total 
Number of firms 4 43 3 50 
% 8 86 6 100 
In the questionnaire survey, only 42 out of 50 participant firms that employ 
management bonus schemes revealed"' how, in the last reported year, the bonus paid to 
the chief executive officer was compared to his/her basic salary (see Table 6-7). Almost 
half of the participant firms (43%) stated that the bonus paid was larger than the basic 
salary. Overall, the median ratio of bonus to salary of participant firms in the survey 
lies in the interval 0.75 to 1.0, with a mean probably around 0.8"'. This estimated mean 
bonus to salary ratio is large in comparison with the findings of other researchers. For 
example, a ratio of 0.317 was documented for US companies in Bowen et al. ý(2002). 
Ratios of 0.13 for Australia, 0.21 for the USA, 0.15 for the UK and 0.23 for New 
Zealand were reported in Coulton et al. (2002). Finally, a figure of 0.592 was 
highlighted in Bauwhede et al. (2003). 
At first sight, it appears that the relatively high proportion of bonus to salary 
ratios for managers of Egyptian firms may offer them an unusually large incentive to 
adopt income-increasing accounting methods. However, these ratios may be due in part 
to the smaller size of the firms in the present survey, compared to those analysed in the 
other surveys cited, and in part to the absence of share options from the typical 
remuneration package of managers in Egyptian companies. Remuneration packages in 
other countries also involve sizeable stock option elements which are not included in 
140 This information was sought in question number 10. 
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the bonus figures examined in academic studies (Murphy, 1999) and which possiblý- 
undertake the incentive-based component of total pay. 
Table 6-7 The proportion of the bonus to salary of firms in the survey 
The proportion of the Owner-controlled Manager-controlled All firms 
bonus to salary Number of firms % Number of firms % Number of firms % 
0-25(%) 5 11.9 1 2.4 6 14.3 
25-50(%) 3 7.1 6 14.3 9 21.4 
>50-75 (%) 2 4.8 2 4.8 4 9.5 
>75-100 (%) 1 2.4 4 9.5 5 11.9 
Over 100% 7 16.7 11 26.2 18 42.9 
Total 18 42.9 24 57.1 42 100.0 
Median for all firms =4 (between 0.75 and 1.0) 
Scale coded 1-5: 1= 0-25 (%), 2= 25-50 (%), 3= 50-75 (%), 4= 75- 100 (%) and 5= Over 100% 
Question number 3 in the questionnaire survey asks whether or not a firm is 
quoted on the stock exchange. All 93 participant finns answered this question, 
revealing that only 56 (60%) of them are quoted on the ESE. Moreover 31 firms out of 
60 owner-controlled firms are quoted on the exchange and 25 of the 33 the manager- 
controlled firms are quoted on the exchange. That means that manager-controlled firms 
in the questionnaire survey are more likely to be quoted on the exchange (see Table 6- 
8). A statistical test of homogeneity of proportions identifies a significant difference 
between the type of control exercised in quoted and unquoted firms (p--value = 0.021). 
This is interesting given that equity is more likely to be widely held in firms quoted on 
the exchange, and may partially explain the relatively high use of bonus schemes 
in 
such firms. 
141 in order to calculate a mean, it is necessary to make arbitrary assumptions as 
to how the data is spread 
within the class intervals specified 
in the table. In particular the choice of value/s to represent the "Over 
100%,, interval can have a considerable effect on the estimated mean. 
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Table 6-8 Firms quoted on the stock exchange by type of control 
Firms quoted on the Owner-controlled Manager-controlled All firms 
exchange Number of firms % Number of firms % Number of firms % 
Not quoted 
Quoted 
Total 
29 
31 
60 
48.3 
51.7 
100.0 
8 
25 
33 
24.2 
75.8 
100.0 
37 
56 
93 
39.8 
60.2 
100.0 
p-value = 0.021 
Table 6-9 Firms quoted on the exchange by bonus schemes 
Firms quoted on the No bonus scheme Bonus scheme All firms 
exchange Number of firms % Number of firms % Number of firms % 
Not quoted 
Quoted 
Total 
23 
20 
43 
53.5 
46.5 
100.0 
14 
36 
50 
28.0 
72.0 
100.0 
37 
56 
93 
39.8 
60.2 
100.0 
p-value = 0.012 
Table 6-9 highlighted that 36 out of the 56 firms quoted on the exchange (64%) 
employ management bonus plans compared with 14 firms out of the 37 firms not 
quoted on the exchange (38%). The stronger tendency for quoted firms than for 
unquoted firms to employ management bonus schemes firms is statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.012). In section 6.3, this finding will be shown to be consistent with 
information from the database in which all of the firms studied are quoted on the ESE. 
6.2.2.2 Leverage characteristics 
A finn's leverage characteristics have been identified as a factor that can give rise 
to the decision to adopt an income increasing accounting method (see, Chapter 5). In 
the questionnaire survey, the ratio of total debt to total assets was used as a proxy for 
leverage. Table 6-10 presents descriptive statistics regarding the total debt to total asset 
ratios of the firms participating in the questionnaire survey. 
Table 6-10 indicates that 
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the typical total debt to total asset ratios for 57 out of 93 firms are less than 40.0%. The 
mean total debt to total asset ratio of the participant firms at 0.37 is lower than the 
figure in preceding studies: for example the mean total debt to total asset ratios was 
0.416 in Rajgopal and Pincus (2000) for American oil and gas firms, 0.523 in Peasnell 
et al. (2000) for a sample of British companies and 0.70 in Jung and Kwon (2002) for a 
collection of Korean finns"I 
Table 6-10 Debt/total asset ratio of firms in the survey"' 
Debt / total asset ratio <20% 20-40(%) >40-60(%) >60-80(%) >80% Total 
Number of firms 26 31 20 9 7 93 
% 28 33.3 21.5 9.7 7.5 100 
- Median =2 between 0.20 and 0.40), mean estimated at 37% 
Scale coded 1-5: 1= <20%9 2= 20-40(%), 3= >40-60(%), 4= >60-80(%) and 5= >80% 
6.2.2.3 Size variable 
In some circumstances, size may be regarded as a proxy variable for political 
visibility (see Chapter 5). Size is hypothesised as providing an input to the decision 
about whether or not to use income-decreasing accounting methods (see H3); larger 
firms are more in the public eye, and thus, more exposed to political costs. One 
explanation is that very large finns seek to choose accounting practices that reduce the 
probability of reporting large earnings in order to avoid unwanted political attention 
(increased regulation and/or higher taxation levels). Based on this view, large finns 
"' Rutterford (1985) highlighted the differences in companies' gearing ratios across countries (the US, 
the UK, Germany and Japan). Specifically, she highlighted how different definitions of gearing yield 
various results depending upon (i) the data source, (ii) the time period and (iii) the country being I 
investigated. For example, she pointed out that with relatively less developed equity markets in Germany 
and France debt is the primary source of finance; gearing ratios are 
higher as a result. Also, the norm in 
Japan is for companies to finance theiractivities such that gearing ratios of 80% or more are not atypical. 
143 Question 12 sought information regarding the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
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would be more likely to choose income-decreasing methods than would their smaller 
sized counterparts. The size of the firms in the questionnaire survey was measured in 
three ways: namely, the current capital market value (SIZEI), the total value of sales 
(SALES) and the latest balance sheet value reported for total assets (ASSETS). The 
frequency distributions of these sizes as reported by the respondents are presented in 
Table 6-11. 
Unfortunately, as panel A of Table 6-11 highlights, only 61% of respondents 
divulged the current capital market value of their firm (SIZE I), whereas there were no 
missing values for either the total value of sales or total assets. Consequently, the 
current capital market value has not been used as a measure of firm size in the analyses 
that follow. 
Table 6-11 Summary of size of firms in the survey 
Panel A: SIZE 1 Panel B: SALES Panel C: ASSETS 
Million L. E. firms % Million L. E. finns % Million L. E. firms % 
<50 8 8.6 <10 8 8.6 <50 10 10.8 
>50-100 12 12.9 10-25 11 11.8 50-100 27 29.0 
>100-250 13 14.0 >25-50 10 10.8 >100-250 24 25.8 
>250 -500 14 15.1 >50-100 18 19.4 >250 -500 16 17.2 
>500 10 10.8 >100 46 49.5 >500 16 17.2 
Total 57 61.3 Total 93 100.0 Total 93 100.0 
Missing 36 38.7 Missing 0 0.0 Missing 0 0.0 
Total 93 100.0 Total 93 100.0 Total 93 100.0 
Information on these aspects of size was sought in questions 4,6 ana 
Egyptian million pound, current rate I L. E. = 0.19 US$ 
The total value of sales (SALES), and last reported balance sheet value of the 
total assets (ASSETS) have both been used to measure SIZE and act as a proxy for 
political costs. An analysis of Table 6-11 reveals that a wide variety of 
differentlý, sized 
companies responded to the questionnaire. There 
is at least one company in each of the 
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size categories. However, the spread of companies varies according to whether size is 
measured by market value, total sales and total assets. For example, 29 companies have 
sales of under LE 50m while only 10 companies have total assets and 8 companies have 
market value in the same category. 
The relationship between the total values of sales (SALES) and whether firms are 
quoted on the exchange (questions 3 and 6) as well as the relationship between the total 
assets (ASSETS) and listing status (questions 3 and 7) are surnmarised in Table 6-12. 
The SALES of all 93 companies were ranked", and the ranks of the companies quoted 
on the stock exchange were averaged separately from the ranks of the unquoted 
companies. The mean rank of the quoted companies, 54.7, is markedly higher than that 
for the unquoted companies, 35.4. Indeed the difference in mean ranks is statistically 
highly significant (p-value = 0.0001). Similarly, with regard to ASSETS, the 
companies quoted on the stock exchange have a markedly higher mean rank of 52.5 
compared to the 38.7 for the unquoted companies. Again the difference is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.007). Both analyses provide evidence to support the con ecture i 
that in Egypt, larger firms are more likely to be quoted on the stock exchange than their 
smaller sized counterparts 
145 
. 
144 The smallest company was ranked 1, and the largest 93. Of course there are many ties 
in the ranking 
of Rert scale data like this. 
145This finding is consistent with data collected from the database for firms quoted on the ESE which 
is 
reported in section 6.3. 
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Table 6-12 An analysis of size and quoting status 
Panel A: SALES and quoting status 
Firms quoted on the exchange Mean rank U-statistic Z-score I-tailed P 
Not quoted 
Quoted 
35.4 
54.7 
1 
605.5 -3.63 0.0001 
Panel B: ASSETS and quoting status 
Firms quoted on the exchange Mean rank U-statistic Z-score I-tailed P 
Not quoted 
Quoted 
38.7 
52.5 
730.5 -2.46 0.007 
Since TAXRATE is included as a control variable in the current study (see 
Chapter 5), data on this measure is collected in the questionnaire; question 13 in the 
questionnaire survey is concerned with the taxation rate. Table 6-13 presents the 
percentage of tax which respondent firms expect to pay on the net income. An analysis 
of Table 6-13 reveals that 16.1% of firms expect to be tax exempted while 20.4% of 
firms only anticipate paying up to 10% of their profits in tax just were one fifth of firms 
responding to the questionnaire expect to face an effect tax rate of 30%. 
Table 6-13 Percentage of tax expect to pay on net income for the survey firms 
Taxation rate 0% 1- 10 (%) > 10-20 (%) >20-3 0 (%) >3 0% Total 
Number of firms 15 19 25 15 19 93 
% 16.1 20.4 26.9 16.1 20.4 100 
Descriptive statistics for each independent variable have been presented in 
previous paragraphs. The correlations between pairs of these independent variables are 
shown in Table 6-14. The table shows a significant positive correlation for respondent 
firms between the use of management bonus schemes (MP) and each of the size 
variables and the tax rate: total sales of respondent firms (SALES), total value of assets 
(ASSETS) and TAXRATE had correlations of 0.311,0.236 and 0.391 respectively. 
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These correlations suggest that larger companies are more likely to employ bonus plans 
(as is expected in any envirom-nent). A significant positive correlation of 0.223 also 
exists between the ASSETS and the debt/total assets ratios (LEV). This could be 
interpreted as meaning that size has a positive influence on leverage and growth and 
that large firms have better access to debt, thereby confirming the findings of Charitou 
and Vafeas (1998). Large finns are likely to have the funds to pursue projects with 
positive net present values and thereby to make more profits. Table 6-14 shows an 
extremely high positive correlation of 0.722 between the total sales of firm (SALES) 
and the total value of assets (ASSETS). In contrast to the prior research, the correlation 
between size of respondent finns (ASLES and ASSETS) and TAXRATE is not 
statistical significant. 
Table 6-14 Correlation between the independent variables of firms in the survey 
(p-values are shown in italics above the diagonal) 
Variables MP LEV SALES ASSETS TAXRATE 
MP 1 0.620 0.001 0.012 0.000 
LEV -0.047 1 0.173 0.009 0.113 
SALES 0.311 ** 0.119 1 0.000 0.230 
ASSETS 0.236* 0.223** 0.722** 1 0.897 
TAXRATE 0.391** -0.135 0.103 -0.011 1 
*Correlation is significant at the level 0.05 and "correlation is significant at the level 0.01. MP was coded as 
one (1) if firm has Management compensation plans, and zero (0) if not; LEV referred to total debt divided by 
total assets; SALES referred to total sales; coded 1-5 (see table 6-11, panel B); ASSETS referred to total assets; 
coded 1-5 (see table 6-11, panel C) and TAXRATE referred to rate of tax coded 1-5 (see table 6-13). 
6.2.3 Accounting choice (dependent) variables 
The depreciation and inventory valuation policy methods of the firms were 
identified as the dependent variables (see Chapter 5). Specifically, the dependent 
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variables refer to whether a firm uses SLD or some other depreciation method, and to 
whether a firm uses FIFO or some other inventory valuation method. 
With regard to the depreciation policy decision, Table 6-15 presents a summarý- 
of the responses from firms regarding the type of depreciation they employ for each of 
8 classes of asset, and in particular whether or not the firm uses SLD. Most of the 
respondent firms use the same depreciation method for all classes of asset"'. Only two 
firms have a different depreciation method for computers and office equipment, so the 
depreciation method used for the fixed tangible depreciable assets (e. g.. plant, 
machinery) has been used to identify the firm's depreciation method for the purpose of 
further analyses. Table 6-15 also shows that 74 firms out of 93 (79.6%) choose the SLD 
method; an income-increasing choice. 
Table 6-15 Responses to depreciation method of firms in the survey (Question 14) 
Number of firms 
Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total % 
Buildings. 19 74 93 79.6 
Plant and machinery. 19 74 93 79.6 
Vehicles. 19 74 93 79.6 
Computers and office equipment 16 76 92 82.6 
Furniture. 19 74 93 79.6 
Intangible asset e. g. patents. 10 27 37 73.0 
Research and development. 15 29 44 65.9 
Goodwill. 9 26 35 74.3 
Other. 1 7 8 87.5 
Total respondent firms. 19 74 93 79.6 
146 Responses regarding type of depreciation about the last 3 classes of assets (intangible asset e. g. 
patents, research and development as well as goodwill) 
have a lot of missing, thus, only the first 5 classes 
of assets were used to determine the type of 
depreciation that is used in the analysis. 
164 
Table 6-16 Factors affecting choice of depreciation method of firms (Question 15) 
N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Industry norm 90 4.18 1.16 5 
Suitability for class of asset 93 4.54 0.75 5 
Simplicity of calculation 90 3.02 1.32 3 
Affect on net income 90 2.91 1.23 3 
Affect on cash flow 88 2.63 1.25 3 
a-uaic couea 1-3: 1= not important at all, 2= not very important, 3= neutral, 4= important 
and 5= very important 
The descriptive statistics regarding the responses to the factors which may 
influence the choice of the depreciation method are examined and reported in Table 6- 
16 (Question 15). The frequency distributions presented in Table 6-16 indicate that two 
factors stand out as being the most important in determining the depreciation method; 
the suitability of the depreciation method for the particular class of asset (mean == 4.54) 
and conforming to the industry norm (mean = 4.18). By contrast, the factors shown as 
of least importance in determining the depreciation method are the effect on cash flow 
(mean == 2.63) and the effect on net income (mean =- 2.9 1). 
The other dependent variable in the current study is the inventory valuation 
method. After minor adjustments"' the classification shown in Table 6-17 is obtained. 
Table 6-17 indicates that on average 40 firms out of 93 respondent firms choose FIFO 
(43%); an income-increasing choice. This mean value masks a spread of responses 
which range from a low of 34.8% for raw material to a high of 45.6% for work in 
progress. 
147 Responses to question 20 show that six firms from the questionnaire survey do not use FIFO for the 
inventory of the raw material but use FIFO for the inventory of the work in progress and final products; 
these firms were categorised as "Use FIFO". In addition, there are three firms that did not answer the 
question concerning the method of valuation 
for the inventory of the raw material but indicated that they 
use FIFO for the other types of 
inventory, those firms also were categorized as "Uses FIFO". 
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Table 6-17 Responses to inventory valuation method of firms in the survey (Question 20) 
Number of firms 
Does not use FIFO Uses FIFO Total % 
Raw material 58 31 89 34.8 
Work in progrýess 43 36 79 45.6 
Final product 52 38 90 42.2 
Other 0 0 0 0 
Total respondent firms 53 40 93 43.0 
Table 6-18 Factors affecting choice of the inventory method of firms (Question 21) 
N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Industry norm 89 4.33 1.13 5 
Current market price 93 4.17 1.19 5 
Simplicity of calculation 89 2.9 1.28 3 
Affect on tax amount 89 2.58 1.33 3 
Affect on net income 89 2.96 1.40 3 
Scale coded 1-5: 1= not important at all, 2= not very important, 3= neutral, 4= important 
and 5= very important 
The descriptive statistics regarding the responses to the factors that may influence 
the choice of valuation method, are reported in Table 6-18 (Question 21). These 
statistics identify two factors that are particularly important in determining the choice 
of inventory valuation method; the industry norm (mean =- 4.33) and the current market 
price of the stock (mean 4.17). However, contrary to expectation, tax is the least 
important factor in deten-nining the choice of inventory valuation method (mean = 
2.58). 
Table 6-19 shows the association between the depreciation policy decision and 
inventory valuation method and indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
using SLD method and using the FIFO inventory valuation method. 
Indeed their non- 
166 
parametric correlation coefficient Kendall's tau-b of 0.440 is significantly greater than 
zero (p = 0.000012). 
Table 6-19 Cross-tabulation of depreciation method by inventory valuation method for 
the survey 148 
Inventory policy 
Depreciation policy FIFO NO FIFO Total 
Income-increasing Income-decreasing 
Uses SLD (Income-increasing) 40 34 74 
Does not use SLD (Income-decreasing) - 19 19 
Total 40 53 93 
p-value = 0.000012 
Table 6-20 Descriptive statistics for firms in the survey 
Descriptive statistics (N=93) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
DEP 0.796 0.405 1 0 1 
INV 0.430 0.498 0 0 1 
MP 0.538 0.501 1 0 1 
NIC 0.355 0.481 0 0 1 
LEV 2.355 1.204 2 1 5 
SALES 3.892 1.363 4 1 5 
ASSETS 3.011 1.264 3 1 5 
TAXRATE 3.043 1.359 3 1 5 
DEP was coded as one for SLID and zero for otherwise; INV was coded as one tor jmjýu ana zero ior 
otherwise; MP was coded as one if firm has Management compensation plans and zero 
if not; MC was 
coded as one if there is no one or group shareholder owning 10% or more of the total shares and zero 
for otherwise; LEV was total debt divided by total assets coded 1-5 (see Table 
6-10); SALES was 
total sales coded 1-5 (see, panel B of Table 6-11); ASSETS was total assets coded 
1-5 (see panel C of 
Table 6-11) and TAXRATE was rate of tax coded 1-5 (see Table 6-13). 
The overall descriptive statistics for participant finns in the questionnaire survey 
are presented in Table 6-20. For each variable, the mean, standard 
deviation, median, 
maximum and minimum values have 
been reported. Table 6-20 shows that a slight 
148 Alternative combinations of accounting policies and 
income strategies are presented in Appendix 6- 1. 
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majority of firms (53.8%) employ bonus plan mechanisms according to the 
questionnaire respondents. The proportion of firms identified as manager-controlled is 
0.355, which means that a majority of firms included in the survey have concentrated 
ownership. The mean size (SALES and ASSETS) for participant firms in the survey is 
3.9 and 3.0 respectively. These figures indicate that the sample includes firms that are 
smaller than those identified in earlier studies. 
This concludes the investigation of the descriptive statistics and an examination 
of the association between certain variables from the responses of the questionnaire 
survey. In the following section the descriptive statistics and association between 
certain variables from the collected financial statements (database) are presented. 
6.3 Financial statements (database) 
Data on Egyptian firms quoted on the CSE have been collected manually from the 
paper documents held by three sources: (i) the CMA in Cairo, (ii) the Disclosure 
Department at the CSE and (iii) the KomPass Egypt business database. Because a 
sizeable tax advantage is given to firms that are listed on the exchange (see Chapter 2), 
a large number of companies have elected to be listed, including some companies that 
are closely held (i. e. that have relatively few shareholders). As a consequence, the ESE 
has two types of listed companies: namely (i) actively traded companies; and (ii) rarely 
and non-traded companies which are mostly closely held. Only the 118 most frequently 
traded companies are included in the database for the current research study"'. The 
annual reports for these companies were collected from the three data sources. 
149 Only the annual reports for the most traded companied were complete and thus analysed in the thesis. 
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The first step was to exclude regulated and non-service firms (financial and 
insurance) which are not particularly likely to hold inventory or to incur significant 
depreciation costs. The next step was to examine the annual reports of the remaining 
firms to determine the depreciation method used by each for financial reporting 
purposes during the years 1999,2000 and 2001. Any firm that did not report its 
depreciation method or did not document its inventory valuation method was excluded 
from the sample. In addition, one firm that changed its inventory valuation method 
during the period 1999 to 2001 was also omitted in order to obtain a sufficient set of 
data for a consecutive three-year period"'. The objective was to obtain a set of firms 
with complete data for the three-year period to make it possible to estimate the logistic 
models outlined in Chapter 5. The final sample includes 96 firms. Egyptian firms are 
able to change their depreciation and inventory valuation policies. It follows that one 
can assume that existing practices reflect managers' preferences. Therefore one can use 
consistent accounting practices to test hypotheses relating to managerial behaviour. (In 
effect, managers have chosen not to adopt alternative accounting practices). 
6.3.1 Dependent variables 
Table 6-21 presents the frequency distribution of accounting policy choices by the 96 
firms drawn from the database. Table 6-21 shows that, for the sample firms, the 
percentage of firms choosing the SLD method is 88.5. This figure is consistent with 
evidence reported in Hagerman and Zmij ewski (1979), Press and Weintrop (1990) and 
150 Precisely, nineteen non-service firms (financial and insurance) were excluded from the sample, two 
firms were excluded from the sample because they 
did not report depreciation method or did not suppily 
details about the inventory valuation method and one 
firm was excluded because it changed the inventorý, 
valuation method within the three-year period. 
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Gopalakrishnan (1994) which quoted percentages of 85.0,89.0 and 84.0 
respectively. Furthermore, Bowen et al. (2000) found that for 1984,1995 and 1996 the 
mean percentage of their sample using SLD were 65.3,70.1 and 79.3 respectively. By 
contrast, Dhaliwal (1988) found that the mean SLD was only 0.277. It seems that most 
traded Egyptian firms have a strong tendency to opt for an income increasing 4: 1 
accounting choice when it comes to selecting a depreciation method. 
Table 6-21 Distribution of accounting policy choices of firms in the database 
Depreciation"' Inventory 
Number of firms % Number of firms % 
Income-increasing policy 85 88.5 19 19.8 
Income-decreasing policy 11 11.5 77 80.2 
Total 96 100 96 100 
Table 6-21 also presents the frequency distribution of inventory method chosen 
by the firms in the database. Table 6-21 indicates that, for the sample firins, the 
percentage of firms choosing FIFO rather than LIFO is 19.8; this percentage compares 
with 50.0 in Hagennan and Zmijewski (1979), 59.0 in Press and Weintrop (1990) and 
85.0 in Gopalakrishnan (1994). Furthermore Bowen et al. (2000) found that for years 
1984ý 1995 and 1996 the mean percentage of firms choosing FIFO inventory method 
was 56.9,68.1 and 70.0 respectively. Thus, it is evident that most traded Egyptian firms 
are less likely to adopt FIFO than the firms investigated in the previous studies. 
The cross-tabulation of depreciation policy decision and the inventory valuation 
method for the firms in the database is shown in Table 6-22. These results indicate that 
there is a strong association between the usage of FIFO for inventory valuation and the 
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usage of SLD for depreciation. Indeed, all nineteen firms that use FIFO for inventory 
also use SLD for depreciation. The degree of association is statistically significant at 
the 5% level; the likelihood ratio with one degree of freedom is 5.193 and the p-value 
is 0.023. 
Table 6-22 Cross-tabulation of depreciation method by inventory method for the 
database'52 
Inventory policy 
FIFO NO FIFO 
Depreciation policy Income-increasing Income-decreasing Total 
Uses SLD (Income-increasing) 19 66 85 
Does not use SLD (Income-decreasing) - II II 
Total 19 77 96 
p-value - 0.023 
6.3.2 Independent variables 
As the previous sections mentioned, management bonus plans, leverage and size 
were identified as the independent variables. Data on these variables were therefore 
gathered. Once again, descriptive statistical of ownership/control structure for the 
database finns is presented and then present the descriptive statistics for each 
independent variable. However, this was a relatively difficult task; no electronic 
databases on the ownership characteristics of Egyptian finns exist; therefore, data on 
the identity and size of the five largest shareholder holdings in all of the 96 finns was 
collected by examining the financial statements. Ownership structure 
for about 70 firms 
was obtained from Kompass Egypt Financial Yearbook 
2001, wherein only brief 
151 In the case of differences in the depreciation method used 
for different types of assets, the 
depreciation method that used for the fixed tangible depreciable assets 
(e. g., plant, machinery) has been 
used to identify the firm's 
depreciation method for the purpose of further analyses. 
152 Alternative combinations of accounting policies and 
income strategies are presented in Appendix 6- 1. 
171 
description about the remaining firms was available. Ownership structure for the 
remaining sample firms was obtained from the Disclosure Database of the CMA. 
A question that arises is what cut-off level of ownership creates a -'sufficient 
incentive" for shareholders to engage in monitoring? In previous, mostly American 
empirical research, concentration of ownership has been measured using various cut- 
offs which vary from 5% to 10% (5%< cut-offs area <10%) as an indicator of the level 
at which owners become active in actual firm management (Tosi and Mejia, 1994). In 
fact, like American firms, Egyptian companies are required to report all individuals or 
institutions holding 3% or more of their shares. This research aims to test the existing 
theories in the Egyptian environment, so the researcher suggests that the current study 
should be compatible with the literature. Therefore, it uses a cut-off of equal or greater 
than 5% to equal or less than 10% indicate firms in which owners are defined as being 
active (inactive) in their firms' management. A "grey area" between greater than 5% 
and less than 10% indicates companies where the researcher cannot arrive at a decision. 
Overall, no firms in the database have been included in this grey area. 
Summary information about the ownership/control structure of the firms drawn 
from the database is presented in Table 6-23. An analysis of this table shows that, 
contrary to the respondent firms in the questionnaire survey, the equity of many firms 
included in the database is widely held"'. Manager-controlled firms form 68% of the 
sample. Table 6-23 also presents the descriptive statistics concerning the management 
bonus schemes of firms drawn from the database. It is clear that a large majority (72%) 
of the respondent firms employ management bonus schemes. 
153 The majority of firms quoted on the exchange are primarily owned 
by relatively small numbers of 
shareholders or by families that exert similar closeness of ownership and control. 
Shares in those firms 
are seldom traded. The current study examines 
96 of the most frequently traded companies. 
172 
Table 6-23 Control and usage of bonus schemes in the database 
Management bonus Owner-controlled Manager-controlled All firms 
schemes Number of firms % Number of firms % Number of firmsj % 
No bonus scheme 23 74.2 4 6.2 27 28.1 
Bonus scheme 8 25.8 61 93.8 69 71.9 
Total 31 100.0 65 100.0 96 100.0 
The substantive literature reports that bonus schemes are more likely to be used 
in manager-controlled rather than in owner-controlled firms. As Table 6-23 shows, a 
cross-tabulation of type of control versus use of a bonus scheme provides support for 
the findings of previous studies, in that 61 firms out of 65 manager-controlled firms 
selected from the database (about 94%) employ management bonus schemes; the 
comparative figures for owner-controlled firins was 8 firms out of 31 (about 26%). 
Subjecting the results reported in Table 6-23 to a test of homogeneity of proportions, 
confirms that the two ownership/control types of firm differ significantly in the 
proportion employing a bonus scheme (p-value = 0.000). This result is consistent with 
the prediction and the evidence reported in the literature (see Dhaliwal et al., 1982; 
Lewellen et al., 1987; Dempsey et al., 1993). 
Leverage for the database firms was measured in two ways: (i) the proportion of 
total debt to total assets (Press and Weintrop, 1990; Warfield et al., 1995; Rajgopal and 
Pincus, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2000) and (ii) the proportion of long-term debt to equity 
(Press and Weintrop, 1990"'; Lifien and Pastena, 1982). Both these approaches used in 
the current study concurrently. 
154 Press and Weintrop, (1990) used four measures for 
leverage: LTD / BV, LTD / MV, TD / ASSETS 
and LTD / (MV + LTD) where: LTD was the 
long-term debt; BV was the book value of equity; MV was 
the market value of equity; TD was the total 
debt; ASSETS referred to total assets. 
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Leverage for these firms was measured by reference to total debt divided bý- total 
assets (LEV) as well as by long term debt divided by equity (LEVI)"'. Leverage 
characteristics have been identified as a factor that can give rise to pressure to adopt 
income-increasing methods (see, Chapter 4). Table 6-24 presents the frequency 
distributions of the debt/total assets ratios (LEV) and debt/equity ratios (LEVI) for the 
firms selected from the database. The mean debt/total assets ratios (LEV) of the 
database firms, at 0.598, is higher than the estimated mean leverage in the 
questionnaire survey (0.37) and is consistent with levels described in preceding studies. 
The mean leverage was 0.475 in Warfield et al. (1995), 0.416 in Rajgopal and Pincus, 
(2000) and 0.523 in Peasnell et al. (2000). Also, there is indication that among the 
database firms, the mean debt/total assets ratios (LEV) are higher than the mean 
debt/equity ratios (LEVI), (0.598 and 0.287 respectively). The mean long-term debt to 
equity was 0.68 in Press and Weintrop 1990. 
Table 6-24 Leverage of the database firms 
Debt/total assets (LEV) Long-term debt/equity (LEVI) 
Ratios Number of firms % Number of firms % 
<20% 3 3.1 62 64.6 
20-40(%) 13 13.5 10 10.4 
>40-60(%) 33 34.4 9 9.4 
>60-80(%) 30 31.3 5 5.2 
>80% 17 17.7 10 10.4 
Total 96 100.0 96 100 
Mean = 0.598 Mean = 0.287 
Firm's size has been found to be negatively associated with management's choice 
155 Both of the ratios of long-term debt divided 
by equity and debt divided by total assets are available 
through Kompass Egypt year-book 2001 for about 
70 companies and the two ratios of the remaining 26 
have been computed. 
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of income increasing accounting methods (Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979). Indeed. 
size is hypothesised to provide an indication regarding management's decision to use 
income-decreasing methods (see H3). One explanation is that large firms seek to 
choose accounting practices that reduce the probability of large earnings in order to 
avoid possible political attention (regulation and/or taxation). Based on this view, large 
firrns are more likely to choose income-decreasing methods. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) argue that the negative association between income-increasing method choices 
and size is driven by political exposure suffered by lobbying companies to avoid 
political visibility. As in the questionnaire survey, the total value of sales (SALES) and 
the last reported balance sheet value of the total assets (ASSETS) have been used as 
measures of size. There is no obvious reason to choose one measure of size over other 
so both are used. 
Table 6-25 shows that the size of firms selected from the database are larger than 
the size of firms included in the questionnaire survey. Panel A of Table 6-25 indicates 
that 46 firms out of 93 (49.5%) in the firms included in the questionnaire survey have 
total sales (SALES) of more than 100 million L. E. compared with 67 firms out of 92"' 
(72.8%) for the firms included from the database. The mean sales for companies that 
responded to the survey are estimated at 97 million L. E. which is about a quarter of that 
for the companies in the database at 426 million L. E. 
156 Sales figures for 4 firms are missing from the sample of 96 companies. 
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Table 6-25 Total sales (SALES) and Total assets (ASSETS) in the survey and database 
Panel A: Total sales (SALES) Panel B: Total assets (ASSETS) 
Survey Database Survey Database 
Million L. E. firms % firms % Million L. E. firms % firms % 
<10 8 8.6 2 2.1 <50 10 10.8 1 1 
>10-25 11 11.8 2 2.1 50-100 27 29.0 7 7.3 
>25-50 10 10.8 3 3.1 >100-250 24 25.8 23 24.0 
>50-100 18 19.4 18 18.8 >250-500 16 17.2 17 17.7 
>100-250 46 49.5 25 26.0 >500-1000 16 17.2 21 21.9 
> -500 250 - - 18 18.8 >1000-2500 - - 13 13.5 
>500-1000 - - 15 15.6 >2500-5000 - - 7 7.3 
>1000 - - 9 9.4 >5000 - - 7 7.3 
Missing - - 4 4.2 Missing - - - - 
Total 93 100 96 100 Total 93 100 96 100 
Furthermore, panel B of Table 6-25 indicates that 16 out of 93 (17%) firms 
included in the questionnaire survey have total assets (ASSETS) of more than 500 
million L. E. compared with 48 out of 96 (50%) firms included from the database. The 
mean assets for companies that responded to the survey is estimated at 263 million L. E. 
which is less than a quarter of that for the companies in the database - 1798 million 
L. E. 
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics for and correlations among the variables in the 
database 
Descriptive statistics for the companies in the database have been highlighted in 
Table 6-26. For each variable, the mean, standard deviation, median, maximum, and 
minimum values have been reported. This table shows that 
bonus schemes are used by 
0.719 of the firms chosen from the database. The proportion of 
database firms recorded 
as manager- controlled (MC) 
is 0.677; fin-ns included in the database therefore have 
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less concentrated ownership than firms included in the survey. Table 6-26 also 
indicates that the means for log of total sales and the log of total assets were 2.348 and 
2.760 million L. E. respectively"'. The mean for the log of current liabilities over the 
same period was about 2.382 million L. E. It appears that the sample firms are much 
smaller than those examined in prior studies which were mostly American. For 
example, the mean log sales in Bowen et al. (2002) were $6.65 1. The mean value of 
total sales in Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) was $1,760 million while figure in Press 
and Weintrop (1990) was $1,911 million. Also, the mean of total assets in Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979) was $1,355 million while the mean log of total assets in 
Bauwhede et al. (2003) was 15.940 million euro. The average mean of the log value of 
the equity for the sample firms is 2.249 million L. E. while the median log value is 
2.241 million L. E., suggesting that the distribution of equity values is symmetric. The 
mean log of the equity was $522.64 million in the Rajgopal and Pincus (2000) analysis 
of oil and gas American firms; this indicates that the sample firms are smaller in size 
relative to those examined in earlier studies. The accounting choice literature indicates 
that the political cost hypothesis is generally applicable to large firms like the ones used 
in Watts and Zimmerman and in subsequent studies"'. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 6-26 underscores the differences in firm size between the sample firms and firms 
examined in prior studies"'. The table also shows that the mean return on assets of the 
sample firms was 0.077. Given this low profitability ratio relative to interest rates"', it 
157 Current rate I L. E. =O. 19 US$ 
151 See for example Hall, 1993 and Malmquist, 1990. 
159 This difference allows the researcher to test whether or not the political cost hypothesis apply to the 
sample firms. 
160 Central Bank of Egypt deposit rate currently is about 9.25%. 
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is possible that profitability could influence the choice of an accounting method. The 
sales levels of fin-ns drawn from the database are smaller than those examined in the 
earlier studies, with log of the total sales (SALES) ranging from 0.883 million L. E. to 
3.547 million L. E., and having a median value of 2.381 million L. E. The log of the total 
assets (ASSETS) also is smaller, ranging from 1.615 million L. E. to 4.680 billion L. E. 
with a median value of 2.732 million L. E. The mean TAXRATE of the sample firms at 
0.086 is significantly lower than that found in identified prior studies; e. g. this 
proportion was 0.31 in Gopalakrishnan (1994) and 0.352 in Hagerman and Zmijewski 
(1979). 
Table 6-26 Descriptive statistics for the firms in the database 
Descriptive statistics (N = 96) 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
DEP 0.885 0.320 1 0 1 
INV 0.198 0.401 0 0 1 
MP 0.719 0.452 1 0 1 
MC 0.677 0.470 1 0 1 
LEV 0.598 0.197 0.594 0.060 0.923 
LEV1 0.287 0.460 0.083 0 2.417 
SALES 2.348 0.529 2.381 0.883 3.547 
ASSETS 2.760 0.585 2.732 1.615 4.680 
EQUITY 2.249 0.497 2.241 1.048 3.319 
CUR LIA 2.382 0.685 2.306 0.769 4.569 
Cl 0.865 1.715 0.300 0.001 11.872 
CR 0.353 0.248 0.292 0.074 1.0 
PROFIT 0.077 0.080 0.062 -0.13 0.3 
ITAXRATE 0.086 0.118 0.004 0.000 0.497 
- -- , r ýTýt-l --J ---- C -- 
DEP was coded as one for SU) ana zero ior otnerwiSC; 
11N V WWi UUUVU Wl V11V, IV. I. 1-1 U11U 1-%, L%J LUX -- IV, -. - 
was coded as one if there is no one or group shareholder owning 
10% or more of the total shares, and zero for 
otherwise; MP was coded as one if firm has Management compensation plans, and zero 
if not; LEV was the total 
debt divided by total assets; LEVI was the long term debt divided by equity; SALES referred to 
log total sales; 
ASSETS was log total assets; Cl was the capital intensity (gross 
fixed assets/sales); CR was eight firm concentration 
ratio (percentage of sales); CUR - 
LIA was log of total current liabilities; EQUITY was log of total value of equity; 
PROFIT was operating income divided by total assets and TAXRATE was the 
firm's tax rate calculated by dividing 
tax expense by net income. All values are measured at 
fiscal year-end 200 1, unless otherwise indicated. 
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The correlations of the independent and control variables for the database firms 
are presented in Table 6-27. The results show a positive and significant correlation for 
the database firms between the management bonus schemes (MP) and total sales 
(SALES), total value of assets (ASSETS) and TAXRATE (0.189,0.185 and 0301 
respectively). There is a positive significant correlation between (i) leverage and value 
of total sales and between (ii) leverage and the value of total assets (0.180 and 0.198 
respective y). A negative significant correlation exists between PROFIT and both 
measures of leveraged (LEV and LEVI) (4212, and -0.315 respectively) 161 . Also, 
there is a negative significant correlation between the long-tenn debt/equity (LEVI) 
and TAXRATE (-0.217) and a high positive significant correlation of 0.532 between 
the total sales values of firm (SALES) and their total assets (ASSETS). Table 6-27 also 
indicates a significant negative association between total assets (ASSETS) and profit 
0.217). 
6.4 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter presented descriptive statistics regarding the responses to the 
questionnaire survey and the characteristics of the firms included in the database have 
been presented. In addition certain pairs of variables have been cross-tabulated in order 
to describe the association between them. 
A number of interesting findings emerge from the descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables. Firstly, the firms included in the database are smaller than the 
firms investigated in previous studies. Secondly, the firms included in the survey tend 
16 'This is not expected because PROFIT is measured as earnings before interest and taxes for the 
financial year divided by the book value of assets; thus, the effect of interest expenses is not included 
(see Table 5-3). 
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to be even smaller than the firms in the database. Thirdly, firms in the survey haN-e 
higher concentration of ownership than firms in the database. Fourthly, management 
bonus plans are more frequently employed by firms in database than by firms included 
in the survey. Fifthly, in both the survey and the database there is evidence that 
manager-controlled firms are more likely than owner-controlled firms to use a bonus 
scheme to motivate managers. Sixthly, leverage is positively correlated with size of 
firm (SALES or ASSETS) in both survey and database. 
Overall, Tables 6.14 and 6.27 indicate that the correlations between independent 
variables are fairly consistent across the questionnaire survey and the database. The 
correlation coefficient for each pair of variables has the same sign in both cases. As a 
rule the correlation coefficient for each pair of variables show approximately the same 
levels of significance in both survey and database (i. e. both are not significant, or both 
are significant at the 0.05 level, or both are significant at the 0.01 level). In only two 
instances are the levels different (SALES vs. LEV, and SALES vs. MP). 
Turning to the dependent variables (depreciation and inventory methods), the 
descriptive statistics included in this chapter show that the majority of firms included in 
the survey (80%) and in the database (89%) adopt the SLD method - an income 
increasing choice. By contrast, the majority of firms in the survey (57%) and in the 
database (80%) employ an income decreasing inventory valuation method (NO FIFO). 
Within this context, the next chapter outlines the results of the formal testing of 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 7: Data Analysis and Empirical Findings 
- Tests of Hypotheses - 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents tests of the hypotheses which were formulated in Chapter 4. 
The individual predictions regarding the economic determinants of accounting choices 
are subjected to preliminary univariate, analyses in section 7.2. Regression of the 
accounting method choice (for depreciation and for inventory) on each economic 
determinant is performed for (i) the survey and (ii) the database datasets in order to 
establish whether a statistically significant relationship exits between each accounting 
method choice and each economic determinant. Section 7.3 contains the results of 
logistic regression analysis of each accounting method choice against all of the proxies 
for management's economic motives. Logistic regression is appropriate because each 
y-variable takes one of only two values. Multiple regression is used because, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, the economic determinants may be correlated with one 
another. Each hypothesis was tested separately using (i) the survey and (ii) the 
database. Section 7.4 concludes the present chapter, with a discussion of the findings of 
the statistical analyses. The findings of the database firms are compared with the results 
from the questionnaire survey companies. 
The general conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the bonus schemes 
and leverage contracting hypotheses could explain accounting choices in Egypt. 
The 
findings provide enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses Hl,,, HIO,,, Hlma, 
Hlb5 
HIM and HIMb also there is partial support for the research hypotheses 
H2a, H20aý 
H2Ma, H2b, H20band H2Mb. The findings also indicate that there is no empirical support 
from the data for the relevance of the political costs hypothesis in Egypt (H3,,. 
Moa. 
H3ma, H3b, H30b and H3Mb). The results of this study suggest that Egyptian managers 
may be motivated by similar factors to these observed 
in studies conducted in the USA 
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and other Western countries. In contrast, as might have been anticipated, perceptions of 
political costs are probably influenced by the environments in which firms operate and 
consequently are not likely to lead to management responses which are consistent on an 
intemational scale. 
7.2 Univariate analysis 
Association analysis was utilised to test the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. The association between a firm's characteristics and its 
accounting method choices relating to depreciation policy decisions and inventory 
valuation method was examined. The null hypothesis of no association between a 
dependent variable and the dichotomous independent variables was investigated via the 
chi-square test of a2x2 contingency table. The null hypothesis of no association 
between the dependent variables and each of the explanatory variables that was 
measured on an ordinal scale with more than two levels was investigated by a Kendall's 
tau-b test. The findings of the investigations are reported in the following sections. 
7.2.1 Bonus plans and accounting method choices 
7.2. LI Bonus plans and depreciation policy decisions 
The widespread use of accounting-based compensation schemes (see Tables 6-5 
and 6-23 in Chapter 6) suggests that the firm's executives may have a strong incentive 
to pursue earnings management. The use of such bonus schemes can therefore play a 
crucial role in determining depreciation policy decisions. For the respondent firms in 
the questionnaire survey, a chi-square test"' using a2x2 contingency table was 
162 To be precise, the likelihood ratio test was employed because 
it is less susceptible to problems that 
can arise when the expected frequencies under the null 
hypothesis take small values (less than 5). 
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employed for testing the hypotheses Hl,,, HIO, and HIMa (for all firms, owner- 
controlled firms and manager-controlled firms respectively)"'. Firstly, for all firms. the 
likelihood ratio test statistic (reported at the foot of Table 7-1, panel AI) is large enough 
to conclude that one can firmly reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. 
The ratio of 25.90 has a p-value of 0.000 which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The frequencies shown in the body of panel Al indicate that the association is in 
the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis (Hla); i. e. 49 of the 50 managers 
who are in firms that have bonus schemes use SLD, whereas 25 out of the 43 managers 
who are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use SLD. Secondly, for owner- 
controlled firms, the likelihood ratio of 11.928 has a p-value of 0.0003 for a one-sided 
test which again is statistically significant at the 5% level. The frequencies shown in the 
body of panel All indicate that the association is in the direction predicted by the 
alternative hypothesis (H I oa); i. e. all but one of the 20 managers who are in firms that 
have bonus schemes use SLD,, whereas only 22 out of the 40 managers who are in firms 
that do not have bonus schemes use SLD. However, for manager-controlled firms, 
panel AIII reveals that all of the 33 managers (3 with no bonus scheme and 30 with 
bonus scheme) employ SLD, thus, no statistics were computed because SLD is 
constant. 
Applying the same test of hypotheses (H I a, HI Oa and HI Ma) to the database firms, 
the findings are also displayed in Table 7-1. Firstly, for all firms, the information in 
163 Hl,, has null hypothesis that there is no association between the employment of management bonus 
plans and depreciation policy decisions; the alternative hypothesis is that managers of firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose SLD. Hlo. has null hypothesis that there is no association between 
employment of management bonus plans and depreciation policy decisions in owner-controlled firms; 
the alternative hypothesis is that managers of owner-controlled 
firms with bonus plans are more likely to 
choose SLID. In addition for testing Hlm. has null 
hypothesis that there is no association between 
employment of management bonus plans and 
depreciation policy decisions in manager-controlled firms, 
the alternative hypothesis is that managers of manager-controlled 
firms with bonus plans are more likely 
to choose SLID. 
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Table 7-1, panel BI, shows that the null hypothesis can again be rejected and that the 
association is in the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis (Hla)- i. e. all but 
one of the 69 managers who are in firms that have bonus schemes use SLD, whereas 
63% of the 27 managers who are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use SLD. As 
a result, the likelihood ratio of 22-303 is large and its p-value of 0.000 is very small. 
this allows us to reject the view that the whole sample of firms has the same propensity 
to use SLD whether or not they have a bonus scheme to reward managers. 
Table 7-1 Association between Depreciation and Management bonus schemes 
Panel Al: Survey (All firms) Panel BI: Database (All fi rms) 
Mp Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total DoesnotuseSLD UsesSLD Total 
No bonus scheme 18 25 43 10 17 27 
Bonus scheme 1 49 50 1 68 69 
Total 19 74 93 11 85 96 
Likelihood Ratio: 25.900 Likelihood Ratio: 22.303 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.000 p-value for a one-sided = 0.000 
Panel AM Survey (OC) Panel B111: Database (OC) 
Mp Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total 
No bonus scheme 18 22 40 8 15 23 
Bonus scheme 1 19 20 178 
Total 19 41 60 9 22 31 
Likelihood Ratio: 11.928 Likelihood Ratio: 1.603 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.0003 p-value for a one-sided = 0.103 
Panel AHI: Survey (MC) Panel BHI: Database (MC) 
Mp Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total 
No bonus scheme 3 3 2 2 4 
Bonus scheme 30 30 - 61 61 
Total 33 33 2 63 65 
Likelihood Ratio: 12.318 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.000 
I .. I- -1 lkffl- A---- MP denotes management bonus scnemes, kit- utmIUMN UWIIUI-'kVLILLVII%, U JLIIIXIO CU1%. 9 114ý 
controlled firms. 
Secondly, for owner-controlled firms, the information in Table 7-1, panel B11, 
shows that the null hypothesis (H10a) cannot 
be rejected, as the likelihood ratio of 
1.603 has a p-value of 0.103 for a one-sided test which 
is not statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Thirdly, for manager-controlled 
firms, on the other hand, the information 
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in Table 7-1, panel B111, shows that the association is in the direction predicted by the 
alternative hypothesis (Hlma); i. e. all of the 61 managers who are in manager- 
controlled firms that have bonus schemes use SLD, whereas 2 of the 4 managers who 
are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use SLD. 
In summary, both survey and database samples provide significant evidence in 
favour of the research hypothesis (Hl,, ) that managers in firms with bonus plans are 
more likely to choose an income-increasing depreciation method. For owner- 
controlled firms, survey companies but not database counterparts provide significant 
support for the association between employment of management bonus plans and 
depreciation policy decisions (rejection of the null hypothesis H10a). Further, database 
counterparts provide significant evidence in favour of the research hypothesis (H I ma) 
that managers of manager-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose 
SLD. 
7.2.1.2 Bonus plans and inventory policy decisions 
In the same way, the use of bonus schemes could also play a role in determining 
inventory policy decisions. For the respondent firms in the questionnaire survey, a chi- 
square test was employed for testing the hypotheses (H I b, HI Ob and HI Mb) which have 
the null hypothesis that there is no association between employment of management 
bonus plans and inventory policy decisions; the alternative hypothesis states that 
managers in firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose the FIFO inventory 
method. 
Firstly, for the all finns, the likelihood ratio test statistic (10.17 1) reported at the 
foot of Table 7-2, panel Al, is sizeable and the very small p-value 
for a one-sided 
alternative of 0.0005 allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the altemative 
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(HIb). The frequencies shown in the body of this panel indicate that the association is 
in the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis. Thus, 29 of the 50 managers 
who are in firms that have bonus schemes do use FIFO, whereas only II out of the 43 
managers who are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use this method of 
inventory valuation. Secondly, for owner-controlled finns, the likelihood ratio of 5.546 
has a p-value of 0.009 for a one-sided test which is statistically significant. The 
frequencies shown in the body of panel All of Table 7-2 indicate that the association is 
in the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis (HIOb); i-e- 10 out of the 20 
managers who are in firms that have bonus schemes use FIFO, whereas only 8 out of 
the 40 managers who are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use FIFO (positive 
association). However, for manager-controlled firms, the ratio of 2.580 has a p-value 
of 0.054 for a one-sided test which is not quite statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The frequencies shown in the body of panel AIII of Table 7-2 indicate that 11 out of the 
30 managers who are in firms that have bonus schemes use FIFO, whereas all of the 3 
managers who are in firms that do not have bonus schemes use FIFO. The results are 
not in the direction predicted by the hypothesis 
HIMb. 
Applying the same test of hypotheses (HIb, 
HlOb and HIMb) to the finns in the 
database, the information in Table 7-2, panel BI, shows that the null hypothesis can 
again be rejected and the association is in the direction predicted by the alternative 
hypothesis (Hlb)- Some 18 of the 69 managers who are in firms that have bonus 
schemes do use FIFO, whereas only one of the 27 managers who is 
in a firm that does 
not have bonus schemes uses FIFO. As a consequence, the 
likelihood ratio of 7.759 has 
a p-value for a one-sided alternative of 
0.003 which is statistically significant. In 
addition, for owner-controlled 
firms, the information in Table 7-2, panel Bll, shows 
that the null hypothesis HlObcan be rejected, as the 
likelihood ratio of 8.075 has a one- 
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sided p-value of 0.002 which is statistically significant. Moreover, for manager- 
controlled firms, on the other hand, the information in Table 7-2, panel B111, shows that 
the null hypothesis HIMb cannot be rejected; although the statistics confirm the 
existence of a positive relationship, it is not significant; i. e. in manager-controlled 
firms, 14 of the 61 managers that have bonus schemes use FIFO, whereas none of the 4 
managers that do not have bonus schemes use FIFO. 
Table 7-2 Association between Inventory policy and Management bonus schemes 
Panel Al: Survey (All firms) Panel BE Database (All firms) 
Mp NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
No bonus scheme 32 11 43 26 1 27 
Bonus scheme 21 29 50 51 18 69 
Total 53 40 93 77 19 96 
Likelihood Ratio: 10.171 Likelihood Ratio: 7.759 
p-value for a one-sided: 0.0005 p-value for a one-sided: 0.003 
Panel AH: Survey (OC) Panel BU : Database (OC) 
Mp NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
No bonus scheme 32 8 40 22 1 23 
Bonus scheme 10 10 20 4 4 8 
Total 42 18 60 26 5 31 
Likelihood Ratio: 5.546 Likelihood Ratio: 8.075 
p-value for a one-sided: 0.009 p-value for a one-sided: 0.002 
Panel A M Survey (MC) Panel B1111: Database (MC) 
Mp NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
No bonus scheme 3 3 4 - 4 
Bonus scheme 11 19 30 47 14 61 
Total I1 22 33 51 14 65 
Likelihood Ratio: 2.580 Likelihood Ratio: 2.011 
p-value for a one-sided: 0.054_ p-value for a one-sided: 0.078 
NT denotes management bonus scliernes, uu cenoies owner-conITOlieu iirms allu ivi%- ut; nutuN 111miagul 
controlled firms. 
Although the general usage of FIFO is lower in the database firms than in the 
survey companies, both datasets provide significant evidence in favour of the research 
hypothesis that managers in firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose an 
income-increasing inventory method (HI b). Further, there an association between the 
employment of management bonus plans and 
inventory policy decisions in owner- 
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controlled firms (H10b). The overall conclusion to be drawn from the findings above is 
that the survey and the database provide evidence in support of research hypothesis HI 
that managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to adopt income-increasing 
accounting choices than those in firms without such bonus plans. Contrary to 
expectation, this conclusion appears to hold strongly for owner-controlled firms but 
only partially for manager-controlled firms (Hla, Hlb, H10a, HlOb and HIMabut not 
HIMb) but, as identified in Chapter 6, owner-controlled firms predominantly do not use 
bonus schemes. 
7.2.2 Firm's leverage characteristics and accounting methods choice 
A firm's leverage characteristics were hypothesised to influence the choice of 
accounting methods. The leverage characteristics used in this study were the debt/total 
assets ratios (LEV) for the questionnaire survey and the debt/total assets ratios and 
debt/equity ratios (LEVI) for the database. Results of testing the association between 
the leverage and dependent variables (a) for the firms responding in the questionnaire 
survey and (b) for the firms included in the database are reported in the following sub- 
sections. 
7.2.2.1 Firm's leverage characteristics and depreciation policy decisions 
The nonparametric Kendall's tau-b" test was used to test the null hypotheses 
(H2a, H20a and H2ma). Results of Kendall's tau-b test for respondent firms in the 
questionnaire survey are presented in Table 7-3. Firstly, the results in Table 7-3 panel I 
indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (the p-value for a one-sided 
164 This test is appropriate because it deals with the association between variables measured on an ordinal 
scale; both SLD and leverage are measured on ordinal scales. 
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altemative is 0.209 which is greater than the critical level of 0.05). The data do not 
provide significant support for the debt hypothesis (H2a) that there is an association 
between a finn's level of the leverage and its depreciation policy decisions: the 
alternative is that firms with higher leverage will have a greater tendency to use SLD - 
an income increasing depreciation policy (see Chapter 4). It appears that so far as those 
firms which responded to the survey are concerned, the likelihood that they will adopt 
SLD is not associated with their level of leverage. This finding lends no support to the 
research hypothesis that more highly leveraged firms will be more likely to adopt SLD. 
Secondly, for owner-controlled firms, the information in Table 7-3, panel 11, shows that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; the p-value for a one-sided alternative is 0.099 
which is greater than the level of 0.05. However, for manager-controlled firms, all of 
the 33 managers employ SLD; thus, no statistics were computed because SLD is 
constant. 
Table 7-3 Association between Depreciation policy and Leverage for the survey 
Panel I (All firms) Pan el H: (OC) Pane l HI (MC) 
Does not Uses Does not Uses Does not Uses 
LEV use SLD SLD Total use SLD SLD Total use SLD SLD Total 
<20% 7 19 26 7 8 15 - II 11 
20-40(%) 6 25 31 6 15 21 - 10 10 
>40-60 (%) 2 18 20 2 9 11 - 9 9 
>60-80 (%) 4 5 9 4 4 8 - 1 1 
>80 (%) - 7 7 - 5 5 - 2 2 
Total 19 74 93 19 41 60 - 33 33 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.078, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.150, DF: 4 
p-value for a one-sided: 0.209 p-value for a one-sided: 0.099 
On the other hand, the results of the Kendall's tau-b test for firms in the database, 
presented in panel Al of Table 7-4, indicate that there is a statistically significant 
association between debt/total assets (LEV) of firms and their depreciation policy 
decisions (the p-values for a one-sided alternative is 0.019). For owner-controlled 
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firms in the database, results presented in panel All of Table 7-4 indicate significant 
evidence in favour of the research hypothesis that the higher the leverage, the greater 
the likelihood that an owner-controlled firm will choose the SLD method (H20a); the 
p-values for a one-sided alternative is 0.001. On the other hand, in panel AIII, the 
negative value of the Kendall's tau-b does not support the research hypothesis that the 
higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a manager-controlled firm will 
choose the SLD method (H2m,,, ). 
Table 7-4 Association between Depreciation policy and Leverage for the database 
Panel Al: LEV (All firms) Panel BI: LEV1(All firms) 
Ratios Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total 
<20% 1 2 3 10 52 62 
20-40(%) 3 10 13 - 10 10 
>40-60 (%) 5 28 33 9 9 
>60-80 (%) 1 29 30 5 5 
>80 (%) 1 16 17 1 9 10 
Total 11 85 96 11 85 96 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.207, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.165, DF: 4 
p-values for a one-sided = 0.019 p-values for a one-sided = 0.026 
Panel AH: LEV (OC) Panel BH: LEV1 (OC) 
Ratios Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total 
<20% 1 1 8 9 17 
20-40(%) 3 - 3 - 3 3 
>40-60 (%) 4 7 11 4 4 
>60-80 (%) - 10 10 - 1 1 
>80 (%) 1 5 6 1 5 6 
Total 9 22 31 9 22 31 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.500, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.354, DF: 4 
p-values for a one-sided = 0.001 P-values for a one-sided = 0.010 
Panel AHI LEV (MC) Panel BUI: LEV1 (MC) 
Ratios Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total Does not use SLD Uses SLD Total 
<20% 2 2 2 43 45 
20-40(%) - 10 10 - 7 7 
>40-60 (%) 1 21 22 - 5 5 
>60-80 (%) 1 19 20 - 4 4 
>80 (%) - II II - 4 4 
Total 2 63 65 2 63 65 
Kendafl7s tau-b: -0.009, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.110, DF: 4 
v-values for a one-sided = 0.552 p-values for a one-sided = 0.076 
LEV referred to Debt/total assets, LEVI reterred to Long-term aenvequity, mr aenotes management Donus 
schemes, OC denotes owner-controlled 
firms and MC denotes manager-controlled firms. 
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Moreover panel BI in Table 7-4 indicates that there is also a statistically 
significant positive association between debt/equity ratios (LEVI) and the use of the 
SLD method, (the p-value for a one-sided alternative is 0.026). The positive 
correlation found in each case confirms that higher leveraged firms are more inclined to 
use SLD. These findings for the database are consistent with the research hypothesis 
H2,, (for all firms) that the use of income-increasing depreciation reporting methods is 
positively associated with leverage. For owner-controlled companies, panel BII of 
Table 7-4 indicates that the higher the debt/equity ratio, the greater the likelihood that 
an owner-controlled firm will choose the SLD method (significant evidence in favour 
of the research hypothesis H20,, ); the p-value for a one-sided test is 0.010. However. 
results from manager-controlled firms shows that the null hypothesis H2Ma cannot be 
rejected; i. e. only 2 of the 65 managers who are in manager-controlled firms do not use 
SLD - the two firms have debt/equity ratios of <20%. 
To sum up, the above analysis indicates that, for firms included in the database, a 
statistically significant positive association exists between the firm's decision to use 
SLD and its degree of dependency on borrowing (for all and owner-controlled firms 
but not for manager-controlled firms). However, this is not the case for the firms that 
responded to the survey. Possible reasons for the disparity include the generally smaller 
size of the firms in the survey, and the differences in capital structure and 
ownership/control of the two sets of firms (survey and database). 
7.2.2.2 Firm's leverage characteristics and inventory policy decisions 
Once again, the Kendall's tau-b test has been employed for testing the null 
hypotheses (H2b, H20band H2Mb) that there is no association between the debt ratios of 
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firms and their inventory valuation method against the alternative that the higher the 
leverage, the greater the likelihood that a fin-n will choose the FIFO inventory method, 
(see Tables 7-5 and 7-6). 
The results presented in Table 7-5 indicate that, for the firms that responded to 
the survey, the null hypothesis of no association between the debt/ total assets ratio of 
firms and the method of inventory valuation they adopt (for all firms, owner-controlled 
firms and manager-controlled firms) cannot be rejected; p-values for a one-sided 
alternative are 0.301,0.392 and 0.103 respectively and all are greater than 0.05). 
Although the coefficients are all positive, this result does not provide significant 
support for the debt hypotheses (H2b, H20band H2Mb). 
Table 7-5 Association between Inventory policy and Leverage for the survey 
Panel 1: L EV (All firms)ý Panel H: LEV (OC) Panel HI: LEV (MC) 
LEV NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<20% 16 10 26 11 4 15 5 6 11 
20-40(%) 17 14 31 14 7 21 3 7 10 
>40-60 (%) 11 9 20 8 3 11 3 6 9 
>60-80 (%) 7 2 9 7 1 8 - 1 1 
>80 (%) 2 5 7 2 3 5 2 2 
Total 53 40 93 42 18 60 11 22 33 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.049, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.033 Kendall's tau-b: 0.192 
p-values for a one-sided: 0.301 p-value for a one-sided: 0.392 p-value for a one-sided: 0.103 
LEV referred to debt/total assets ratios, OC denotes owner-controlled tirms and MU denotes manager-controllea 
firms. 
Similarly, the association between the firms' inventory policy choices and their 
leverage (whether measured by debt/total assets or by long-term debt/equity ratios) was 
examined for companies in the database. The results presented in Table 7-6 do not 
permit a rejection of the null hypotheses for H2b, H20b and H2Mb (the one sided p- 
values are higher than the significance level 0.05). Again, these findings do not provide 
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support for the debt hypotheses"'. 
Table 7-6 Association between Inventory policy and Leverage for the database 
Panel Al: LEV All firms) Panel BE LEV1(All firms) 
Ratios NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<20% 3 - 3 49 13 62 
20-40(%) 9 4 13 9 1 10 
>40-60 (%) 27 6 33 9 - 9 
>60-80 (%) 23 7 30 3 2 5 
>80 (%) 15 2 17 7 3 10 
Total 77 19 96 77 19 96 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.050, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.002, DF: 4 
p-values for a one-sided = 0.289 p-values for a one-sided = 0.492 
Panel AM LEV (0Q Panel BH: LEVI (0Q 
Ratios NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<20% 1 1 13 4 17 
20-40(%) 3 3 3 - 3 
>40-60 (%) 10 1 11 4 4 
>60-80 (%) 7 3 10 1 - 1 
>80 (%) 5 1 6 5 1 6 
Total 26 5 31 26 5 31 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.188, DFA Kendall's tau-b: -0.156, DFA 
p-values for a one-sided = 0.089 p-values for a one-sided = 0.819 
Panel AHI LEV (MC) Panel BUI: LEVI (MC) 
Ratios NO FIFO FIFO Total NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<20% 2 - 2 36 9 45 
20-40(%) 6 4 10 6 1 7 
>40-60 (%) 17 5 22 5 - 5 
>60-80 (%) 16 4 20 2 2 4 
>80 (%) 10 1 11 2 2 4 
Total 51 14 65 51 14 65 
Kendall's tau-b: -0.145, DFA Kendall's tau-b: 0.093, DFA 
p-values for a one-sided = 0.909 p-values for a one-sided = 0.240 
LEV referred to Debt/total assets, LEV I reterreci to Long-term aeot/equity, mr aenotes management 
bonus schemes, OC denotes owner-controlled firms and MC denotes manager-controlled firms. 
To sum up, both of the above analyses of the responses to the survey and of the 
database indicate no significant relationship between a firm's decision to use FIFO and 
its degree of dependency on borrowing. Neither survey nor database results provide 
165 H2b indicates that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the FIFO 
inventory method, H20b indicates that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that an owner- 
controlled firm will choose the FIFO 
inventory method and H2Mb indicates that the higher the leverage, 
the greater the likelihood that a manager-controlled 
firm will choose the FIFO inventory method. 
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evidence in support of hypotheses H2b, H20band H2Mb. 
7.2.3 Firm's size and its accounting methods choice 
Size is used in this study as a proxy variable for political visibility (Pacecca, 
1995). Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and Gopalakrishnan (1994) used total sales 
and the book value of assets as indications of size. The current study measured size 
using three parameters, namely current market value (SIZEI), total value of sales 
(SALES) and the last reported balance sheet value of the total assets (ASSETS). 
However, the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire survey did not use current 
market value (SIZEI) because many respondents did not provide that data. As there 
was no identified reason to prefer one of the remaining measures of size, both the total 
value of sales (SALES) and value of the total assets (ASSETS) were used in the 
analysis as proxies for political costs. 
7. Z3.1 Size of thefirm and its depreciation policy decisions 
The Kendall's tau-b test was used for testing the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between the size of firms and their depreciation policy decisions against the 
altemative hypothesis that the larger the firm, the lesser the likelihood it will choose the 
income increasing depreciation method (for all firms, owner-controlled firms and 
manager-controlled firms). For responses to the survey, the size variables (total sales 
and total assets) were independently cross-tabulated against the use of SLD. Table 7-7 
panel A and panel B show the results. The Kendall's tau-b test statistics and the p- 
values for a one-sided test of association are also shown in the table. 
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Table 7-7 Association between Depreciation policy and Size for the survey 
Panel Al: SALES (All firms) Panel BI: ASSETS (All firms) 
Does not use Does not use Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 1 7 8 <50 2 8 10 
>10-25 3 8 11 50-100 6 21 27 
>25-50 5 5 10 >100-250 9 15 24 
>50-100 5 13 18 >250-500 - 16 16 
>100 5 41 46 >500 2 14 16 
Total 19 74 93 Total 19 74 93 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.175, DFA Kendall's tau-b: 0.112, DFA 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.973 p-value for a one-sided = 0.907 
Pa nel AH: SAL S (OC) Panel BH: ASSETS (OC) 
Does not use Does not use 
Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 1 3 4 <50 2 5 7 
>10-25 3 6 9 50-100 6 12 18 
>25-50 5 4 9 >100-250 9 8 17 
>50-100 5 9 14 >250-500 - 9 9 
>100 5 19 24 >500 2 7 9 
Total 19 41 60 Total 19 41 60 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.13 8ý DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.105, DFA 
p-value for a one -sided = 0.889 p-value for a one -sided = 0.830 
Panel AIII: SALES (MC) Panel BHI: ASSETS (MC) 
Does not use Does not use 
Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 - 4 4 <50 - 3 3 
>10-25 - 2 2 50-100 - 9 9 
>25-50 - 1 1 >100-250 - 7 7 
>50-100 - 4 4 >250-500 - 7 7 
>100 - 22 22 >500 - 7 7 
Total 33 1 33 Total - 33 33 
SALES referred to the total sales, ASSETS reterred to the total assets, UU clenotes owner-controlieu tirms ana 
MC denotes managers-controlled firms. 
The frequencies presented in panel Al of Table 7-7 appear to suggest that the 
smallest firms and the largest firms use SLD more than their medium sized 
counterparts"'. However tau here takes positive values, so the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected; the alternative of a negative association between the total value of sales 
(SALES) and use of SLD is not supported by this evidence (Ma). For owner-controlled 
166 That is the case also for owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. 
197 
firms, the information in Table 7-7, panel All, shows that tau here takes a positiNe 
value that is not significant at the 5% level, however, according to the alternative 
hypothesis, the sign is predicted to be negative. Thus, the P-value for the appropniate 
one-sided alternative should be larger than 0.05. Consequently, that null hypothesis 
that there is no association between the size of the owner-controlled finn and the use of 
the SLD method cannot be rejected (H30,, ); the p-value for a one-sided altemative is 
0.889 which is greater than the level of 0.05. However, for manager-controlled firms, 
all of the 33 managers employ SLD; thus, no statistics were computed because SLD is 
constant. 
The frequencies presented in panel BI of Table 7-7 also show a positive value for 
the relationship that is not statistically significant, so the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, but the alternative of a negative association between the total assets (ASSETS) 
and use of SLD receives no support (H3,, ). These findings do not provide support for 
the political visibility hypothesis (H30a) that the larger the owner-controlled firm, the 
lesser the likelihood that it will choose the SLD method (see Chapter 4). Indeed, it 
appears that, contrary to the prediction of the research hypothesis, the SIZE coefficient 'r, 
is positive and not significant. Again, for manager-controlled firms (H3Ma), no 
statistics were computed because SLD is constant. 
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Table 7-8 Association between Depreciation policy and Size for the database 
Pane l Al: SALES (All firms Pane l BE ASSETS (All firms ) 
Does not use Does not use Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 2 2 <50 - 1 1 >10-25 - 2 2 50-100 1 6 7 
>25-50 1 2 3 >100-250 6 17 23 
>50-1 00 4 14 18 >250-500 1 16 17 
>100-250 3 22 25 >500-1 000 2 19 21 
>250-500 2 16 18 >1000-2500 1 1 -) 13 
>500-1000 - 15 15 >2500-5000 - 7 7 >1000 - 9 9 >5000 - 7 7 Total 10 82 92 Total 1 85 96 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.19 1, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: 0.185, DF: 7 
P-value for a one-sided = 0.989 p-value for a one-sided == 0.985 
Pa nel AH: SALES (OC) Panel BH: ASSETS (OC) 
Does not use Does not use 
Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 2 2 <50 - - 
>10-25 - - 50-100 - 2 2 
>25-50 - - - >100-250 5 4 9 
>50-100 3 7 10 >250-500 1 5 6 
>100-250 3 3 6 >500-1000 2 6 8 
>250-500 2 1 3 >1000-2500 1 2 3 
>500-1000 - 3 3 >2500-5000 - I I 
>1000 - 5 5 >5000 - 2 2 
Total 8 21 29 Total 9 22 1 31 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.094, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: 0.178, DF: 7 
P-value for a one-sided = 0.745 p-value for a one-sided = 0.881 
Panel AHI: SALES (MC) Panel BUI: ASSETS (MC) 
Does not use Does not use 
Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total Million L. E. SLD Uses SLD Total 
<10 - - <50 - I I 
> 10-25 2 2 50-100 1 4 5 
>25-50 1 2 3 >100-250 1 13 14 
>5 0-100 1 7 8 >250-500 - 11 11 
>100-250 - 19 19 >500-1 000 - 13 13 
>250-500 - 15 15 >1000-2500 - 10 10 
>500-1000 - 12 12 >2500-5000 - 6 6 
>1000 - 4 4 >5000 - 5 5 
Total 2 61 63 Total 2 63 65 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.23 1, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: 0.205, DF: 7 
P-value for a one-sided = 0.930 1 p-value for a one-sided = 0.927 
SALES referred to the total sales, ASSETS referred to the total assets, OC denotes owner-controlled firms and MC 
denotes managers-controlled firms. 
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Similar behaviour to that shown in Table 7-7 can be seen in panels A and B of 
Table 7-8 that refer to the database. Again Kendall's tau-b test of the null hypothesis of 
no association against the alternative that larger firms are less likely to use SLD. leads 
to the null being preferred to the alternative. Indeed the evidence from the database lies 
in the opposite direction to the political cost hypothesis. Again, these findings 
contradict the political costs hypothesis (H3,, ). 
For the split data, results shown in panel All and panel Bll of Table 7-8 do not 
provide significant evidence in favour of the research hypothesis that the larger the 
owner-controlled firm, the lesser the likelihood it will choose the SLD method (Mo. ). 
Similarly, results that shown in panel AIII and panel BIll of Table 7-8 do not provide 
significant evidence in favour of the research hypothesis that the larger the manager- 
controlled firm, the lesser the likelihood it will choose the SLD method (H3Ma). 
To sum up, both the univariate analysis of the responses to the survey and of the 
database failed to find support for a negative relationship between the finn's decision to 
use SLD and its size. Contrary to the findings reported in some of the earlier literature, 
the present results (for all firms) suggest a positive association between a firm adopting 
SLD and its size. This result is not surprising in Egypt. As indicated in Chapter 2, large 
firms operating in Egypt are unlikely to face political costs; consequently, the factors 
affecting the accounting choices are most likely to be those identified in the hypotheses 
HI and H2 - which work in the opposite direction to H3 (see Tables 6-14 and 
6-27). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that political costs, which are represented by the 
SIZE variables, are only important for very large firms (such as oil companies). They 
argue that there is a threshold effect in other firms, so that minimizing political 
visibility is not likely to be a major concern 
for most businesses. That perception is 
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supported by a study by Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), which found that the SIZE 
coefficient was positive and not significant. The relatively small size of the firms in the 
samples in the present study and the political environment in Egypt arguably make the 
political costs hypothesis largely irrelevant to that country. 
According to the results reported in Tables 7-7 and 7-8 (panels All and Bll) about 
the owner-controlled firms, contrary to the prediction, the negative association between 
sizes of owner-controlled firms and the probability of adopting SLD is not found. 
Possible reasons for the disparity include the likelihood that closely-held firms obtain 
greater levels of corporate debt as compared to firms which are widely-held (Kim and 
Sorenson, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the factors affecting the accounting 
choices are most likely to be those identified in the hypotheses H2. Furthermore, the 
results reported in Tables 7-7 and 7-8 (panels AIII and BIII) about the large manager- 
controlled firms do not provide evidence to support the hypothesised relationship 
between the size of manager-controlled firms and the likelihood of adopting of SLD. 
One can assume that, although politicians may interpret high reported profits as 
evidence that a certain closely-held firm enjoys a monopolistic status, large widely- 
held firms which earn high earnings levels may be viewed with appreciation. Given 
that the executives of manager-controlled firms are hypothesised, ceteris paribus, to 
make accounting choices and report accounting income in the most positive way, thus 
they are more likely to forego political costs in order to report higher reported income 
because it may impact on their reputations. Therefore, they are assumed to prefer 
higher rather than lower reported eamings. 
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7.2-3.2 Size of thefirm and its inventory policy decisions 
The Kendall's tau-b test was employed for testing the null hypothesis that there is 
no association between the size of the firm and its adopted inventory valuation method. 
The alternative research hypothesis is that larger firms will be less likely to use FIFO. 
The results of the Kendall's tau-b tests for those responding in the questionnaire survey 
are presented in Table 7-9, panel A and panel B. Firstly, for all firms included in the 
questionnaire survey, the results indicate that there is a positive association between the 
total sales (SALES) and adopting FIFO; in the opposite direction to the political cost 
hypothesis (H3b)"'. However, there is no statistically significant association between 
the total assets (ASSETS) of firms and their inventory valuation method adopted, (the 
p-value for a one-sided alternative is 0.898 which is greater than 0.05). Secondly. for 
owner-controlled firms, results presented in Table 7-9, panel All and panel 1311, 
indicate that there is a positive association between the total assets (ASSETS) in the 
closely-held firms included in the questionnaire survey and the likelihood of adopting 
FIFO; in the opposite direction to H30b 168 . However, there is no statistically significant 
association between the total sales (SALES) of closely-held finns and the inventory 
valuation which they have adopted, (the p-value for a one-sided alternative is 0.939 
which is greater than 0.05). Similarly, there is no statistically significant association 
between the SIZE variables (SALES and ASSETS) of manager-controlled firms and 
their inventory valuation method adopted (the p-value for a one-sided alternative is 
0.438 and 0.281 respectively and both are greater than 0.05). This process takes 
account of the predicted sign of the coefficient (panel AIII and panel B111 of Table 7-9). 
"' P-value calculated at 0.0 17 in the opposite sign, so the appropriate one-sided alternative should be 
larger than 0.05 (1 - 0.017 = 0.983). 
"' P-value calculated at 0.041 in the opposite sign, so the appropriate one-sided alternative should be 
larger than 0.05 0-0.041 = 0.959). 
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Table 7-9 Association between Inventory policy and Size for the survey 
Panel Al: SALES (All firms) Panel BE ASSETS (All firms) 
Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIF otal 
<10 5 3 8 <50 5 5 10 
> 10-25 7 4 11 50-100 18 9 -7 >25-50 7 3 10 >100-250 18 6 24 
>50-100 14 4 18 >250-500 3 13 16 
>100 20 26 46 >500 9 7 16 
Total 53 40 93 Total 53 40 93 
Kendall's tau-b 0.200, DFA Kendall's tau-b: 0.122, DFA 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.983 p-value for a one-sided = 0.898 
Panel AH: SAL S (0Q Pane l BU: ASSETS (OC) 
Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<10 3 1 4 <50 5 2 7 
> 10-25 6 3 9 50-100 15 3 18 
>25-50 7 2 9 >100-250 14 3 17 
>50-100 14 - 14 >250-500 2 7 9 
>100 12 12 24 >500 6 3 9 
Total 42 18 60 Total 42 18 60 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.197, DF: 4 Kendall's tau-b: 0.2 10, DF: 4 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.939 p-value for a one-sided = 0.959 
Pane l AHI: SALES (MC) Panel BHI: ASSETS (MC) 
_ Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<10 2 2 4 <50 - 3 3 
>10-25 1 1 2 50-100 3 6 9 
>25-50 - 1 1 >100-250 4 3 7 
>50-100 - 4 4 >250-500 1 6 7 
>100 8 14 22 >500 3 4 7 
Total 11 22 33 Total 11 22 33 
Kendall's tau-b: -0.027, DFA Kendall's tau-b: -0.087, DFA 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.43 8 p-value for a one-sided = 0.281 
SALES referred to the total sales, ASSETS reterred to Me total assets, uu Oenotes owner-contronea urms ana mk- 
denotes managers controlled fin-ns. 
Kendall's tau-b was used to test the association between the inventory policy 
choices of sample firms included in the database and their sizes (see Table 7-10, panel 
A and panel B). The results presented in panels Al and BI of Table 7-10 indicate that 
there is no statistically significant association between the SIZE variables (SALES and 
ASSETS) of firms and their inventory valuation policies (the one sided p-values at 
0.254 and 0.637 are greater than 0.05); do not provide support for H3b. 
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Table 7-10 Association between Inventory policy and Size for the database 
Panel Al: SALES (All firms) Panel BE ASSET S (All flrms ) 
_Million 
L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<10 1 1 2 <50 1 - 1 >10-25 2 - 2 50-100 6 1 7 
>25-50 3 - 3 >100-250 19 4 23 
>50-100 14 4 18 >250-500 14 3 17 
>100-250 17 8 25 >500-1000 15 6 21 
>250-500 16 2 18 >1000-2500 9 4 13 
>500-1000 13 2 15 >2500-5000 7 - 7 >1000 7 2 9 >5000 6 1 7 
Total 73 19 92 Total 77 19 96 
Kendall's tau-b: -0.060, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: 0.029, DF: 7 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.254 p-value for a one-sided = 0.637 
Panel AH: SALES (0Q Panel BU: ASSETS (0Q 
Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<10 1 1 2 <50 - - 
>10-25 - - 50-100 2 
>25-50 - - - >100-250 7 2 9 
>50-100 8 2 10 >250-500 5 1 6 
>100-250 6 - 6 >500-1000 8 8 
>250-500 3 3 >1000-2500 2 1 3 
>500-1000 2 1 3 >2500-5000 1 - I 
>1000 4 1 5 >5000 1 1 2 
Total 24 5 29 Total 26 5 31 
Kendall's tau-b: -0.086, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: 0.054, DF: 7 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.335 p-value for a one-sided =0.617 
Panel AIH: SALES (MC) Panel BH1: ASSE TS (MC) 
Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total Million L. E. NO FIFO FIFO Total 
<10 - - <50 1 1 
>10-25 2 2 50-100 4 1 5 
>25-50 3 - 3 >100-250 12 2 14 
>50-100 6 2 8 >250-500 9 2 11 
>100-250 11 8 19 >500- 1000 7 6 13 
>250-500 13 2 15 >1000-2500 7 3 10 
>500-1000 11 1 12 >2500-5000 6 - 6 
>1000 3 1 4 >5000 5 - 5 
Total 49 14 63 Total 51 1 14 65 
Kendall's tau-b: -0.096, DF: 7 Kendall's tau-b: -0.004, DF: 7 
p-value for a one-sided = 0.175 1 p-value for a one-sided =0.481 
SALES referred to the total sales, ASSETS referred to the total assets, OC denotes owner-controlled tirms and MC 
denotes managers controlled firms. 
Moreover, the results presented in panels All and B11 of Table 7-10 do provide 
some but not significant support for H30b that the 
larger the owner-controlled firm, the 
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lesser the likelihood that it will choose the FIFO inventory method. Similarly, results 
presented in panels AIII and BIII of Table 7-10 do provide some but not significant 
support for H3Mbthat the larger the manager-controlled firm, the lesser the likelihood it 
will choose the FIFO inventory method. The results do not permit a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. The observed relationships appear to be in the direction contrary to the 
political cost hypothesis. Thus, no evidence has been found to support the hypothes's 
that a firm's inventory policy is related to its size. This result does not provide support 
for the political visibility hypothesis (H3b5 H30band H3Mb). 
To sum up, the univariate analysis of the responses to the questionnaire survey 
and analysis of the database provide no evidence to support H3 relating to the political 
costs hypothesis (that large firms prefer an income-decreasing accounting option). No 
evidence of that type of relationship has been found"'. 
7.2.4 Control variables and accounting choice policy 
Control variables are only used in the database analysis. The logistic models 
which were developed for the current study use BETA, Cl, CR and PROFIT as control 
variables for the depreciation policy decisions and BETA, Cl, CR, PROFIT and 
TAXRATE as the control variables for the choices of inventory valuation methods (see 
Chapter 5). 
Bivariate correlation statistics were utilized for testing the associations between 
the control variables and the dependent variables. The results are summarized in Table 
7-11 and indicate that there are no statistically significant correlations between any of 
169 One can interpret the present finding that size is positively associated with leverage in a number of 
ways. Large firms may have better access to debt (Marsh, 1982; Baskin, 1989; 
Chang and R-hee, 1990; 
Bennets and Donnelly, 1993; Charitou and Vafeas, 1998; Adedeji, 1998) and are likely to have the funds 
necessary to pursue projects with positive net present values. 
Thus, the large firms may not really face 
significant pressure to adopt income 
decreasing inventory valuation methods. 
205 
the control variables and the depreciation method, as significance levels of the observed 
relationships are higher than the cut-off point of 0.05. 
Table 7-11 Correlation between the control and dependent variables 
Variables BETA Cl CR PROFIT TAXRATE 
Predicted sign 
Depreciation -0.082 
p=0.476 
-0.035 
p=0.740 
-0.080 
p=0.440 
-0.021 
p=0.842 
- 
Inventory -0.242 
p=0.034* 
-0.191 
p=0.068 
0.058 
p=0.573 
-0.024 
p=0.819 
-0.020 
p=0.848_ 
-3igniticant at me level U. U3. BE 1A was computed using the daily returns around December 31,2000 and 
a value weighted market index; it was obtained from the CMA in Cairo, CI was the fixed assets divided by 
total sales, CR was measured by eight-firms concentration ratios for industries (percentage of sales), 
PROFIT was measured as earnings before interest and taxes for the financial year divided by the book 
value of assets and TAXRATE was measured as tax expense divided by net income. 
The results of the tests of association between the control variables and inventory 
valuation methods are also summarized in Table 7-11 and indicate that there is a 
negative and statistically significant correlation between BETA and the use of FIFO 
(p-value = 0.034). The table indicates that the observed associations of the other 
control variables with inventory method are not statistically significant. This study 
adopted no hypotheses concerning the control variables. 
7.2.5 Univariate analysis: concluding remarks 
Taken together, (Table 7-1 to Table 7-11), the results of the univariate analyses 
are summarised in Table 7-12 and indicate that, MP, which is a proxy for management 
incentive plans, is significantly positively associated with management's choice of 
income-increasing methods (depreciation and inventory) consistently across the 
questionnaire survey and the database firms. The univariate results support the 
prediction that managers with bonus plans are more likely to adopt 
income-increasing 
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accounting choices than those without bonus plans (HI a and Hlb). Also, the results 
support the prediction that managers of owner-controlled firms with bonus plans are 
more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting choices than those -without bonus 
plans (HlOa and H 104 While the results support the prediction that managers of 
manager-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose SLD than those 
without such bonus plans (Hlm,, ), they do not support the prediction that managers of 
manager-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose the FIFO 
inventory method (HIMb); however, the p-value of 0.078 for this latter test is not too far 
from the significance level of 0.05 (see panel BIll of Table 7-2). 
LEV, which is a proxy for the existence and tightness of a firm's debt covenants, 
is positively and significantly associated with management's choice of income 
increasing depreciation methods in the database but the association is not significant in 
the questionnaire survey (see panel I of Table 7-3 and panel Al and panel BI of Table 
7-4). The coefficient of the association between LEV and management's choice of 
income increasing inventory method is positive but the association is not statistically 
significant in either the questionnaire survey or the database. The univariate results 
present some sUPport for the hypothesis that the higher the leverage, the greater the 
likelihood that a firm will choose the income increasing depreciation methods (H2,, ). 
On the other hand, the results presented do not support the prediction that the higher the 
leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the income increasing 
inventory valuation method (H2b). Also, the results support the prediction that the 
higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that an owner-controlled firm will choose 
the SLD method (Moa) (across the database but is not significant for the questionnaire 
survey) but the results do not support the prediction that the greater the likelihood that 
an owner-controlled firm will choose the FIFO inventory method (H20b). Overall, the 
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results do not support the hypothesis that the use of income-increasing reporting 
methods is positively associated with leverage in manager-controlled firms (H2m,, and 
H2Mb)- 
Table 7-12 A summary for results of the univariate analysis 
Panel A: Support for Ell (Bonus hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inve tory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p 0.000 P=0.000 p 0.0005 p=0.003 
Null rejected for OC firms Y N Y Y Y P 
p 0.0003 p=0.103 P 0.009 p=0.002 
Null rejected for MC firms a Y N N P P 
p=0.000 p 0.054 p=0.078 
HI supported YI P P P P P 
Panel B: Support for H2 ( Leverage hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N Y N N N P 
p=0.209 P=0.019 p=0.301 p=0.289 
and 0.026 and 0.492 
Null rejected for OC firms N Y N N N P 
P=0.099 P=0.001 p=0.392 p=0.089 
and 0.010 and 0.181 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N N N 
p=0.552 p=0.103 p=0.091 
and 0.076 and 0.240 
H2 supported N IP N N N P 
Panel C: Support for H3 (P fitical costs hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inventory overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N N N N N N 
p=0.973 P=0.989 p=0.983 p=0.254 
and 0.907 and 0.985 and 0.898 and 0.637 
Null rejected for OC firms N N N N N N 
p=0.889 p=0.745 p=0.939 p=0.335 
and 0.830 and 0.881 and 0.959 and 0.617 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N 
N N 
p == 0.930 p=0.438 p=0.175 
and 0.927 and 0.281 and 0.481 
H3 supported N N N 
N N N 
Y means that the null hypotliesis can t)e rejeciea, IN MCanS LMIL UIC IIUII 
HYPUMUNZ-) taIIIIVL LA, I 111-ýCnla 
that the null hypothesis partially can be rejected and p referred to the p-valve. a means that the analysis was not 
possible. 
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SIZE, is used as a proxy for political visibility. Contrary to prediction, the total 
value of sales (SALES) coefficient was positive and significantly associated ýýith 
management's choice of income increasing depreciation method among the database 
firms (at the 5% level) and in the questionnaire survey (at the 10% level). An 
altemative proxy for political costs, the total value of assets (ASSETS), is also 
positively significantly associated with management's choice of income increasing 
depreciation method across the database at 5% level of significance but is not 
significant for the questionnaire survey. The SALES variable is positively and 
significantly associated with management's choice of income increasing inventory 
valuation method for the questionnaire survey but not for the database. However, the 
ASSETS variable is not statistically significantly associated with management's choice 
of income increasing inventory valuation method in either across questionnaire survey 
or the database. Also, the results lend no support for either H30a or H3ma that a 
relationship exists between size of owner and manager-controlled firms and their 
depreciation choice. Similarly, contrary to what has been hypothesised (H30b), the total 
value of sales (ASSETS) is positive and significantly associated with management's 
choice of income increasing inventory method for owner-controlled firms in the survey 
at the 5% level and the total value of assets (SALES) at the 10% level. On the other 
hand, such relationships are not found for owner-controlled firms in the database. Also, 
the results lend no support for H3Mb that there is a relationship between size of 
manager-controlled firms and their inventory valuation methods either across the 
questionnaire survey or the database. 
Overall, the univariate results of the SIZE variable show a significant positive 
relationship with the firm's decision to use 
SLD for the finns included in the database 
which is less significant 
for the survey companies. Only one of the four tests relating to 
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FIFO was statistically significant and that showed a positive rather than negatiN, e 
relationship. The results do not support the hypothesis that managers of larger firms are 
less likely than those of smaller firms to adopt income-increasing accounting choices 
(H3,, and H3b)- 
BETA, which is a control variable and a proxy for systematic risks is negativelly 
associated with management's choice of income increasing inventory valuation method 
at 5% level but is not associated with management's choice of the income increasing t-- 
depreciation method. No other coefficients for the control variables appear to be 
significantly associated with firms' depreciation policy decisions or choices of 
inventory valuation methods. 
In summary, the univariate analyses results provide strong support for the bonus 
plans hypothesis (Hl,,, Hloaý HlMa and Hlb and H10b)- In addition, the results are 
consistent with hypotheses H2, and H20,, concerning the association between leverage 
and depreciation method but not for the hypothesis concerning the association between 
leverage and inventory valuation method (H2b). The univariate analysis provides no 
support for the hypotheses relating to political costs (H3, H3o and H3m). Whereas 
previous studies hypothesized a negative relationship between the firm's size and the 
firm's choice of SLD (e. g., Wang, 1988; Cahan, 1992), the data in the current research 
shows a positive association between the firm's size and its use of that method. 
On the basis of the findings of the univariate statistical analysis, some basic 
conclusions can be arrived at with respect to the research questions being raised in the 
present study. The management incentive plans were significantly related to the 
accounting choices whether this choice related to depreciation or inventory valuation 
methods. Moreover, the level of leverage was significantly related to the 
depreciation 
accounting choices. These observations are 
largely consistent with the findings of 
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earlier studies using univariate analysis. A multivariate analysis provides the possibility 
of more detailed insights suggesting which associations are direct and which indirect. 
The next section provides such an analysis for the survey and the database. 
7.3 Multivariate analysis 
The objective of univariate analyses of individual variables was to examine the 
empirical validity of predictions relating to particular economic motives. Such analyses 
were unable to assess how much of the total variation in management's accounting 
method choice is explained by each of the economic motives considered in the current 
study. Multivariate analysis is able to identify relationships in more detail and to 
suggest which relationships may be direct and which may be indirect. The empirical 
analysis was conducted in a cross-sectional framework using SPSS software for 
multivariate analysis. It aimed to identify the contribution of all of the variables to 
explaining the depreciation and the inventory valuation policy decisions of firms using 
the logistic models (1) and (2) that were described in Chapter 5. Logistic regression 
analysis is appropriate because each of the dependent variables of interest can take one 
of only two values (see Chapter 5). In this study the choice of depreciation policy is 
reduced to use of SLD method or not, and the choice of inventory valuation policy to 
use of FIFO or of some other method. The multivariate analysis provides estimates of 
how much of the variation in accounting method choice might be explained by the 
proxies for management's economic motives. The emphasis in these multivariate 
analyses is on the regressions of each of the accounting method choice variables on 
various groups of proxies. The logistic regression analysis proceeded 
in two stages. 
Throughout the first stage, the incremental tests were conducted to examine the 
contribution of each independent variable 
in explaining the dependent variable using 
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the models developed for the purpose of the study. Throughout the second stage. the 
logistic regression analysis was conducted to indicate the cumulative explanatory 
power of the identified variables. Before starting the logistic regression analysis, it is 
helpful to examine the multicollinearity in the logistic model. The results of the 
analysis for each dependent variable are presented below both for the questionnaire 
survey and for the database firms. 
7.3.1 Multicollinearity in the logistic model 
The strong correlation between SALES and ASSETS (Kendall's tau-b = 0.722 in 
the survey and 0.532 in the database) reveals the possibility that multi-collinearity may 
exist between these explanatory variables. No collinearity diagnostics are available 
a from logistic regression in SPSS. However, since collinearity is solely a function of the 
independent variables, one could use linear regression to determine the extent to which 
collinearity is present (see SAS/STAT User's Guide, p. 1416-1418). Thus, one 
dependent 'Y' variable was supplied and the same independent variables on the 
regression models statement that developed in the logistic model were tested. Ideally, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable should be I (this 
would happen when variables in the model are orthogonal). Values of VIF exceeding 5 
are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity, but in a weaker model, which is often 
the case in logistic regression, values above 2.5 may be a cause for concern (see 
Allison, 1999). Table 7-13 shows that the VIF for SALES and ASSETS variables are 
2.452 and 2.517 respectively for survey finns as well as 2.142 and 2.356 respectively 
for database firms. Thus, the standard error of the coefficient of the ASSETS variable 
for survey is larger than it would have been with in the absence of multicollinearity 
(values above 2.5) as well as the standard error of the coefficient of ASSETS variable 
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for the database is very close to 2.5. Since both SALES and ASSETS variables were 
used as alternative proxies for political costs, one of these two variables can be dropped 
from the analysis. 
Table 7-13 Collinearity statistics 
Su ey Database 
Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
NIP 0.729 1.371 0.851 1.175 
LEV 0.894 1.118 0.611 1.638 
LEVI - - 0.660 1.514 
SALES 0.408 2.452 0.467 2.142 
ASSETS 0.397 2.517 0.424 2.356 
TAXRATE 0.763 1.310 0.478 2.092 
BETA - - 0.630 1.587 
Cl - - 0.637 1.570 
CR - - 0.881 1.135 
PROFIT - - 0.459 2.176 
ioierance =I/ V11F. These results are from an OLS regression of y-variable 
depreciation on all independent and control variables. 
7.3.2. Incremental tests 
To test the hypothesis that all P's =0 versus the alternative that at least one did 
not, one can use an overall chi-squared statistic; on the improvement obtained by fitting 
a model with all the independent variables. To test the hypothesis that each P=0 versus 
the alternative that it does not, one can use an incremental chi-squared statistic; on the 
improvement obtained when the corresponding independent variable is added to the 
model"'. Sequences of logistic regression models were therefore fitted to the survey 
data and to the database data with the dependent variables (a) choice of depreciation 
method and (b) choice of inventory valuation method. 
170 Unfortunately, the improvement achieved by adding a particular variable to the model depends on 
which other variables are already present. 
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7.3. Zl Firmsdecisions regarding depreciation method choices 
Table 7-14 presents the results of the tests to estimate the individual contribution 
of each variable in explaining the variation in the depreciation choice for the sun, ey 
companies (i) for all firms (panel A) and (h) for owner-controlled firms (panel B)"'. 
Firstly, for all firms in the survey (see panel A of Table 7-14), only the variable 
MP significantly contributes to explaining the variation in the depreciation variable. 
The results indicate that the particular variable MP reduces the value of the -2LL to 
68.270 from 94.173, while the level of significance for the improvement from a chi- 
squared distribution with one degree of freedom is 0.000. Moreover, the sign of the 
coefficient for the particular variable MP matches the prediction made in Chapter 5. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis (Hl a) that managers of firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose SLD. None of the other coefficients in Model (1) are 
statistically significant. The p-values for the reported contributions of the other 
variables (LEV and SALES) are well above 0.05. 
Secondly, behaviour similar to that shown in panel A of Table 7-14 can be seen 
in panel B of Table 7-14 that refers to owner-controlled firms in the survey. The results 
indicate that the particular variable MP reduces the value of the -2LL ratio to 62.992 
from 74.920; the level of significance of the observed improvement in -2LL is 0.001. 
The sign of the coefficient for the MP variable is positive as predicted in Chapter 5. 
The result of the MP variable is consistent with the hypothesis (H I o,, ) that managers of 
owner-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose SLD. The p-values 
171 Since all manager-controlled firms in the survey used SLD, the sub-analysis 
for such firms was 
dropped. To split the file the dependent variable has to have more than two non-missing values. 
For 
logistic regression, the dependent value must assume exactly two values on 
the cases being processed. 
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for the observed improvement (block chi-squared) for the other variables (0.149 and 
0.788) are far from the significance level of 0.05. 
Table 7-14 Individual contribution of each variable for the depreciation choices for 
survey 
Panel A: All firms (N = 93) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 94.173 - - 
I Model 0+ MP 3.374 68.270 25.903 1 0.000** 
2 Model I+ LEV 1.252 66.622 1.647 1 0.199 
3 Model 2+ SALES 172 -0.683 66.147 0.475 1 0.491 
Panel B: OC firms (N 60) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df. Sig. 
0 Constant - 74.920 
1 Model 0+ MP 2.555 62.992 11.928 1 0.001* 
2 Model I+ LEV 1.400 60.908 2.084 1 0.149 
3 Model 2+ SALES -0.269 60.835 0.073 1 0.788 
Panel C: MC firms (N = 33) 
The analysis was not possible. Since there are no cases the split file MC was skipped. For 
split file MC, the dependent variable has fewer than two non-missing values. For logistic 
regression, the dependent value must assume exactly two values on the cases being proce sed. 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative and "signiticant at the level U. U I, against 
a one-sided alternative. MP denotes the existence of management bonus plans based on accounting 
figures, OC denotes owner-controlled firms, LEV referred to total debt divided by total assets and 
SALES referred to total sales. 
Table 7-15 presents the results of the tests to estimate the individual contribution 
of each variable"' in explaining the variation in the depreciation choice for the database 
companies (i) for all firms (panel A), (ii) for owner-controlled firms (panel B) and 
Gii) 
for manager-controlled firms (panel 
Firstly, for all firms in the database (see panel A of Table 7-15), the variable MP 
contributes significantly to explaining the variation in the 
depreciation choice variable. 
172 Since the standard error of the coefficient of ASSETS variable 
for survey is larger than it would have 
been with in the absence of multicollinearity 
(see Table 7-13) this variable was dropped from the 
analysis. 
173 For the database companies, information was available on a number of 
further variables that were not 
investigated in the survey. 
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The results indicate that this variable generates the greatest and the most significant 
reduction in the -2LL ratio. The MP variable reduces the value of the -2LL to 43.065 
from 63.255, while the level of significance is 0.000. In addition, the variable LEVI 
contributes significantly to explaining the variation in the depreciation variable. The 
particular variable LEVI reduces the value of the -2LL ratio to 37.981 from 43.065; the 
associated p-value is 0.024. Further, the CR variable contributes significantly to 
explaining the variation in the depreciation variable; this variable generates an 
improvement of 4.949 in the -2LL ratio; with a p-value of 0.026. Moreover, the sign of 
the coefficients for the particular variables MP, LEVI and CR match the predictions 
made in Chapter 5. The result for the MP variable is consistent with the hypothesis 
(Hla) that managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose SLD. 
Moreover, the result of LEVI variable is consistent with the hypothesis (H2a) that the 
higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the SLID method. 
None of the other coefficients in Model (1) are statistically significant. 
Secondly, for owner-controlled firms in the database (see panel B of Table 7-15), 
the results indicate that the PROFIT variable generates the greatest and the most 
significant reduction of 13.556 in the -2LL ratio; the p-value is 0.000. In addition, the 
variables of LEVI 5 CR and 
Cl significantly contribute to explaining the variation in the 
depreciation variable. The particular variable LEVI reduces the value of the -2LL ratio 
to 28.468 from 32.762; p-value is 0.038. Further, variables Cl and CR reduce the value 
of the -2LL ratio to 22.335 from 27.871 and to 13-556 
from 22.335 respectively; with 
p-values 0.019 and 0.003 respectively. The sign of the coefficients for the particular 
variables PROFIT, LEVI, Cl and CR match the predictions made in Chapter 5. The 
result for the LEVI variable is consistent with hypothesis H20a that the 
higher the 
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leverage, the greater the likelihood that an owner-controlled finn will choose the SLD 
method. 
Table 7-15 Individual contribution of each variable for the depreciation choices for 
database 
Panel A: All ifirms (N 96) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 63.255 - - 
I Model 0+ MP 3.316 43.065 20.19 1 0.000** 
2 Model I+ LEVI 1.684 37.981 5.085 1 0.024* 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS 0.316 37.878 0.103 1 0.749 
4 Model 3+ BETA -1.506 36.149 1.729 1 0.188 
5 Model 4+ Cl -1.567 33.866 2.282 1 0.131 
6 Model 5+ CR -1.845 28.917 4.949 1 0.026* 
7 Model 6+ PROFIT -0.731 28.375 0.541 1 0.462 
Panel B: OC firms (N 31) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 34.162 
1 Model 0+ MP 1.075 32.762 1.400 1 0.237 
2 Model I+ LEVI 1.518 28.468 4.294 1 0.038* 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS 0.125 28.453 0.015 1 0.903 
4 Model 3+ BETA -0.845 27.871 0.582 1 0.446 
5 Model 4+ C1 -1.955 22.335 5.536 1 0.019* 
6 Model 5+ CR -1.942 13.556 8.779 1 0.003** 
7 Model 6 +PROFIT -0.017 0 13.556 1 0.000** 
Panel C: MC firms (N 65) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 17.736 - - 
I Model 0+ MP 0.138 5.545 12.191 1 0.000** 
2 Model I+ LEVI 0.778 4.742 0.803 1 0.370 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS 0.621 4.153 0.589 1 0.443 
4 Model 3+ BETA -0.008 0.000 4.153 1 0.042* 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sidea alternative ana --signincant at Lne ivvn v. vi, dgalllbL a VIIC; - 
sided alternative. NW denotes management bonus schemes, OC denotes owner-controlled 
firms and MC denotes 
manager-controlled firms, ASSETS referred to the total assets, LEVI referred to 
long-term debt divided by total 
equity, BETA was computed using the daily returns around December 
31,2000 and a value weighted market 
index; it was obtained from the CMA in Cairo, CI was the fixed assets divided by total sales, 
CR was measured 
by eight-firms concentration ratios for industries (percentage of sales) and 
PROFIT was measured as earnings 
before interest and taxes for the financial year divided by the book value of assets, 
Thirdly, for manager-controlled firms in the database (see panel C of Table 7-15), 
the MP variable generates the greatest and the most significant reduction 
in the -2LL. 
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The particular variable MP reduces the value of the -2LL ratio to 5.545 from 17.7-')6,, 
and the level of significance associated with this change is 0.000. In addition5 the 
BETA variable contributes significantly to explaining the variation in the depreciation 
variable; the p-value for the observed improvement in -2LL is 0.042. The sign of the 
coefficients for the particular variables MP and BETA are in line with those reported in 
Chapter 5. The result for the MP variable is consistent with hypothesis Hl, \la that 
managers of manager-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose SLD. 
The remaining variables, Cl, CR, PROFIT were not included in the list of models 
because their contributions were almost zero. 
7.3.22 Firms'decisions regarding inventory method choices 
Table 7-16 presents the individual contribution of each variable in explaining the 
variation in the inventory choice for the survey companies (i) for the total sample 
(panel A), (ii) for owner-controlled firms (panel B) and (iii) for manager-controlled 
firms (panel Q. A number of points emerge from this analysis. 
Firstly, for all firms that responded to the survey (see panel A of Table 7-16), the 
results reported indicate that only the MP variable significantly improved the modelling 
of the inventory variable. In particular, the MP variable reduces the value of the -2LL 
to 116.932 from 127.102, and this improvement has a level of significance of 0.001. 
The sign of the coefficient for the MP variable matches the prediction made in Chapter 
5. The result for the MP variable is consistent with hypothesis HI b that managers of 
firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose the FIFO inventory method. None of 
the other coefficients in Model (2) significantly improve the prediction of the inventory 
variable. 
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Table 7-16 Individual contribution of each variable for the inventory choices for survey 
Panel A: All firms (N 93) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0. Constant - 127.102 - - 
I. Model 0+ MP 3.077 116.932 10.171 1 0.001** 
2. Model I+ LEV 1.000 115.917 1.015 1 0.314 
3. Model 2+ SALES 0.567 115.597 0.32 1 0.572 
4. Model 3+ TAXRATE 0.499 115.348 0.249 1 0.618 
Panel B: OC firms (N 60) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0. Constant 73.304 
1. Model 0+ MP 2.322 67.758 5.546 1 0.0 19* 
2. Model I+ LEV 0.535 67.471 0.287 1 0.592 
3. Model 2+ SALES 0.61 67.093 0.378 1 0.539 
4. Model 3+ TAXRATE -0.324 66.986 0.107 1 0.744 
Panel C: MC firms (N = 33) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0. Constant 42.010 
1. Model 0+ MP -0.219 39.431 2.579 1 0.108 
2. Model I+ LEV 1.403 37.179 2.252 1 0.133 
3. Model 2+ SALES 1.333 35.257 1.922 1 0.166 
4. Model 3+ TAXRATE 1.838 31.304 3.953 1 0.047* 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative and "significant at the level U. U I, against a one- 
sided alternative. TAXRATE was measured as tax expense divided by net income. The abbreviations defined 
in table 7-14 continue to apply for the remaining variables. 
Secondly, for owner-controlled finns in the survey (see panel B of Table 7-16), 
the results indicate that only the MP variable generates a significant reduction of the - 
2LL. The value of the improvement in the -2LL is 5.546; the p-value is 0.0 19. The sign 
of the coefficient for the MP variable is positive as predicted in Chapter 5. The result 
for the MP variable is consistent with hypothesis HlOb that, managers of owner- 
controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose the FIFO 
inventory 
method. For owner-controlled firms in the survey, none of the other coefficients in 
Model (2) are statistically significant in explaining the variation 
in the inventory 
choice. Thirdly, for manager-controlled 
firms in the database (see panel C of Table 7- 
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16), only the TAXRATE variable significantly improved the prediction of the 
inventory choice variable. It reduces the value of the -2LL to 31.304 from 35.257. and 
the level of significance associated with this improvement was 0.047. The sign of the 
coefficient for the particular variable TAXRATE does not match the prediction made in 
Chapter 5. None of the other coefficients in Model (2) are statistically significant. 
Table 7-17 presents the individual contribution of each variable in explaining the 
variation in the inventory choice for the database firms (i) for all finns (panel A), (ii) 
for owner-controlled firms (panel B) and (iii) for manager-controlled firms (panel 
An inspection of this table reveals that for all firms in the database (see panel A 
of Table 7-17), the variable MP significantly reduces the value of -2LL to 86.374 from 
93.713, while the level of significance is 0.007. The sign of the coefficient for the MP 
variable is positive which matches the prediction made in Chapter 5. The result for the 
MP variable is consistent with hypothesis HI b that managers of firms with bonus plans 
are more likely to choose the FIFO inventory method. In addition, the BETA variable 
contributes significantly to explaining the variation in the inventory variable; this 
variable generates a significant reduction of the -2LL to 77.732 from 83.419; with a 
value of 0.0 17. The sign of the coefficient for this particular BETA variable is negative 
which matches the prediction made in Chapter 5. None of the other coefficients in 
Model (2) are statistically significant. 
For owner-controlled firms in the database, panel B of Table 7-17 indicates that 
the variables MP, BETA and CR generate significant reductions of the -2LL ratio. The 
MP variable improves the -2LL ratio by 7.531; with a p-value 0.006. The sign of the 
coefficient for this MP variable is positive as predicted 
in Chapter 5. The result for the 
MP variable is consistent with hypothesis HlOb that, managers of owner-controlled 
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firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose the FIFO inventory method. 
Furthermore, the variables of BETA and CR contribute significantly to explaining the 
variation in the inventory variable for owner-controlled fin-ns. 
Table 7-17 Individual contribution of each variable for the inventory choices for database 
Panel A: All firms (N = 96) 
Model B/S. E. -2 LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 93.713 - - - 
-I 
I Model 0+ MP 2.060 86.374 7.339 1 0.007** 
2 Model I+ LEVI 1.508 84.140 2.234 1 0.135 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS -0.830 83.419 0.721 1 0.396 
4 Model 3+ BETA -2.020 77.732 5.687 1 0.017* 
5 Model 4+ CI 0.508 77.491 0.241 1 0.623 
6 Model 5+ CR 0.649 77.074 0.418 1 0.518 
7 Model 6+ PROFIT -0.695 76.585 0.489 1 0.484 
8 Model 7+TAXRATE 0.420 76.411 0.174 1 0.677 
Panel B: OC firms (N 31) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL Improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 26.662 - - 
I Model 0+ MP 2.406 19.131 7.531 1 0.006** 
2 Model I+ LEV 1.075 17.788 1.343 1 0.247 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS -0.264 17.718 0.07 1 0.791 
4 Model 3+ BETA -1.497 9.967 7.751 1 0.005** 
5 Model 4+ CI 0.884 9.356 0.611 1 0.434 
6 Model 5+ CR 0.036 0.000 9.356 1 0.002** 
Panel C: MC firms (N 65) 
Model B/S. E. -2LL improvement df Sig. 
0 Constant - 66.743 - - 
I Model 0+ MP 0.233 64.658 2.085 1 0.149 
2 Model I+ LEVI -1.500 62.282 2.375 1 0.123 
3 Model 2+ ASSETS -0.291 62.197 0.086 1 0.769 
4 Model 3+ BETA -0.525 61.918 0.279 1 0.597 
5 Model 4+ CI 0.145 61.898 0.02 1 0.888 
6 Model 5+ CR 0.033 61.897 0.001 1 0.975 
7 Model 6+ PROFIT -0.920 61.029 0.868 1 0.352 
8 Model 7+TAXRATE 0.958 60.123 0.906 1 0.341 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative and * *signiticant at tne ievei umi, against a one- 
sided alternative. TAXRATE was measured as tax expense 
divided by net income. The abbreviations defined in 
table 7-15 continue to apply for the variables. 
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The BETA variable reduces the value of the -2LL ratio to 9.967 from 17.718- 
value 0.005) while the CR variable improves the -2LL ratio by 9.356; the level of 
significance of the observed improvement (block chi-square) is 0.002. The sign of the 
coefficient for the BETA variable matches the prediction made in Chapter 5. None of 
the other coefficients in Model (2) are statistically significant for owner-controlled 
firms in the database in explaining the variation in the inventory choice. 
Finally, panel C of Table 7-17 reveals that for manager-controlled firms in the 
database, none of the variables significantly improve the modelling of the variation in 
the inventory variable. The p-values for the observed improvement in the -2LL for all 
of the variables presented in panel C of Table 7-17 are well above the significance level 
of 0.05. 
7.3.3. The logistic regression analysis 
Z3.3.1 Logistic regression analysisfor depreciation method choice 
The results of the logistic regression analysis for the firms' depreciation choice 
for the questionnaire survey and database are presented in Tables 7-18 and 7-19. The 
logistic model (1) used to analyse the choice of depreciation method for the survey 
data. It includes 3 explanatory variables (MP, LEV and SALES). MP is an indicator 
variable, taking values 0 or 1, whereas LEV and SALES are categorical variables with 
5 levels"'. To obtain a clearer picture by removing some explanatory variables that are 
either insignificant or highly correlated with others and to identify a model in which 
most of the variables have significant coefficients, a "backward elimination" search 
was conducted. The overall goodness of fit of the model was then assessed using the 
174 The intervals underlying the 5 levels were chosen to represent each variable on an approximately 
logarithmic scale. For that reason, and in order to arrive at a monotonic relationship with the dependent 
variable these categorical variables have 
been used as if they were interval valued explanatory variables. 
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deviance, which is twice the reduction in the log-likelihood compared to the maximal 
model"'. A combined test of the model coefficients was performed using the 
improvement in log-likelihood"'. The ability of the fitted model to explain the choice 
of method from the independent variables was measured by the percentage correctly 
identified by the fitted model"'. The significance of the individual parameter estimates 
for the independent variables was assessed by treating the ratio of parameter estimate to 
its standard error as a standard normal deviate"'. For the regression coefficients, the P- 
value shown is the probability of a standard normal deviate taking a value further than 
the observed ratio in the direction predicted by the alternative hypothesis. This process 
takes account of the predicted sign of the coefficient. Table 7-18 presents the results of 
the logistic regression analysis for the survey firms' depreciation choice (i) for all firms 
(panel A) and (ii) for owner-controlled firms (panel B) 179 . 
When all the firms in the survey are included, (see panel A of Table 7-18) MP 
has a statistically significant part to play in predicting the choice of depreciation policV 
by those firms that responded to the questionnaire (B/S. E. statistic = 3.374 with a p- 
value of 0.0004). None of the other variables have coefficients that are statistically 
significant. The -2LL shows that the model does provide an improved explanation of 
17' The maximal model has as many parameters as observations and hence provides the best possible fit 
to the model. Large values of this statistic indicate a poor fit. 
176 The omnibus test of model coefficients compares the fit of the model in question with that of the first 
model, with a single parameter. Large values of this statistic indicate a significant improvement in fit. 
177 The overall percentage correct compares the observed frequencies with the fitted group frequencies, 
using a cut-off point to assign an observation to a group [0 or 1] depending on its estimated probability 
of group membership. 
178 SPSS provides the Wald statistic, which is the square of the ratio of parameter estimate to its standard 
error. The Wald statistic is not appropriate when the alternative hypothesis is one-sided, as it destroys 
the information on the sign of the parameter estimate. 
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the variability in choice of depreciation method by firms that responded to the 
questionnaire. The combined test of the model coefficients reveals that the 
improvement in fit due to including only one variable in the model is highly significant 
(p-value = 0.000). 
Table 7-18 Logistic regression y-variable depreciation choice for the survey 
Panel A: All firms (N = 93) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
MP 3.562 1.056 3.374 1 0.0004*** 
Constant 0.329 0.309 1.063 01 0.2879 
***Significant at the level 0.001, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 68.270. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 25.903, p-value 0.000. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 79.6. 
Panel B: OC firms (N = 60) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
NIP 2.742 1.073 2.555 1 0.005** 
Constant 1 0.201 1 0.318 1 0.631 0 0.528 
"Significant at the level 0.01, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
62.992. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 11.928, p-value = 0.001. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 68.3. 
Panel C: MC firms (N = 33) 
The analysis was not possible. Since there are no cases the split file MC was skipped. For split file 
MC, the dependent variable has fewer than two non-missing values. For logistic regression, the 
dependent value must assume exactly two values on the cases being processed. - NW denotes management bonus schemes, OC denotes owner-controlled tirms and Mc denotes manager- 
controlled firms. 
Behaviour similar to that shown in panel A of Table 7-18 can be seen in panel B 
of the same Table which refers to owner-controlled firms in the survey. MP has a 
, statistically significant part to play 
in explaining the choice of depreciation policy by 
those firms that responded to the questionnaire (B/S. E. statistic = 2.555 with a p-value 
of 0.005). None of the other variables have coefficients that are statistically significant. 
The -2LL shows that the model 
does provide an improved explanation of the variability 
179 Here, once again, all manager-controlled firms used 
SLD, thus, the sub-analysis for such firms was 
dropped. 
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in choice of depreciation method by firms that responded to the questionnaire and the 
model is highly significant (p-value = 0.001). The overall percentage correct was 68.3 
which is relatively poor. 
Table 7-19 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for the firms' 
depreciation choice for the database firms (i) for all firms (panel A), (ii) for owner- 
controlled firms (panel B) and for manager-controlled firins (panel Q. The logistic 
model used for choice of depreciation method includes 8 explanatory variables (MP, 
LEV5 LEVI, ASSETS, BETA, Cl, CR and PROFIT). A "backward elimination" search 
was also conducted to create the best model. 
For all firms in the database, an analysis of panel A of Table 7-19 indicates that 
four variables (MP, LEVI, C1 and CR) are statistically significant. The signs taken by 
their parameter estimates match the predictions made in Chapter 5. The variable MP 
emerges as the most statistically significant (p-value = 0.00 1). There are three further 
variables (LEVI, C1 and CR) that are statistically significant at the 5% level. None of 
the other variables in model (1) are statistically significant. Although it has fewer 
parameters, the 4-variable model outlined in the table is highly significant (p-value = 
0.000). 
An inspection of the results for the owner-controlled firms in the database (see 
panel B of Table 7-19) highlights that the variables MP, LEV, LEV 1, and CR are 
statistically significant; they provide an adequate explanation of the variability in 
choice of depreciation method by owner-controlled firms that are in the database. The 
signs taken by their parameter estimates match the predictions made in Chapter 5 and 
are significant at the 5% level. The model is highly significant (p-value = 0.001). 
Finally, for manager-controlled firms in the database (see panel C of Table 7-19), 
none of the variables provide a significant contribution to the explanation of 
the 
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variability in choice of depreciation method. But the model is highly significant, of the 
chi-squared is 72.246 with a p-value of 0.000. 
Table 7-19 Logistic regression y-variable depreciation choice for the database 
Panel A: All firms (N = 96) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-va 
MP 5.914 1.867 3.167 1 0.001** 
LEVI 0.055 0.024 2.302 1 0.011* 
C1 -0.333 0.192 -1.735 -1 0.041 * 
CR -4.904 2.676 -1.833 -1 0.033* 
Constant 1.172 0.939 1.248 0 0.2 12 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative and "significant at the level 0.01, 
against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL = 30.865. Omnibus test of model 
coefficients chi-squared = 32.390, p-value = 0.000. Overall percentage correctly predicted group 
membership is 92.4. 
Panel B: OC firms (N = 31) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
MP 4.012 2.428 1.652 1 0.049* 
LEV 0.084 0.048 1.728 1 0.042* 
LEVI 0.040 0.024 1.662 1 0.048* 
CR -7.275 3.916 -1.858 -1 0.032* 
Constant -2.629 2.499 -1.052 0 0.293 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
19.216. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared 18.135, p-value = 0.001. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 90-3. 
Panel C: MC firms (N 65) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
Constant 3.45 0.72 4.803 0 0.000 
Model Goodness of Fit -2LL = 17.863. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 72.246, 
p-value = 0.000. Overall percentage correctly predicted group membership is 96.9. 
The abbreviations defined in table 7-14 continue to apply for the variables. 
Overall, several noteworthy points emerge from comparing the analyses for the 
questionnaire survey and database finns. First, when the results for the variables those 
are available in both questionnaire and database are considered, as expected the 
coefficient of MP is positive and statistically significant both for all firms and for 
owner-controlled firms. Second, an analysis of the results that only are available 
for the 
database variables indicate that LEVI and CR are significant for all firms and for 
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owner-controlled firms but not for manager-controlled firms. In addition. Cl and 
PROFIT are significant for owner-controlled firms. Third, the variable LEV that 
features in both datasets is significant for owner-controlled firms but only in the 
database and not in the survey. Finally, the chosen models provide a better fit for the 
database than for the questionnaire. This could be because the model has more 
variables for the database than survey. 
7.3-3.2 Logistic regression analysis of the choice of inventory method 
Separate logistic regression analyses of the firms' choice of inventory valuation 
method were also carried for the questionnaire survey and the database. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Tables 7-20 and 7-21. For the survey data, the logistic 
model (2) used for choice of inventory valuation method includes the 4 explanatory 
variables (MP, LEV, ASSETS and TAXRATE). A "backward elimination" search was 
conducted to identify the best model. A number of findings emerge. 
Firstly, for all survey firms (see panel A of Table 7-20), the results suggest that 
h MP has a statistically significant part to play in predicting the choice of inventory 
policy by those firms that responded to the questionnaire (B/S. E. statistic is 3.077 with a 
p-value of 0.001). None of the other variables have coefficients that are statistically 
significant. The combined test of the model coefficients reveals that the improvement 
in fit due to including only one variable in the model is highly significant (p-value is 
0.001). The overall percentage correct was 65.6. 
Secondly, similar behaviour to that shown in panel A of Table 7-20 can be seen 
in panel B of Table 7-20 that refers to owner-controlled firms in the survey. Again, \,, IP 
has a statistically significant part to play in predicting the choice of depreciation policN. " 
by those firms that responded to the questionnaire, (the B/S. E. statistic is 2.323 with a 
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p-value of 0.010). None of the other variables have coefficients that are statisticalb- 
significant. The -2LL shows that the model does provide an improved explanation of 
the variability in choice of depreciation method by firms that responded to the 
questionnaire and the model is highly significant (p-value is 0.001). In contrast, for 
manager-controlled firms in the survey (see panel C of Table 7-20), only the variable 
LEV provides a significant contribution to the explanation of the variability in choice 
of inventory method. 
Table 7-20 Logistic regression y-variable Inventory method for the survey 
Panel A: All firms (N = 93) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value, 
MP 1.391 0.452 3.077 1 0.001** 
Constant -1.068 0.350 -3.055 1 01 0.002** 
"Significant at the level 0.01, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
116.932. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 10.171, P-value 0.001. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 65.6. 
Panel B: OC firms (N = 60) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
MP 1.386 0.597 2.323 1 0.010* 
Constant -1.386 0.395 -3.507 0 0.0005** 
"Significant at the level 0.01, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
62.992. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared 11.928, P-value = 0.001. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 68.3. 
Panel C: MC firms (N 33) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
MP -12.64 46.96 -0.269 1 0.606 
LEV 1.03 0.54 1.901 1 0.029* 
SALES 0.82 0.42 1.972 -1 0.976 
TAXRATE 0.84 0.46 1.838 -1 0.967 
Constant 4.53 46.94 0.096 0 0.923 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL ý 
31.304. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 10.706, p-value = 0.030. Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 75.8. 
The abbreviations defined in table 7-16 continue to apply for the variables. 
Model (2) also provided the basis of the regression estimations for inventory 
valuation method choices that are surnmarised in Table 7-2 1; this table shows the 
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results of the analysis of the choice of inventory valuation method for the database 
companies (i) for all firms (panel A), (ii) for owner-controlled finns (panel B) and for 
manager-controlled firms (panel Q. A "backward elimination" search was conducted 
to create the best model. 
Panel A of Table 7-21 reveals that, as predicted, the coefficients of MP and LEVI 
are positive and statistically significant (income increasing) with the inventory method 
(the B/S. E. statistics are 2.231 and 2.328 respectively with p-values of 0.002 and 
0.010). Also, the BETA coefficient is negative and statistically significant as predicted 
(the B/S. E. statistic is -2.106 with a p-value of 0.0 18). None of the other coefficients in 
Model (2) are statistically significant for the database. The omnibus test of the model 
coefficients for the database is statistically significant, as the chi-squared statistic was 
15.807 with a p-value of 0.001. The model goodness of fit (-2LL = 69.677) confirms 
that including these terms in the model has achieved a substantial improvement in the 
fit. Furthermore, the predictability rate of the model for the database is quite good at 
84.6%. 
For owner-controlled firms in the database (see panel B of Table 7-2 1), the 
results suggest that MP has a statistically significant part to play in predicting choice of 
inventory policy by owner-controlled finns in the database (the B/S. E. statistic is 2.406 
with a p-value of 0.008). None of the other variables have coefficients that are 
statistically significant. The combined test of the model coefficients reveals that the 
improvement in fit due to including only one variable in the model is statistically 
significant; the chi-squared is 5.531 with a p-value of 0.006. Again, the predictability 
rate of the model for the database is quite good at 82.8%. 
Finally, the results in panel C of Table 7-21 suggest that only LEV I has a 
statistically significant part to play in predicting the choice of inventory policy býý 
229 
manager-controlled firms in the database (the B/S. E. statistic is 2.198 with a p-value 
0.014). None of the other variables have coefficients that are statistically significant. 
The omnibus test of model is statistically significant, as the chi-squared of 7.826 has a 
p-value of 0.020. 
Table 7-21 Logistic regression y-variable inventory for the database firms 
Panel A: All firms (N = 96) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. S, i gn p-value 
NIP 2.477 1.110 2.231 1 0.013* 
LEVI 0.017 0.007 2.328 1 0.010* 
BETA -0.923 0.438 -2.106 -1 0.018* 
Constant -2.789 1.150 -2.424 0 0.015* 
*Significant at the level 0.05, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
= 77.907. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 15.807, P-value = 0.00 1 
Overall percentage correctly predicted group membership is 84.6. 
Panel B: OC firms (N = 31) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
MP 2.996 1.245 2.406 1 0.008** 
Constant 1 -2.996 1 1.025 1 -2.924 01 0.003** 
"Significant at the level 0.01, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
= 19.13 1. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 5.53 1, P-value = 0.006 Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 82.8. 
Panel C: MC firms (N = 65) 
B S. E. B/S. E Exp. Sign p-value 
LEVI 0.021 0.010 2.198 1 0.014* 
LEV -0.038 0.019 -2.039 1 0.979 
Constant 0.394 1 0.980 1 0.402 1 0 0.687 
*Significant at the level 0.0 1, against a one-sided alternative. Model Goodness of Fit -2LL 
= 58.917. Omnibus test of model coefficients chi-squared = 7.826, P-value = 0.020 Overall 
percentage correctly predicted group membership is 8 1.0. 
The abbreviations defined in table 7-15 continue to apply for the variables. 
Interesting points emerge from comparing the analyses of inventory method for 
the questionnaire and database. First, considering the results for the variables that are 
available in both questionnaire and database: as expected MP is positive and 
statistically significant both for all firms and for owner-controlled firms but not for 
manager-controlled firms. In addition, the LEVI coefficient that features only in the 
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database analysis is significant both for all firms and for manager-controlled firms but 
not for owner-controlled firms in the database. LEV as the alternative is significant for 
manager-controlled firms in the survey. Also the BETA coefficient that features only in 
the database analysis is negative and statistically significant as predicted for all firms. 
Second, again the chosen models provide a better fit for the database than for the 
questionnaire. 
A summary for results of the multivariate analysis is presented in Table 7-22. 
Overall, the multivariate analyses of the questionnaire data, presented in Tables 7-18 
and 7-19, partially confirm the findings of the multivariate analyses of the database, 
presented in Tables 7-19 and 7-21. The results in panel A of Tables 7-18 and 7-19 
strongly support the research hypothesis (Hl,, ); that firms that employ bonus plans are 
more likely to opt for the SLD method than those without bonus plans. Moreover, the 
results reported in panel B of Tables 7-18 and 7-19 support the research hypothesis 
(H I oý, ) that the managers of owner-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to 
choose SLD. The findings in panel A of Table 7-19 (but not those in Table 7-18) 
provide significant evidence in support of the research hypothesis (H2a); that the higher 
the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the SLD method. 
Similarly, The findings in panel B of Table 7-19 (but not those in Table 7-18) provide 
significant evidence in support of the research hypothesis (H2o,, ); that the higher the 
leverage, the greater the likelihood that an owner-controlled finn will choose the SLD 
method. 
The results in panel A of Table 7-21 (but not those in Table 7-20) support the 
research hypothesis (Hlb); that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a 
firm will choose the FIFO inventory method. The findings in panel A of Tables 7-21 
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(but not those in Table 7-20) provide significant evidence in support of the research 
hypothesis (H2b); that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a finn will 
choose the FIFO inventory method. Similarly, the research hypothesis (MMO, that the 
higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a manager-controlled firm will 
choose the FIFO inventory method, enjoys adequate support from the results for LEVI 
in panel C of Table 7-21 and from Table 7-20"'. 
Table 7-22 A summary for results of the multivariate analysis 
Panel A: Support for H1 (Bonus hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inve tory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms Y 
p 0.0004 
Y 
p=0.001 
Y 
p=0.001 
Y 
= 0.013 
Y Y 
Null rejected for OC firms Y 
p 0.005 
Y 
p=0.049 
Y 
= 0.010 
Y 
p=0.008 
Y Y 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N N N 
HI supported 
IY 
p p p p p 
Panel B: Support for H2 verage hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inve tory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N Y 
p 0.011 
N Y 
P=ý .10 
N Y 
Null rejected for OC firms N Y 
p 0.042 
and 0.048 
N N N p 
Null rejected for MC firms N N Y 
. 
Y 
p=0.0 4 
p p 
H2 supported N p pI P p p 
Panel C: Support for H3 (Political costs hypothesis) 
Depreciation Inve tory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for OC firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for MC firms N N N N N N 
H3 supported N N N N N N 
Y means that the null hypothesis can be rejected, N means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, F 
means that the null hypothesis partially can be rejected and p referred to the p-valve. a means that the 
analysis was not possible. 
180 A summary of the multivariate regressions: listing only the significant variables is presented in 
Appendix 7-1. 
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7.4 Discussion of the results 
Overall support for hypothesis HI including the results of the univariate and 
multivariate analyses is presented in Table 7-23. The table indicate that the existence of 
management bonus schemes appears to be significantly associated with a firm's choices 
of methods of depreciation and inventory valuation (HI. and HI b). Also, the 
hypotheses HI oa and HI ob those related to the association between the existence of 
management bonus plans and a firm's choices of methods of depreciation and 
inventory valuation in owner-controlled firms appear to be significantly. However, both 
I 
hypotheses HIMa and HIMb those related to the association between the existence of 
management bonus and a firm's choices of methods of depreciation and inventory 
valuation in manager-controlled are not supported. 
Table 7-23 Support for H1 
Panel A: Univariate results 
Depreciation Inve ry Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Null rejected for OC firms Y N Y Y Y P 
Null rejected for MC firms a Y N N N P 
HI supported Y P P P P P 
Panel B: Multivariate results 
Dep iation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Null rejected for OC firms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N N N 
HI supported Y P P P P P 
Panel A: Summary 
Dep iation Inve ry Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Null rejected for OC firms Y P Y Y Y P 
Null rejected for MC firms a P N N N P 
HI supported YI P P P P P 
Y means that the null hypothesis can be rejected, N means that Me null hypotnesis cannot t)e rejectea ana 
P means that the null hypothesis partially can be rejected. a means that the analysis was not possible. 
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Overall support for hypothesis H2 including the results of the univariate and 
multivariate analyses is presented in Table 7-24. Considering the firms' leverage 
characteristics, the debt-to-equity variable (LEVI) is significantly related to the 
depreciation method at level of 0.05 in both of the univariate and multivariate analysis 
for all firms and owner-controlled firms but not for manager-controlled firms (see 
Table 7-4, panel B and Table 7-19). LEV I also is significantly related to the inventory 
method at level 0.05 in the multivariate analysis both for all firms and for manager- 
controlled but not significant related in the univariate analysis, (see Table 7-6. panel B 
and Table 7-21). 
Table 7-24 Support for R2 
Panel A: Univariate results 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N Y N N N P 
Null rejected for OC firms N Y N N N P 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N N N 
H2 supported N P N N N P 
Panel B: Multivariate results 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N Y N Y N Y 
Null rejected for OC firms N Y N N N P 
Null rejected for MC firms N N Y Y P P 
H2 supported N P IPI P P P 
Panel C: Su mary 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N Y N P N P 
Null rejected for OC firms N Y N N N P 
Null rejected for MC firms N N P P P P 
H2 supported N 
- ----- 
P-------. 
LP 
P P P 
Y means that the null hypothesis can be rejected, N means that Me null nypotnesis cannot oe 
rejected and P means that the null hypothesis partially can be rejected. a means that the analysis 
was not possible. 
Moreover, the debt-to-total assets variable (LEV) is statistically slgnificantiN., 
related to the depreciation method in the univariate analysis for all firms and owner- 
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controlled firms but in the multivariate analysis the variable LEV is statistical1v 
significantly for owner-controlled firms only. LEV also is not significantly related to 
the inventory valuation method in the univariate but in multivariate analý'sis LEV is 
statistically significantly for manager-controlled firms only. This result applies in both 
the survey and the database. 
Total sales (SALES) and total assets (ASSETS) were used as altemative proxies 
for political costs. This implies that larger Egyptian companies could be subject to 
more political pressure than the smaller ones. H3 related to political costs and 
hypothesised that larger firms would choose income-decreasing behaviour, despite 
reasons indicated in Chapter 6 that this might not be expected to occur in Egypt. 
Overall support for hypothesis H3 including the results of the univariate and 
multivariate analyses is presented in Table 7-25. Contrary to the hypothesis, the 
univariate results indicated that the sign of the coefficient of SIZE is positive. 
Nevertheless, the multivariate results showed no significant relationship between the 
variables of interest. These results are inconsistent with an expectation that concerns 
about political costs motivate Egyptian managers of large firms to choose accounting 
methods that reduce the reported eamings. The results for Total sales (SALES) and 
total assets (ASSETS) suggest that SIZE variable does not significantly affect 
managers' accounting choices in the Egyptian environment. 
The different rates of tax paid by companies were not found to significantly affect 
their accounting choices. Cash flow effects of such choices may influence decisions but 
have been identified with other characteristics such as management control which may 
directly or indirectly influence choices. This might be due to large tax advantages that 
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are given to companies listed on the exchange in Egypt"' which are unlikely to be 
found in most developed economies. The results above noted that CI and CR variables 
appeared to be significantly related to the choice of depreciation methods. Whereas. 
with the exception of BETA, none of the control variables appeared to be significantly 
related to the choice inventory valuation method in the multivariate analysis. 
Table 7-25 Support for R3 
Panel A: Univariate results 
Depreciation Inve tory Overal I 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for OC firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for MC firms a N N N N N 
H3 supported N N N N N N 
Panel B: Multivariate results 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Surve Database 
Null rejected for All firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for OC firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for MC firms N N N N N N 
H3 supported N N N N N N 
Panel C: Su mary 
Depreciation Inventory Overall 
Survey Database Survey Database Survey Database 
Null rejected for All firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for OC firms N N N N N N 
Null rejected for MC firms N N N N N N 
H3 supported NI Nj NI N N N 
N means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and F means that the null hypothesis partially can be 
rejected. a means that the analysis was not possible. 
In general the multivariate findings partially confirm the univariate findings. 
Overall, the empirical work provides an analysis of depreciation and inventorN, 
valuation methods based on binary logistic regression models. The results suggest that 
the firm's accounting choices are affected by the employment of management bonus 
schemes, and the depreciation and inventory policy choices are affected by its level of 
"' For more details see Business income taxation in Chapter 2. 
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leverage. On the other hand, the SIZE factor does not appear to be significantly 
associated with either the depreciation policy decisions or inventory valuation method 
of the firm (see Table 7-26). Taking an overview of the findings, there is evidence to 
support the relevance of the identified explicit contracting PAT hypotheses to 
accounting in Egypt. On the other hand, there is no empirical support in the data 
collected by the survey and the database for the relevance of the implicit contracting 
political costs hypothesis in Egypt. 
Table 7-26 Overall support for the formulated hypotheses 
HI H2 H3 
Depreciation: 
All firms (H I 
a, H2a and H3 a) 
y p N 
OC firms (H I Oa, H20a and H3 Oa) p p N 
MC firms (H I Ma, H2m,, and H3Ma) p N N 
Inventgryj 
All firms (H I b, H2b and H3b) y p N 
OC firms (H10b, H20b and H30b) y N N 
MC firms (HIMb, H2Mb and H3Mb) p p N 
Overall p p N 
Y means that the null hypothesis can be rejected, N means that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and P means that the null hypothesis partially can be rejected. 
Differences between owner-controlled and manager-controlled companies can be 
observed in the highlighted parts of Table 7-26. Although the bonus hypothesis (HI) is 
only partially supported for the depreciation variable as far as both the owner- 
controlled (Hlo) and manager-controlled (Hlm) subsets are concerned, there are 
differences between the subsets for inventory valuation. Bonus hypothesis (HI b) 
182 IS 
strongly supported in owner-controlled firms (HI Ob) but is only partially supported in 
manager-controlled firms (HI Mb). This observation is likely to be attributable to the 
182 Bonus hypothesis Hlb indicates that managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose 
income increasing inventory valuation method. 
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failure of the statistical analysis to identify significant differences associated with 
inventory valuation, because only 3 of the 33 manager-controlled firms in the survey 
and 4 of the 65 firms in the database did not remunerate managers using bonus 
schemes. 
The debt hypothesis (H2,, )... relating to depreciation is partially supported in 
owner-controlled firms (H2,,,, ) but it is not supported in manager-controlled firms (H2N,, ). 
Such a difference could be attributable to the fact that the survey data revealed that all 
manager-controlled firms used SLD and the database data showed that all but two of 
the 65 managers in manager-controlled firms used SLD, so the results about adopting 
SLD in manager-controlled companies could not be robust. (As there was no adequate 
basis for discrimination by reference to the use of SLD). 
The debt hypothesis (H2b)"' relating to inventory valuation is partially supported 
in manager-controlled firms (H2Mb) but it is not supported in owner- contro I led firms 
(H20b). This could arise because of the fact that the use of FIFO is likely to increase tax 
charges on reported profits. It is possible that executives of manager-controlled 
companies are more prepared to incur higher tax charges to increase reported income 
figures (Mikhail, 1999), whereas such behaviour seems more likely to be resisted by 
equity holders in owner-controlled companies (unless they are given convincing 
reasons) (Cloyd et al., 1996). One should, however, note that taxation related influences 
(if they exist) did not affect the findings for the bonus hypotheses. This difference 
183 Debt hypothesis H2a indicates that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will 
choose income increasing depreciation method. 
184 Debt hypothesis H2b indicates that the higher the leverage, the greater the likelihood that a firm will 
choose income increasing inventory valuation method. 
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might occur if the motivation, to increase reported earnings, from bonus considerations 
was greater than that associated with gearing in owner-controlled firms. 
The political costs hypothesis (113) is not supported by the sample data for anN- of 
the populations considered. However, one could generalise the results for the bonus 
hypothesis (HI) as the provision of material support in all of the three considered 
populations (all firms, owner-controlled firms and manager-controlled). The debt 
hypothesis (H2) received some, but less, overall support. Interestingly, the balance of 
support for the depreciation and inventory valuation hypotheses differed between 
owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms - which might have been the result of 
the different tax treatments of depreciation and inventory. 
In the following chapter, a brief summary of the main findings of this study is 
presented and some areas for fature research are proposed. 
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Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusion, Limitations and 
Implication for Future Research 
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8.1 Summary and conclusions 
The PAT approach developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978; 1986) 
hypothesises that accounting choices are partly influenced by managerial opportunism. 
In particular, PAT researchers hypothesised that to avoid violating debt covenants and 
to increase their own remuneration when it is associated with ýcompany earnings, 
managers will often prefer income-increasing accounting methods. In contrast. it has 
been hypothesised that if there appears to be a likelihood of politically imposed costs 
because of the appearance of high levels of income and wealth managers will choose 
income-decreasing methods. PAT hypotheses have been tested frequently in Western 
industrialised countries, primarily in the U. S. A. Arguably, managers' behaviour is 
influenced by the cultural and institutional environments in which they operate. 
Consequently, it is possible that hypotheses that are well supported in studies of 
developed Western economies are less valid in emerging middle-eastern capitalist 
economies. This study provides evidence concerning the relevance of the established 
main theories of PAT in Egypt, a developing state with a recently re-established capital 
market. 
The Egyptian empirical context of this paper provides a valuable opportunity to 
examine accounting choice in a relatively recently established, and rapidly growing, 
capital market. Egypt provides an interesting environment for the study of PAT 
hypotheses. Until the 1990s it had a largely managed economy with many state-owned 
enterprises. These organisations have progressively been privatised and the Cairo stock 
exchange has been re-established. Nevertheless, a majority of firms quoted on that 
exchange are primarily owned by very few people. Within the economy as a whole, 
there are still significant numbers of relatively large businesses that are similarly 
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closely owned and controlled. Furthennore, the government pursues taxation policies 
intended to encourage the expansion of businesses that potentially provide employment 
to its citizens. These policies produce differing, and often extensive, periods of relief 
from business taxation. Within this context, successful business growth will probably 
be valued - indeed it might even be rewarded by government agencies. Consequently, 
the conventional political costs hypothesis could be quite inappropriate. Indeed, the 
evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggests that this is the case. 
Three main hypotheses were derived from the fundamental hypotheses of the 
PAT and were tested using Egyptian companies. Firstly, it was hypothesised that, 
ceteris paribus, managers of firms that employ management bonus plans are more 
likely to adopt income-increasing methods. Secondly, the debt contracting costs 
hypothesis suggests that managers of firms that are closer to violation of debt covenants 
are more likely to choose to increase earnings in an effort to avoid the costs associated 
with renegotiation of debt or bankruptcy. Because constraints on leverage (debt/equity) 
are often found in debt covenants, this variable was examined in this study. A third 
hypothesis was derived from the conventional political costs hypothesis which suggests 
that managers of larger firms will seek to avoid the costs associated with the increased 
visibility which accompanies high earnings levels. This suggests that managers of large 
firms are less likely to use an accounting change to increase earnings than are managers 
of smaller firms. There are, however, reasons for anticipating that the hypothesis may 
be inappropriate in Egypt. Total assets and total sales were used as proxies for finn's 
size. 
These three hypotheses were examined separately for all firms, owner-controlled 
nd manager-controlled companies. Specifically, where owners monitor managers 
closely, no bonus plan may be employed to motivate executives who in turn may have 
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fewer incentives to adopt increasing accounting choices. In contrast, for manager- 
controlled firms, bonus plans may be widely used to address the agency conflict 
between the goals of the shareholders and the aims of executives. In such 
circumstances, managers may have cogent self-interested reasons for choosing 
accounting alternatives which lead to higher reported earnings. However, in Egypt, 
owner-controlled firms may employ bonus plans if the large owners are not involved in 
the management and they employ professional individuals to represent them and 
manage the firms"'. In such case, the executives of owner-controlled firms may be 
motivated to increase the reported earnings not only to maximise their personal 
benefits, but also to influence their reputation and increase the satisfaction of their 
employers. In addition, the nature and/or level of debt and the importance attached to 
political costs may also vary from manager-controlled to owner-controlled firms. Thus, 
all three hypotheses were examined for the two different owner-type companies. 
The literature indicates that the use of accounting numbers in the contractual 
agreements between the parties who have an interest in the firm (i. e. shareholders, hired 
managers, debtholders and pressure groups) may motivate accounting choices that 
influence the accounting income. The accounting methods most frequently used in the 
literature for testing the PAT hypotheses are depreciation methods, inventory valuation 
methods, investment tax credit treatments and periods of pension amortization (see 
Hagennan and Zmijewski, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; and Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Bowen et al., 2000; Bowen et al., 2002). Investment tax credIts 
operate in the U. S. A. and some Western countries but not in Egypt. Also, pension 
'"Under the Companies Law No. 159 of 1981, individuals or related group shareholders owning 
company or the" 10% or more of the total shares have a privilege to share in the management of the 
can employ individuals to represent them and manage the firm. 
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amortization does not appear in Egyptian income statements because under EAS No-21 
the pension system is subject to a special fund system and the investment of this special 
fund has a separate financial statement. Thus, the current study focused on 
management's inventory valuation and depreciation method choices which can have 
large systematic effects on the assets and expenses reported in firms' financial 
statements (Bowen, et al., 2000). 
Previous research has indicated that accounting-policy choices may be 
determined by some explanatory variables related to the following characteristics of the 
firm: (i) whether a firm employs management bonus schemes or not; (ii) its leverage 
characteristics and (iii) its size as a proxy for the firm's political costs. On the basis of 
this theoretical framework, certain operational hypotheses were developed in this thesis 
(see Chapter 4). Beta, concentration ratio, capital intensity, profits and tax rate were 
adopted as control variables (see chapter 5). 
The empirical study followed most preceding work in using an established 
database of the financial data of firms quoted on the stock market concerned. Given the 
special features applying in Egypt, it also analysed data from an independent 
questionnaire survey. This methodological expansion enabled mutual validation of, and 
challenge to, the findings from each independent source. It also allowed the study to be 
extended to large firms that are not quoted on the stock exchange and to companies that 
are, on average, smaller than the quoted firms. Given the objectives of this study, data 
was collected on firms': depreciation and inventory policies; ownership structure, 
management bonus plans as well as leverage and size characteristics (see Chapter 5). 
Tests of the hypotheses constituted the second stage of the research project. -\ 
statistical analysis of annual reports, for the period 1999-2001, of a sample of firms 
operating in Egypt was conducted in order to test the hypotheses. In addition, factual 
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infonnation collected through the questionnaire survey was used for testing certain 
hypotheses. The statistical analysis included a univariate and multivariate analý'sis for 
both owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. The survey data revealed that all 
manager-controlled firms used SLD - which means that the analysis for such surveý, 
firms has not been possible for depreciation. Nevertheless, the overall analyses for the 
combined samples indicated that management incentive plans are significantly 
associated with income increasing depreciation and inventory valuation methods (H I 
and HI b). Furthermore, there are partial supports for the prediction that executives of 
owner-controlled firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose SLD and/or FIFO 
than those without bonus plans (H I Oa and HI Ob). The findings provide weaker support 
for hypotheses HIm,, and HIMb that executives of manager-controlled firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to adopt income-increasing depreciation-policy and inventory 
valuation decisions, which could be attributable to the observed tendency of such firms 
to adopt similar policies. The findings are mainly consistent with the bonus-hypothesis 
for owner-controlled firms but not manager-controlled firms. The findings also provide 
some support for the debt hypothesis (that the leverage of firms is positively associated 
with income increasing depreciation and inventory valuation policies). The study's 
findings provide some statistically significant support consistent with the expectation 
that managers of firms that are more highly leveraged are more likely to adopt SLD and 
FIFO inventory valuation methods than managers of firms that are less highly 
leveraged (H2,, and H2b). The findings provide also partial support for hypothesis H20a 
that executives of owner-controlled firms which are highly dependant on borrowing are 
more likely to adopt SLD, whereas, lend no support for hypothesis H20bthat executives 
of owner-controlled firms with more highly leveraged level are more likely to adopt 
FIFO; this may be attributable to the different tax status of depreciation and inventorN, 
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costs. On the other hand, there is a partial support for hypothesis H2Mb that executives 
of manager-controlled firms with more highly leveraged level are more likely to adopt 
FIFO, whereas, the fact that almost all manager-controlled firms use SLD means that 
no support could be found for hypothesis H2m,, (that executives of manager-controlled 
firms which are highly dependant on borrowing are more likely to adopt SLD). Overall, 
firms which are highly dependant on borrowing and which are therefore close to 
violating their debt-covenants seem more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting 
options. It can be argued that the findings of the study provide some support for debt 
hypothesis. 
Interestingly, when testing the political costs hypothesis, little difference in the 
behaviour of large and small companies was observed (for all firms as well as owner- 
controlled and manager-controlled firms). There was no significant association between 
the use of income-decreasing procedures and size (see Chapter 7). This may be 
because the large firms face few political costs in Egypt. The magnitude of the firm 
size apparently is not independently important to the decision to adopt certain 
accounting choice. This may attributable to the tax incentives provided for companies 
working in Egypt. The structural characteristics of the Egyptian business environment 
suggest that large firms in Egypt are unlikely to face significant political costs. Indeed, 
they are more likely to enjoy important tax-reducing benefits. It can be concluded that 
the findings of the present study are not consistent with the hypothesis that accounting- 
policy decisions of larger firms operating in Egypt are likely to reduce reported 
accounting income to avoid political costs. 
The findings from the study as a whole (including both uni,,, ariate and 
multivariate analyses) suggests that the existence of management incentive plans are 
significantly related to depreciation policies and inventory valuation methods that 
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increase accounting income. Also, there is some evidence that the leverage 
characteristics of firms are related to choices of depreciation policies and inventor-. ý,,, 
valuation methods. On the other hand, the remaining factors examined in the study do 
not appear to be significantly associated with either the depreciation policy decisions or 
inventory valuation methods of firms in the study. One can therefore conclude that the 
findings of the current study are not inconsistent with the argument that accounting 
policy decisions of firms operating in Egypt can be explained on the basis of the 
economic consequences of theses choices. Overall, the study provides evidence to 
support the relevance of the identified explicit contracting PAT hypotheses to 
accounting in Egypt, but it lends no empirical support for the relevance of the implicit 
political costs contracting theory hypothesis in Egypt. It is perhaps surprising that the 
explicit contracting positive-theory approach which primarily based on the North 
American experience and institutional environment seems to be relevant to Egypt. One 
could reason that managers' motivations will inevitably be conditioned by the 
institutional, cultural, ethical and political environments in which they work. The 
findings of this study suggest that motivations of managers may be influenced by fairly 
common factors on an international basis. In contrast, as might have been anticipated, 
motivations derived from perceptions of political costs seem to be influenced by the 
potential envirom-nents in which firms operate. 
8.2 Limitations of the study 
There are several notable limitations inherent in the interpretation of the results of 
the study. One limitation concerns the questionnaire survey. The response rate seems 
reasonable at 29% but findings are still subject to the data problems always associated 
with that data collection method. The bias that can permeate the responses is a general 
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issue that disturbs all survey methods. Although, using database as another method can 
mitigate the deficiencies of survey-method studies, it cannot be guaranteed that the 
responses have been completely "shielded" against the danger of bias. 
A further limitation is related to size of the sample. The 320 largest firms 
working in the Cairo area, the Alexandria governorate and the Menoufia governorate 
were used as the target sample for questionnaire survey. It is possible that this target 
sample is not representative of the general population of Egyptian businesses. This 
means that the results may apply only to the sample and cannot be generalized to other 
populations. In the case of the database, financial statements of firms being listed in the 
CSE were collected. By checking the publicly available records it was possible to 
determine the firms' depreciation and inventory valuation policies with almost absolute 
confidence. The analysis of the data from the financial statements provided significant 
insights about potential motives underlying firms' depreciation and inventory valuation 
decisions. However, the fact that the analysis of the annual reports was confined to the 
most frequently traded listed firms may mean that the findings from the analysis of the 
database could apply only to that category of firms. Indeed, the observed accounting 
choices could have been influenced by the fact that the firms were traded listed. 
Consequently, the conclusions drawn from the observed relationships in the database 
study should not be extended to non-traded firms. Thus, in line with the middle range 
thinking methodology, the findings advanced in this study relate exclusively to the 
empirical data obtained and analysed. 
Finally, it should be noted that there might be factors/variables that affect 
managers' decision-making that have not been identified in this study. Nevertheless, 
the spec' ic accounting measures that have been used in this study have been used 
extensively in earlier studies of managers' accounting policy choices. 
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8.3 Extensions and future research 
The findings of the present study can provide a basis for further investigations of 
the factors that may influence accounting policy decisions of firms operating in Egypt. 
The present study has provided some evidence that some firm's characteristics such as 
the employment bonus plan and the level of leverage could influence Egyptian fin-ns 
accounting policies. This study could be extended to include additional detailed 
information for ownership (such as the nationality of investors), and more details of 
management bonus plans. 
In addition, future studies could examine whether the incidence of earnings 
management in the Egyptian firms is associated with monitoring by the Board of 
Directors. The role of outside Board members and the audit committee could also be 
explored. Prior researches, mostly in the U. S. A., have suggested that the likelihood of 
managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting both losses 
and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the 
board. Given these suggestions, it would be interesting to examine whether such 
influences appear to exist in Egypt. A further extension could investigate the influence 
of the identified variables on economic decisions that affect cash flows but involve 
management decision, e. g. "revenue investments" such as research and development 
expense, advertising expense and investments in inventory. 
Adding variables that proxy for industry determinants of accounting method 
choices could also offer the opportunity to study the accounting choices of firms in 
more detail. It has been noted that accounting choice varies by industry (Watts, 1992). 
Research in a single country context has shown that there are industry effects on 
accounting practices. Earlier examinations of PAT (e. g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) 
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were criticized for not recognizing industry effects and later studies tried to control for 
industry (e. g., Daley and Vigeland, 1983). The nature of activities within an industnY 
could be a reason for the diversity in both the amount and type of disclosure and 
measurement practices among firms in Egypt. 
A new Egyptian stock market law, issued in August 2002, requires all listed firms 
to disclose full financial statements on a quarterly and semi-annual/annual basis. Firms 
that do not comply will be removed from the exchange. Indeed, from August 2003. the 
CSE will enhance its on-line electronic surveillance system for all listed firms. That 
means that in future a more comprehensive database will be available to researchers. 
In addition, the investigations outlined in this study suggest that there are a 
number of further topics that are specific to Egypt that should merit more detailed 
examination. These examinations could deepen and extend the PAT related findings of 
the current project. They could, inter alia, investigate owner controlled firms in more 
detail. For example, the relationship between ownership structure and the use of bonus 
schemes could be researched using far more different criteria of ownership/control e. g. 
using several levels of ownership between 10% and 51%, (ii) owner managed and 
professionally managed categories of firms and (iii) size of firms by reference to levels 
of capital and tumover. 
Overall, the researcher hopes that this study will provide some contribution 
towards answering fundamental questions of whether, under what circumstances and 
how accounting choice matters. Versions of the model used in this study could be used 
to study accounting policy choices in other developing countries. It remains likely that 
PAT hypotheses that are well supported in the USA may not be appropriate in many w 
other countries so that additional (and in some cases, different) variables may be 
needed to explain accounting policy choices in other economies. 
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Appendix 1-1 A summary of World Bank corporate governance report on codes and 
standards 
_ 
Market and Regulatory Notes 
Market cap 120 billion L. E. (US$32.3) as of 12/31/2000 (35% of GDP) 
Turnover ratio 34% for year 2000 
Number of listed 1076 companies listed, 659 traded. 141 are listed on official table, rest on 
companies unofficial table due to tax exemption on the equivalent of the CBE's 
deposit rate on paid in capital. 
Legal system (origin) Legal system (origin) French legal system with some other continental 
European influences. Islamic law does not shape the financial and 
corporate legal frameworks. Recent amendments to securities legislation 
are inspired by the Anglo- American legal framework. 
Autonomy of capital CMA 7 members' board. Two directors, including chairman appointed by 
markets regulator the President for 3 renewable years. 
Powers of the capital Administrative powers. Under Egyptian constitution, financial and 
markets regulator criminal penalties can only by imposed by a court. 
Stock exchange governance Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange. Quasi governmental body under 
supervision of CMA. 10 members' board; 5 elected by brokers, one 
director represents CMA, one the Central Banks and two the banking 
sector. 
Corporate ownership Concentrated with incidence of pyramid structures, cross holdings and 
structure bank participation. Average free float of traded companies: approx. 201/0- 
25%. 
Shareholders' Rights 
Voting rights Up to 25% of capital stock may be issued as bearer shares. These shares 
cannot vote. Preferred stock enjoys privileges in 3 areas: Profit 
distribution, voting power and liquidation rights. 
Proxy voting Natural person must be shareholder or any juridical person. BOD 
member may not be proxy. 
ownership percent required 5% for ordinary meetings, 10% for extraordinary meetings 
to call shareholder meetings 
Redress against violations/ 5% if AGM decision favours a category of shareholders or 
BOD; or any 
minority oppression individual shareholder who registers his/her objection 
during AGM and 
remedies sues within one year. Companies' organization may also sue on 
behalf of 
shareholders. 
Take-over code To be drafted as integral part of competition 
legislation 
Mandatory tender offer in At 20% for some or all outstanding shares. 
change of control 
Insider trading and self- Not specifically addressed, but provision of capital market 
law 95, article 
dealing prohibition 64 can be used to sanction insider trading. 
Pre-em tive ri ts According to statutes of company 
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Oversight of Management 
Board structure One tier BOD elected by the AGM. Chairman is often also CEO. Primary 
responsibility towards shareholders. Independent directors no concept of 
independent directors is unknown. The company law 159 allows for up to 
2 experts to be appointed. 
Committee practices The BOD may create a sub-committee in charge of day-to-day 
management. No other committee practices. 
External auditors Appointed/removed by AGM. 
Accounting - standards and EASs are close to IASs, except with respect to financial leasing and other 
enforcement minor differences. 
Company officers related The AGM approves remuneration of BOD. 
disclosures j: 
Disclosure of ownership Disclosed in prospectus at time of listing and at AGM, but not to the level 
of ultimate beneficial owner. 
Source: World Bank Corporate Governance Report, issued 2001. The full text of the report is available at 
www. worldbank. org/html/fpd/privatesector/cg/ cg_rosc. htm (4.5.2002). 
AGM denotes annual general meeting and BOD denotes board of directors. 
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Appendix 3-1 Discretionary accruals measurement 
Author (s) Discretionary accruals measurement 
Healy (1985) Non-discretionary accruals estimated by a mean value over a period 
DeAngelo (1986) Discretionary accruals are measure by total accruals. 
Dechow and Sloan Non-discretionary accruals are measured by the mean of the industr-ý 
(1991) sector (the industry model). 
Jones(1991) Non-discretionary accruals are established by providing for the normal 
growth of the firm revenues and assets by normalizing with total assets at 
the beginning 
Dechow, et al., (1995) Models tested: Jones original, Jones modified, Healy, DeAngelo and the 
(Jones modified) 
186 industry model. They conclude that the modified Jones model is the best 
to detect EM. 
Discretionary accruals and earnings management are used synonymously in the 
literature. The discretionary accrual models split total accruals into a discretionary 
component, which serves as a proxy for earnings management, and a non-discretionarý' 
component. The non-discretionary accrual together with operating cash flow is 
assumed to be the non-discretionary component of reported earnings. Consequently, if 
cash flows cannot be manipulated, the only way to manage the profit is to increase or 
decrease the accruals component. 
Accruals, = discretionary accruals, + non - discretionary component, 
Non - discretionary component, = non - 
discretionary accrualst + cash flow, 
Kothari (2001) categorizes at least three streams of research that use the 
discretionary 
accrual models. First, discretionary accrual models are employed 
in tests of hypotheses 
about contracting costs which study management's 
incentives to manipulate accounting 
186 Dechowý et al., (1995) critically examine Jones-model and conclude that 
Jones-model detects 
earnings management with low power and 
has some inherent biases. 
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numbers (i. e., the opportunistic use of accruals) (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; 
Holthausen, 1990). Second, using market efficiency as a maintained hypothesis, maný' 
studies test the efficient contracting and opportunistic hypotheses by correlatinc, 
earnings components with share returns (e. g. Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam. 1996). 
Third, a separate area of research tests market inefficiency by examining accrual 
manipulation with a capital market motivation (e. g., do managers have an incentive to 
manipulate accruals upwards in periods prior to stock issues in order to optimise the 
issue price (see Dechow et al., 1996a). 
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Appendix 5-1 A questionnaire survey 
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41, OXII 1 
Department ofAccountancy and Business Finance 
DUNDEE 
Questionnaire 
An Analysis of the Influence of Economic Factors on 
Accounting Policy Decisions in Egypt. 
All responses will be treated in strictest confidence. 
The identify of respondents will not be disclosed in any publication 
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Please answer the following guestions by filling in the blank st)ace or ticking the 
approp. riate box. 
I- What is your position in your company: -------------------------------------- 
Q2. In which main industry group(s) does your company operate? 
Textile Hotels and tourism 
Food and beverages Electrical appliances 
Steel Wood and paper 
Chemical production IT and communications 
Construction and housing real estate Pharmaceuticals and medical 
Building materials Other (please specify): - -------- 
-------------------------------------- 
Q3. Is your company quoted on the Cairo stock exchange? 
Yes 
If the answer to Q3 is "No" please go to Q5. 
Q4. Approximately, what is the total value of your company in Million of Egyptian pounds at 
current market prices? 
E50 E504100 >iI00-E250 >E2504500 Over f 500 
Q5. Please indicate your company's ownership status. 
Yes No 
A One shareholder or one group (for example a family) owns 10% or 
more of the total share capital 
B A bank or insurance company owns 20% or more of the total share 
capital 
C One group of up to five shareholders (either physical persons or legal 
entities), who are not members of the same family own 10% or more of 
the total share capital 
D Your company is a privatised company and the government still owns 
more than 50% of the total share capital 
E Your company is a privatised company and the goverment still owns 
less than 50% of the total share capital 
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Q6. What was the total value of your company sales in Million of Egyptian pounds during the 
last reported financial year? 
flo E10425 >E25450 >E504100 Over f 100 
Q7. What was the last reported balance sheet value of the total assets of your company in 
Million of Egyptian pounds? 
E50 E504100 >E1004250 >E2504500 Over E500 
Q8. Does your company employ bonus schemes to remunerate members of its board of 
directors? 
Yes No 
If the answer to Q8 is "No" please go to Q12. 
Q9. What is the bonus based on? 
Net income before tax Net income after tax Other (please identify) 
Q 10. Approximately, what the percentage of the bonus to salary of the chief executive officer 
was paid last reported year? 
0-25(%) >25-50 (%) >50 -75 (% Over 100% 
Q 11. Please specify the trend of percentage of bonus to salary within 
last three years? 
Increased substantially 
IGone 
up iý il : 11! 
LStayed theýý! :;; : 1, rile 
]Gone down a little 
ý Gone down a lot 
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Q12. Approximately, what percentage of your firm's total assets in the balance sheet is financed by debt? 
0-20(%) 1 >20-40 (%) 1 >40-60 (%) 1 >60-80 (%) 1 >80- 100 (%) 
Q13. What is the percentage of tax that you would expect your company to pay on net income? 
0% 1-10(%) > 10-20 (%) >20-30 >30-40 >40-50 
Q14. What depreciation method does your company employ? 
Depreciation method 
Class of asset Straight line 
depreciation 
Accelerated 
depreciation 
Other (please specify) 
Buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Vehicles 
Computers and office equipment. 
Furniture 
Intangible asset e. g. patents 
Research and development 
Goodwill 
Other (please specify): 
Q 15. How important are the following for your choice of the depreciation method? 
(Scale: I= Not important at all, 2= Not very important, 3= Neutral, 4= Important, 5 =Very 
important) 
2 3 4 5 
Industry norm. 
Suitability for class of asset. 
Simplicity of calculation. 
Affect on net income. 
Contribution to the net cash flows over time. 
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16. What rate of depreciation does your company use? 
D preciation rate 
Class of asset Lessthan5% 5-10(%) >10-15(%) >15-20(%) Over-200o 
Buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Vehicles 
Computers and office equipment 
Furniture 
Intangible asset e. g. patents 
Research and development 
Goodwill 
Other (please specifý): 
17. How does your company decide on the rate of depreciation? 
Basis 
Class of asset Reference 
to "UAS" 
Industry 
non-n 
Company 
specific 
Other (please specify) 
Buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Vehicles 
Computers and office equipment 
Furniture 
Intangible asset e. g. pýtents 
Research and development 
Goodwill 
Other (please specify): 
Note: UAS represents "Uniform Accounting Systems". 
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18. Has your company changed the method of depreciation within last three years? 
Yes No Do not 
Know 
Buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Vehicles 
Computers and office equipment. 
Furniture 
Intangible asset e. g. patents 
Research and development 
Goodwill 
Other (please specify): 
19. Please specify the trend of depreciation rate within last three years? 
Gone 
up 
Stayed 
the same 
Gone 
down 
Do not 
Know 
Buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Vehicles 
Computers and office equipment. 
Furniture 
Intangible asset e. g. patents 
Research and development 
Goodwill 
Other (please specifý): 
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Q20. What inventory valuation method does your company use? 
Inventory method 
Class FIFO LIFO Weighted 
average 
Other (please specify) 
Raw material 
Work in progress 
Final product 
Other (please specify): 
Q21. How important are the following for your choice of the inventory valuation method? 
(Scale: I= Not important at all, 2= Not very important, 3= Neutral, 4= Important, 5 =Very 
important) 
2 3 5_ 
Industry norm. 
Approximation of the current market price. 
Simplicity of calculation. 
Affect on tax charges 
Affect on net income. 
Q22. Has your company changed the method of inventory valuation within last three years? 
Yes No Do not 
Know 
Raw material. 
Work in progress. 
Final product. 
Other (please specify): 
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Appendix 6-1 Alternative combinations of accounting policies and income strategies 
Classification Sample in the survey Sample in the database 
Combination SLD FIFO of strategies* Frequency % Frequency % 
1 0 0 1 11 11.5 19 20.4 
2 1 0 2 66 68.7 34 36.6 
3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 3 19 19.8 40 4 3.0 
Total 96 100 93 100 
*Strategy I consists of both choices being income-decreasing; strategy 3 is both choices are income- 
increasing 
This table is based on an idea taken from Zmijewski and Hagerman (198 1. table 
1). Given the two policy choices (depreciation and inventory) and two choices for each 
policy (income increasing and income decreasing) there are 22, or 4 combinations that 
firms could follow as shown in Appendix 6-1. 
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Appendix 7-1 A summary of the multivariate regressions: listing of the significant 
variables 
Incremental analysis 
Depreciation choice Inventory valuation choice 
Survey Database Survey Database 
Table 7-14 7-15 7-16 7-17 
All firms NIP MP, LEVI and CR MP NIP and BETA 
OC firms NIP LEVI ý 
Cl, CR and PROFIT NIP NIP, BETA and CR 
MC firms MP and BETA TAXRATE 
Backward elimination logistic regression 
Depreciation choice Inventory valuation choice 
Survey Database Survey Database 
Table 7-18 7-19 7-20 7-21 
All firms MP MP, LEVI 9 CI and 
CR MP MP, LEVI and BETA 
OC firms MP NIP , LEVI, 
LEV and CR Mp Mp 
MC firms LEV LEVI 
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